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Enpirical case study analysis of shop steward
organisation within three specific manufacturing plants in Merseyside has
been conducted with the aim of contributing to an understanding of the
dynamics of steward organisation, activity and consciousness within British
manufacturing industry more generally. This involves not merely a snap-shot
of contemporary developments but an historical overview of the past 20
years that will be of relevance to an understanding of potential future
trends. Methods of data collection include extensive interviews - with shop
stewards, union members, managers and full-time union officials - analysis
of documentary evidence and personal observation. The research is informed
by a Marxist analytical framework, namely that there is a contradiction in
the nature of workplace trade unionism - between conflict and acconinodation
in stewards' relationship to management, between democracy and bureaucracy
in stewards' relationship to rank and file members and between independence
and dependence in stewards' relationship to full-time union officials.
Because the balance struck between these interrelated and overlapping
tendencies varies, depending on the level of workers' confidence, activity
and militancy vis-a-vis management, an evaluation is made of the different
'micro-level' factors which affect the balance of bargaining power in each
workplace and of the way these are located within the much broader 'macro-
level' social, economic and political context of the changing balance of
class forces in society, with a contrast being drawn between the broad
upturn in workers' struggles during the 1970s and the downturn of the
1980g . A central concern is a critique of Eric Batstone's 'strong
bargaining relations' model of pragmatic shop steward organisation, which,
as the case studies illustrate, merely serves to reinforce the limitations
and compromises of workplace trade unionism within capitalist society. The
distinctive potential role of revolutionary socialist organisatlon and
leadership is posed as a vital missing element.
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During the 1980s a consensus developed among many
comentators that the powerful shop steward organisation built up in some
key sectors of British manufacturing industry during the 1960s and 1970s
had been considerably weakened. The hostile economic and political climate
of Conservative rule had sapped shopfloor militancy, eroded stewards' power
and brought dramatic changes in working practices. Some argued that
although shop stewards continued to operate using formal bargaining
procedures they had become increasingly marginal to managerial concerns in
many companies (Chadwick, 1983). Yet not everybody agreed on the nature or
depth of the weakness of shop steward power. A number of contributors,
notably Eric Batstone, maintained that whilst it would be mistaken to
believe stewards had not experienced some reduction in their power and
influence the extent of the decline was often widely exaggerated (1986b).
Both in terms of the formal institutional aspects of workplace trade
unionism and in terms of substantive measures of the power of shop stewards
what was striking was the stability of workplace industrial relations
rather than its transformation during the 1980s. Stewards continued to do
much the same job as before, 'nothing much had changed'.
Of course, there were differences in approach and
emphasis both between each of these two camps and within them, notably over
the most appropriate research method (surveys and/or case studies) and
criteria for measuring shop steward strength (organisation and/or
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substantive indices) as well as over the significance of cyclical trends
and corporate, sectoral, and regional variations (Terry, 1986a).
Nonetheless, contributors from both perspectives (with some exceptions,
including Fairbrother: 198Th, 1988, 1989 and Spencer: 1987, 1989) drew
similar practical conclusions about what constituted the most effective
model of workplace trade unionism within the rapidly changing climate,
ranging from Brown's 'enterprise unionism' (1983) and Batstone's
'sophisticated shop steward organisation' (1986) to Jones and Rose's
'pragmatic trade unionism' (1986). Essentially, they argued shop stewards'
reliance on the actions and approach of yesteryear - with its old fashioned
principles of collective solidarity, strikes and picket lines - was
counter-productive; militant workplace trade unionism as traditionally
conceived had become increasingly outmoded. Instead, they heralded the new
brand of 'moderate' shop steward who was not restricted in the range of
compromises they were prepared to accept in the form of flexible bargaining
over changes in employment and work. The impact of a renewed economic
recession in the early 1990s merely served to reinforce the apparent
potency of such 'new realist' notions.
Unfortunately, many contributors tended to conflate the
empirical evidence uncovered with the model of workplace trade unionism
they themselves theoretically championed - without drawing out the linkages
and disjuncture between the two. Moreover, often the underlying theoretical
assumptions and analytical premises that shaped their interpretation were
only stated implicitly. Whilst providing a mountain of factual data about
what shop stewards actually do - in terms of the conduct of collective
bargaining and stewards' functions, activities and attitudes - most offered
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no adequate conceptualisation of the social dynamics of the shop stewards'
role or general theory of the underlying factors which determine shop
steward behaviour.
In the light of such considerations, my research has
three main complementary objectives. Firstly, to conduct empirical case
study analysis of shop steward organisation within three specific
manufacturing plants in Merseyside with the aim of contributing to an
understanding of the changing state of workplace trade union organisation
in British manufacturing industry more generally, offering not merely a
snap-shop of contemporary developments but an historical overview of the
past 20 years that will be of relevance to understanding potential future
trends. Secondly, to deepen a theoretical and empirical understanding of
the essential features of the dynamic nature of shop steward organisation,
activity and consciousness, exploring the various factors that influence
the balance of bargaining power in the workplace and locating these within
their broader economic, social and political context. Thirdly, to make the
focus of my research a critique of the work of Eric Batstone, a foremost
contributor to the analysis of the role of shop stewards in relation to
workplace leadership and organisation, whose 'Shop Stewards In Action'
(1977) and subsequent studies were widely acclaimed as establishing a new
way of looking at shop steward organisation and behaviour which has
continued to be highly influential in workplace industrial relations
research.
thlike many others, Batstone did explore the social
dynamics of the stewards' role (1977, 1978). He rejected the traditional
structural emphasis in favour of a more interactive and processual approach
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which concentrated on the nature of goals pursued, the patterns of action
and interaction which developed and the meaning and values attached to such
processes. Moreover, he attempted to make explict a theoretical vantage
point of analysis, namely that of right-wing Labourism, an unequivocal
reformist workplace trade unionism. It will be my contention that despite
useful, although partial, insights his analytical approach and political
assumptions contained considerable flaws. In essence, my aim is to put
Batstone's notion of 'sophisticated' shop steward organisation to the test
of empirical research through the prism of an alternative Marxist
analytical framework, whilst evaluating the strengths and weaknesses of
alternative militant shop stewards' strategies. Focussing attention on
Batstone's model of 'moderate' workplace trade unionism can be justified
not merely because of the pivotal contribution his analysis has made to the
study of shop stewards, but because it also helps illuminate some of the
limits and potential of his more 'radical' critics including Richard Hyman,
lIuw Beynon, Michael Terry, Peter Fairbrother and Bruce Spencer. Moreover,
it provides an extremely useful basis from which to explore the dilerwnas of
workplace trade unionism within a capitalist political economy, the
dialectical relationship between shopfloor organisation, activity and
consciousness, and the distinctive role an alternative socialist political
leadership can (potentially) play within the workplace.
From the outset it is necessary to state that this thesis
has been written not simply within the general framework of a revolutionary
Marxist approach but also within the overall perspective of the Socialist
Workers Party and is devoted to assisting those engaged in the battle to
advance the struggles of workers against employers. Such partisan motives
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might be regarded as academically somewhat disreputable. No doubt to
consider how shop stewards might build up the strength of workplace union
organisation by challenging the structure of managerial control is to
display an 'irresponsible bias' which ironically is not noticed in
managerially orientated studies (Hyman, 1989c). Notwithstanding such
incongruity, my attempt to link theoretical, methodological and policy
perspectives will, naturally enough, be open to critical scrutiny from
alternative approaches, not only by students of industrial relations but
also by management and trade union front-line practitioners 'in the field'.
The structure of the thesis is as follows: Chapter One
considers the dynamics of shop steward organisation by means of a critique
of the work of Eric Batstone and an outline of my own analytical framework,
background hypothesis and research methodology. Chapters Two, Three and
Four present the results of my empirical case study research into shop
steward organisations' in three Merseyside manufacturing plants. Chapter
Five contains a comparative analysis of recurring themes within the
research material and draws some general lessons in light of Batstone's
competing approach.
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Chapter One: The Dynamics of Shop Steward Organisation
CHAFIER (NE: ThE DYNMffCS OF ¶flP STJJARD ORGANISATION, ACflVIT! AND
flfflODuiJnON
In this Chapter I subject Eric Batstone's social
democratic analysis of the dynamics of shop steward organisation to
critique; outline an alternative Marxist analytical framework from which to
examine stewards' relationship to management, rank and file members and
union officials; provide a general background hypothesis about the various
factors affecting the balance of bargaining power and its affect on the
nature of steward organisation; and indicate the research strategy,
technique and methodology underpinning my empirical case study analysis.
CRITI(JE OF ERIC BATS1E
Batstone's survey evidence provided some justification
for assuming that the basic institutions of shop steward organisation
remained fundamentally intact during the 1980s (1988b). In this respect,
his stress on the continuity rather than change in workplace industrial
relations - with the notion that 'nothing much had changed' - had the merit
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of refuting some of the more pessimistic assessments provided by many other
coninentators. Nonetheless, there appears little doubt the self-confidence
of shop steward organisation has been severely undermined during the last
decade or more. Unfortunately, an adequate evaluation of this contradictory
phenomenon is hampered by Batstone's analytical framework and political set
of assumptions. This is not to imply the procedural and substantive indices
of shop steward power and influence he utilised were worthless. On the
contrary, if we want to talk about the balance of power, either in the
workplace or in society, then we have to use the indicators and measures
that are on hand. Batstone provided some extremely useful, if partial,
insights into the strengths and weaknesses of workplace union organisation.
However, it is necessary to bear in mind all such indices are open to wide-
ranging interpretation depending upon the analytical vantage point of the
observer. Arguably, Batstone's reformist prism of analysis not only
bunkered his assessment of such measures but also provided a
misrepresented analysis of the dynamics of shop steward organisation more
generally.
Despite the multi-faceted nature of Batstone's
contribution to the analysis of workplace trade unionism it is useful to
identify two distinct components which highlight the overarching themes of
his notion of steward 'sophistication', namely the emphasis placed on the
key role played by 'leader' stewards and the 'strong bargaining
relationship' they establish with management. Both of these elements can be
explored in more detail.
Firstly, Batstone (et, al. 1977, 1978) was concerned with
the institutional, organisational and ideological features of the work
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situation which encouraged shop steward leadership and its consequences for
the dynamics of workplace industrial relations. At the heart of his
analysis was the notion of a 'sophisticated' shop steward organisation, a
centralised organisational structure which has the resources to take into
account the interests of union members as a whole, co-ordinating the
activities of sectional groups, and formulating the most cost-effective
strategy in the light of the union's relative power position. The focus of
attention was placed on the relatively small number of 'leader' stewards -
referred to as the 'quasi-elite' - a centralised body of stewards who act
in a 'representative' role on behalf of a fragmented and sectionalist
membership. Such 'leader' stewards have close informal contacts with
management and are able to improve their members' conditions through
pragmatic bargaining, having little need to resort to strike action or
risky confrontations; through their network of relations with members and
the 'mobilisation of bias' 'leader' stewards exercise a decisive degree of
power and influence both within the stewards' body and over a volatile
union membership. They seek to shape a strategic plant-wide perspective
supportive of 'trade union principles' of unity and collectivism. Other,
less centrally positioned, 'populist' stewards were also identified by
Batstone. Possessing tenuous contacts with management 'populist' stewards
lack sophisticated bargaining awareness and are more susceptible to
managerial attempts to gain the advantage; without firm links with their
members they confine themselves to a 'mouthpiece' (populist) role, placing
greater emphasis on the pursuit of sectional interests, and are more likely
to adopt the militant strike tactic to advance the 'frontier of control'.
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Secondly, Batstone focussed on what he termed stewards'
'strong bargaining relations' with management. Whilst acknowledging a basic
conflict of interest between employers and workers Batstone did not believe
this represented a fundamental antagonism; such conflicting goals were
compatible with and dependent upon some form of acconinodation. Not losing
sight of the fact that a rational calculation of advantage in a context of
power relations was always at stake there was an assumption that conflict
could be resolved through compromise and concession within a mature system
of workplace bargaining which both sides would find acceptable and mutually
advantageous. Batstone emphasised how both shop stewards and managers
tended to press for their own competitive advantage in such a way that no
group was completely dominant or able to have their own way on every
occasion. Instead, there was often something approximating a rough balance
of power. 'Strong bargaining relations' involved 'leader' stewards in close
contact with managers, adopting a tough but cautious bargaining approach of
give-and-take, a process of marginal incremental adjustment that maintained
a more or less stable equilibrium within a generally agreed framework of
rules and procedures, both formal and informal.
From such a vantage point, collective bargaining was
valued not only as a means of resolving conflict but as an end in itself.
Shop stewards and their members would lose more by adopting an aggressive
militant approach to management than they could possible achieve through
pragmatic bargaining. A frontal challenge to the existing framework of
power and control would only be possible at disproportionate cost to
themselves. Therefore, Batstone accepted as natural and inevitable that
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stewards should pursue restricted (and hence readily negotiable)
objectives. It was a right-wing Labourist conception of workplace trade
unionism par excellence.
In making a critical assessment of Batstone's conception
of 'sophisticated' shop steward organisation it is necessary to examine
some of the key concepts he utilised, namely 'power', 'strong bargaining
relations', 'interests', 'leadership' and 'bureaucracy'. An initial point
to make is that Batstone was primarily interested in the exercise of power
where it could be readily 'observed', concentrating his focus on decision
making within the shop stewards' body and stewards' bargaining relationship
with management. Whilst this highlighted the uneven distribution of power
and influence that exists within steward organisation it tended to
segregate workplace industrial relations as an arena of analysis from the
broader social context within which it unfolds, thereby providing only a
partial, one-dimensional picture. Thus, Batstone took the existence of shop
stewards 'action' (their ideas, beliefs and goals) as given rather than
attempting to explain their source and origin (at least beyond specific
organisational and institutional factors within the workplace) to the
underlying social 'structure' and relations of production within capitalist
society. He took for granted an existing system of workplace relations
where shop stewards are motivated to act in terms of social norms which
serve to generate their coninitment to rules which do not seriously obstruct
managerial objectives.
Arguably, Batstone takes for granted as given the
substantive inequality of power and rewards that results from the coninand
of the economy by capital and which structures the whole agenda of
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collective bargaining in a manner conducive to employers' interests. Yet it
is clear that the 'frontier of control' in the workplace is necessarily
conditional precisely because it operates within an economic and structural
context which can be expected to persist only so long as an employer is
able to extract an acceptable level of profit from workers' labour. Not
only does control over higher-level policies and decisions set rigorous
limits to workplace controls but the employers and the state are in a
position to use their immense economic and social power to threaten the
very security and survival of shop steward organisation that does not agree
to work by the 'rules of the game'. Playing the rules of the game means not
pressing demands 'too far' or directly challenging the 'rights of capital'
but accepting the compromises of capitalist economic and political logic.
At the same time, stewards' subjective 'meanings' are systematically
influenced by the capitalist class in its interest of maintaining control
over the structure of society through the exploitation of labour.
Thus, it is because shop stewards are faced with these
broader material and ideological pressures - and not just organisational
factors within the workplace - that they are encouraged to enagage in
'strong bargaining relations' with management. Yet this should be
interpreted as an accommodation to external power. Therefore, it becomes
possible to see why Batstone's underlying assumption of convergent and
reconcilable interests between shop stewards and managers obtained through
mutually advantageous trade-offs is flawed. Of course, 'strong bargaining
relations' may achieve some limited concrete gains for sections of workers
but the scope for such give-and-take bargaining is strictly circumscribed
by the structural context of capitalist social relations. It is conditional
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on company and/or capitalist stability in which there is considerable
margin available for employers to make concessions to workers. Yet
competitive pressures and/or economic recession are not necessarily an
opportune context for the orderly accoriinodation of opposing interests.
Indeed, in such conditions, social and economic antagonisms are often
sharpened and the processs of give-and-take can become manifestly zero (or
even negative) sum. (Hyman: 1989a, p87)
A related problem with Batstone's focus on stewards'
bargaining power is that it failed to take adequate account of the way many
of the most important limitations on managerial preogative derive not from
the bargaining skills of shop stewards but from the activity of rank and
file workers themselves. Of course, the power of workplace union
organisation is built through effective steward negotiation but at the end
of the day it comes from what rank and file workers are prepared to do
collectively to set limits to the power of management. Stewards have little
else to fall back on the when the crunch comes. The 'frontier of control'
constantly shifts as the determination not to have their conditions of work
entirely dictated to them constantly expresses itself in workers' struggles
to establish some element of counter-control. In this sense, the power of
workplace union organisation is not the personal property of the
steward(s). It only really comes from the daily shopfloor struggle over pay
and conditions, sometimes led by shop stewards, but often organised
independently of their initiative. Arguably, it is these shopfloor controls
which are the basis upon which real material improvements in workers'
position are achieved. In other words, what determines whether the level of
workers' exploitation is driven up or not is the level of workers'
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resistance and confidence to fight.
Because Batstone conceived conflict between workers and
managers as narrowly bound within workplace institutional forms, he made a
sharp distinction between what he appeared to regard as workers'
'realistic' subjective interests - that arise from their lived experiences
of work - as opposed to so-called unrealistic objective 'radical'
interests, which might challenge the capitalist system (although it is
ironic that whilst acknowledging the material situation and ideological
influence of 'leader' stewards makes workers' subjectively expressed
interests ambivalent Batstone did not clarify his definition of interests.)
Yet this is a false dichotomy that fails to take account of the fact that
both employers and workers are forced to act in certain ways with
contradictory and antagonistic interests, irrespective of what they may
consciously articulate at any point in time. Batstone's overall starting
point of analysis - the specific work situation - is in complete contrast
to Marx's own parameter of the totality of class relations in society.
Thus, Marx's evidence for a 'class in itself', generating conflict and
giving the working class objective interests, can only be understood if the
nature of the inter-capitalist competition external to the workplace is
taken into consideration. In order to remain competitive, employers are
forced to attack workers' living standards, thereby demonstrating that
their interests - profit - fundamentally conflict with workers. Equally,
workers are often driven to take strike action to defend their wages and
conditions precisely because employers refuse to satisfy their basic
aspirations and needs. Batstone did not recognise how irrinediate forms of
workers' struggle and consciousness can actually seek to embody - in
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however fragmentary and partial forms - 'radical' needs which cannot be met
within exploitative relations of production and which as a result can lead
workers to consciously act on those 'objective' interests. In this sense,
workers' activity within capitalism shows the potential for transcending
capitalist production relations (notwithstanding the very real obstacles
involved).
Significantly, Batstone tended to treat 'leadership' as a
generalised property of certain stewards rather than as a pattern of
behaviour all stewards adopt in dealing with particular issues in certain
situations. He identified two distinguishing features of a 'leader' steward
- namely, their 'representative' role in relation to members (as opposed to
populist) and their coninitment to 'trade union principles' of collectivism
(rather than sectionalism) (Batstone et al. 1977. pp23-53). The problem
with such a characterisation is the assumption that 'leadership' is
essentially a one-way relationship between ('leader') shop stewards and
their members. Although he acknowledged the influence of other key figures
on the shopfloor who transmit their concerns upwards (namely, the 'opinion-
leader' and 'griever') Batstone saw the 'leader' steward as pivotal in
amending and squashing issues, and knowing what was 'best' for the members.
But this conception simplifies and underestimates the complexities involved
in what is a dynamic interaction. Of course, day-to-day experience of
shopfloor conflict and bargaining with management can help shop stewards to
develop distinctive insights into workplace industrial relations. Moreover,
steward organisation provides crucial resources and support for stewards to
develop and test their perspectives. Nonetheless, although they retain a
degree of autonomy from the rank and file, stewards are under constant
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pressure not to become too isolated from the practical needs of their
members and in order not to face a challenge to their position they are
often forced to respond to rank and file demands.
In other words, the 'leadership' relationship is a two-
way interaction between the rank and file and shop stewards, between day-
to-day resistance to management and building effective trade union
organisation. It involves stewards both sharing their experience and being
responsive to their ininediate interests whilst simultaneously 'giving a
lead' and transcending their limitations. In fact, internal factional
conflict amongst 'leader' stewards concerns in part, arguments about what
this involves, reflecting differing currents of concern and activity among
the rank and file. On this basis, it would be an oversimplification to term
a shop steward either a 'leader' or a 'populist'; stewards may behave
differently in varying situations and circumstances - depending on the
issue and the work group involved, the strength of rank and file
confidence, management's strategy, the role of union officials, etc - and
simple typologies cannot deal with this. Batstone's distinction between
'leaders' and 'populists' is far too sharply polarised, exaggerating the
difference between the roles. In practice, stewards usually display
characteristics from both poles, although the balance may vary.
Nichols and Beynon's description (1977) of the ChemCo
shop stewards, Alfie and Greg, showed how Batstone's distinction between
'leader' and 'populist' is too overdrawn. Alfie is a shop steward, active
in the union and conuilted to trade union principles. Using Batstone's term
he is a 'leader' steward in that he has 'strong bargaining relations' with
management and a 'representative' role in relation to his members. At the
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same time however, contradicting Batstone's characterisation, he has little
contact with his members over whom he has little influence. Because he is
not willing to conimit himself sufficently militantly to rank and file
grievances his members think he is too soft with management, and withhold
their loyalty because of his inability to achieve satisfactory improvements
in working conditions. By contrast, Greg is a shop steward, not active in
the union, but coninited to 'trade union principles'. Using Batstone's terms
he is more inclined to act as a 'populist' in that he does not have close
links with management and because he takes up and militantly pursues
sectional rank and file grievances . Yet, in contradiction to Batstone's
characterisation, Greg, because of his willingness to represent the rank
and file, has good contacts with his members who provide him with their
loyal support. Moreover, not only is he able to successfully deliver real
improvements but he also attempts to bridge the day-to-day sectional
concerns of his members with a longer-term strategy aimed at building up
strong collective plant-wide union organisation.
Again, Batstone's definition of 'trade union principles'
in terms of generalised subjective value concepts such as 'justice' and
'fairness' cannot be easily related to the specific actions or policies
adopted by shop stewards. The precise manner in which union principles may
be operationalised can vary. By way of example, take the issue of
sectionalism. Batstone's framework assumed that not only were 'trade union
principles' and sectional interests incongruent but that left to themselves
the members tend to pursue only sectional interests; it requires 'leader'
shop stewards to mobilise collective responses and behaviour on the
shopfloor by encouraging sentiments of solidarity.
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Undoubtedly, there is an uncertain relationship between
the ininediate day-to-day grievances of rank and file members and the desire
of shop stewards to provide a long-term strategy to protect the interests
of all workers across the plant. Nonetheless, sectional interests and
collective attitudes are not necessarily incompatible. Often rank and file
members may have ininediate sectional grievances which are potentially
directly relevant to other workers in the plant (and the working class
generally) but which are blocked by shop stewards' narrow organisational
interests of not upsetting stable relations with management. For example,
the victory of a sectional strike to resist changed working practices could
help boost the strength of union organisation in every section of a
factory. However, if stewards utilised so-called 'trade union principles'
(in the way Batstone envisaged) to argue against the sectional walk-out and
to prevent it speading, it could amount to a self-defeating policy of
weakening union organisation generally. Certainly, there is a problem in
terms of what 'trade union principles' actually mean and Batstone's
fleeting recognition of the existence of 'hard-liners' within the quasi-
elite of 'leader' senior stewards (who hold a militant perspective)
illustrates how it is possible to have quite different assessments of the
cost-benefits involved in workplace union activity (Batstone et al. 1977.
p89). Nichols and Beynon's study (1977) provided an example of an
alternative type of shop steward role in the application of 'trade union
principles'. Greg represents the type of steward who recognises both the
strengths and weaknesses of sectional rank and file activity and attempts
to accentuate the positive and downplay the negative. Crucially, this
involves making a conscious effort to build up the level of organisation
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and consciousness of shopfloor workers to fight management, rather than
engaging in backroom compromise deals (even though in the absence of a
wider group of stewards he is not able to get very far). In other words,
'trade union principles' is rather an omnibus category under which a
variety of styles or strategies could be adopted.
Batstone's typology also did not allow for the impact
which management may have through promoting the stewards' role as part of
the formalisation of workplace industrial relations (Wiliman, 1981). Thus,
steward organisations may display quite different policy characteristics
depending on the degree to which they are 'independent' or 'management
sponsored'. Using Batstone's typology one could conceive both types of
steward organisation as having both 'leaders' and 'populists'. Yet
ironically, it would be impossible to distinguish them in terms of the
policies pursued because such a vague definition does not allow it. This
highlights the inherent ambiguity of Batstone's framework. For example, at
the 'ChemCo' plant studied by Beynon and Nichol (1977) there was no
coherent 'quasi elite'. Crucially, it is necessary to take account of the
contrasting traditions of accountability and forms of membership contact
characteristic of different steward organisations, something which
Batstone's framework merely obscures.
Unfortunately, Batstone refused to acknowledge how the
tendencies towards hierarchy, centralisation and bureaucratisation within
steward organisation - particularly among senior stewards - can lead to a
divergence of perspective and interest between stewards and members. He
insisted such features existed prior to the Donovan reforms and were not
noticeably enhanced during the l970s. Yet Batstone's interpretation of
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survey data was based on a set of theoretical assumptions about
'sophisticated' steward 'leadership' which clearly did not see rank and
file members as absolutely central to workplace union organisation.
Instead, he effectively looked at steward organisation through the prism of
the 'quasi-elite' and developed a theory derived from and for the 'quasi-
elite', a 'top down' view of stewards relationship to the members. From
this vantage point, the key to 'sophisticated' union organisation is
'leader' stewards' bargaining expertise and contacts with management. Rank
and file members are viewed as essentially passive agents whom stewards
might occasionally mobilise into activity but merely as a bargaining lever
against management, ensuring any independent initiative is strictly
controlled. Yet arguably, such a view of the relationship between stewards
and members is a recipe for a weak and 'bureaucratised' workplace union
organisation. It can be contrasted with a 'bottom up' attempt by stewards
to not merely act on their members' behalf but to encourage them to act for
themselves. From this vantage point, rank and file self-activity, the
collective participation and involvement of members in decision making, and
their collective mobilisation through struggle against management, is the
key to building strong shop steward organisation. Only when such
contrasting interpretations of workplace union democracy are taken into
consideration is it possible to evaluate the significance of various
measures of steward 'bureaucratisation' such as 100 per cent time-off work,
the contesting of stewards' positions, their tenure of office and so on.
To further illustrate the limitations of Batstone's
notion of 'sophisticated' shop steward organisation it is necessary to
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outline an alternative Marxist analytical framework from which to examine
the dynamics of workplace trade unionism.
ANALYTICAL FRK
Trade unions are profoundly contradictory institutions,
struggling both against capitalism and within it. On the one hand, they are
the means whereby the working class begins to organise and act
independently as a class to combat capitalist exploitation. They mobilise
workers' collective strength and stop the employers riding roughshod over
them. Through their experience of trade union struggle workers can develop
the confidence, organisation and political consciousness necessary to
overthrow capitalism and establish socialism. As Engels [19741 cormiented,
as schools of war the unions are unexcelled. On the other hand, trade
unions operate within the framework of capitalism. They seek not to
overthrow, but to improve workers' position within the existing system and
are concerned with improving the terms on which labour power is exploited,
not with ending that exploitation. As Marx [1970a} commented they deal with
effects, not with the causes of these effects.
The self-limiting nature of trade unionism manifests
itself in three related ways (Cliff and Gluckstein, 1986). Firstly, there
is the problem of sectionalism. Thus, whilst uniting workers into distinct
groups 'trade unions', as the name implies, separate them from workers in
other unions through the different wages, conditions and traditions
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pertaining in different industries. The geography of trade unionism matches
the geography of capitalism. Secondly, there is a separation of economics
and politics. Trade union leaders push the notion that for political change
workers must look to the Labour Party, while the trade unions mainly
confine themselves to the narrow horizon of economic issues, such as wage
and conditions. This false divide is used to prevent workers mobilising
their vast potential industrial strength against the power of the
capitalist class concentrated in the state and reinforces the politics of
reformism - of negotiating piecemeal improvements in workers' conditions
through collective bargaining and parliament rather than fighting for the
revolutionary transformation of society through militant class struggle.
Thirdly, because trade unions limit their horizons to those set by
capitalism, every struggle, however militant, must end up in a compromise
and it is this situation which gives rise to a permanent apparatus of full-
time trade union officials - constituting a distinct social layer
privileged in income, working conditions and lifestyle with interests
different from and contrary to those of rank and file union members - whose
role is to mediate between the working class and the capitalist class.
Bureaucratic and conservative tendencies operate on full-
time union officials not simply because of the 'logic' of their distinctive
collective bargaining 'function' (Roberts, 1976) or as a result of the
pattern of social relations that permeates the practice of trade unionism
(Hyman, 1979) but primarily because of their distinctive material and
social position within capitalist society which places them in a different
world from the bulk of their members. On the one hand, trade union leaders'
role is to negotiate the terms on which workers are exploited. It follows
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they fear the independent action and organisation of the rank and file
because it threatens to undermine their control over the union apparatus
and to disrupt the smooth bargaining relations which they often enjoy with
employers. Because their own privileges are bound up with the strength and
prosperity of the union machine, the official tends to see the organisation
as an end in itself and their concern is always to contain workers'
struggles, within the boundaries of 'normal' collective bargaining. The
union official becomes what C. Wright Mills (1948, p9) termed "a manager of
discontent". The corrinitment to parliament and 'Labourism' reinforces the
pressures to distance themselves from strikes and other militant struggles.
On the other hand, union leaders also have a vital interest in not pushing
collaboration with employers and the state to a point where it makes them
completely impotent. Therefore, they are sometimes compelled to launch
struggles against employers and governments who place severe constraints on
effective union activity and organisation. Moreover, it is important they
deliver at least some improvements in pay and conditions for rank and file
members otherwise it could result, eventually, in internal challenges from
below. This explains why even right-wing union leaders see a role for
strike action, if only as a threat to be used to extract concessions from
the employers rather than a means of destroying the power of the employers.
The matter then is more complicated than a simple 'the
officials always sell-out' analysis suggests. There have been periods when
union officials opposed practically all workers' strikes, as from 1940 to
the mid-1950s, but there have also been periods when they have actually led
a good many official strikes, as from the late l960s until the mid-1970s.
Nor is it the case that the officials want to lose disputes. Invariably
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they want a compromise deal more or less favourable to the workers
concerned without risking a general confrontation with the employers. Nor
are the officials always forced into action by an insurgent rank and file
membership. On occasions, they can attempt to initiate action which some
sections of the members may be less than enthusiastic about. As Kelly
(1988) has pointed out union leaders are often politically and socially
more progressive than many of their members. Moreover, there is
considerable internal differentiation within the ranks of union
officialdom, partly because officials in different industries with
different conditions and traditions find themselves under different
pressures from their members and partly because of the ideological
differences between left and right-wing union leaders. Interesting splits
and tensions can develop in the process. Nonetheless, whether full-time
officials are 'left' or 'right' is less important than the fact that they
acquire a set of interests different from those of the rank and file. It is
the relative strength of the internal and external pressures bearing upon
union officials from employers and the state on the one hand, and rank and
file workers on the other, that explains why they tend to vacillate between
leading struggles, limiting struggles and selling out. Crucially, whilst
shopfloor workers ultimately have a coniiion interest in overthrowing the
capitalist system and establishing collective control over production,
trade union officials - irrespective of any political differences within
their ranks - have a coninon interest in confining workers' struggles within
the framework of capitalist society rather than challenging the very social
order from which trade unions derive their function.
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It is precisely because shop steward organisations' arise
directly from the daily struggles in the workplace and are more responsive
to rank and file members' needs and interests that they are distinguished
from official union structures, with which they are often in conflict. Even
though shop steward organisations are themselves usually sectional and
reformist - they tend to provide a significant counter-weight to the
bureaucratic structures of 'official' trade unionism, representing what
Allan Flanders (1970) termed the "challenge from below". Nonetheless,
workplace trade unionism under capitalism is itself shot through with
contradictions as will become apparent if we consider the dynamics of
stewards' organisation through the three-fold conceptual framework of
stewards' relationship to management, rank and file members and full-time
union officials.
* shop stewards' relationship to managnt
Firstly, the relationship between shop stewards and
management involves a contradiction between tendencies towards conflict and
accommodation. Thus, stewards display the general contradictory tendencies
involved in trade unionism - that of seeking to organise resistance to
capitalism but within the framework of the existing system (Lane, 1974;
Hyrnan, 1975). On the one hand, shop stewards are a manifestation of the
need for the collective defence of rank and file members' interests against
the exploitation which profitable capitalist production requires. They are
the living embodiment of the incompatibility of labour and capital. By co-
ordinating workers' collective strength and at times directing this in
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militant action, shop stewards can win significant improvements in their
members' pay and conditions. Daily disputes over control of the work
process - sometimes marked by very severe conflicts between stewards and
managers - are of crucial importance in the development of strong workplace
trade union organisation. Moreover, such shopfloor struggles, although
often sectional and limited in objectives, contain the potential for a
genuine challenge to capitalism.
On the other hand, the inherent threat posed to the
security of shop steward organisation that does not agree to work by the
'rules of the gane' encourages the development of a stable and compatible
bargaining relationship, in which stewards channel rank and file workers'
grievances into acconinodatory procedures that operate within the boundaries
of managerial authority and exploitative capitalist relations of
production. Similarly, management's provision of a range of facilities to
senior shop stewards - union office, 100 per cent time off work, etc - is
intended to define co-operative relationships that promote stewards'
partial incorporation into management structures, leading them to exercise
a restraining role over members' militancy.
Turner, Clack and Roberts in their detailed study of the
car industry in the rnid-1960s stressed that in becoming established,
stewards had developed:
a dependence on management itself. In a sense the leading
stewards are performing a managerial function, of grievance
settlement, welfare arrangement and human adjustment, and the
steward system's acceptance by management (and thus in turn,
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the facility with which the stewards themselves can satisfy
their members demands and needs) has developed partly because
of the increasing effectiveness - and certainly economy - with
which this role is fulfilled (1967, p214).
The responses of shop stewards to such pressures towards
'responsibility' are often ambivalent. As Richard Hyman has explained:
They were often conscious of the threat involved in such
employer strategies, and at times resisted fiercely. Yet they
were also conscious of a comon interest with employers in
establishing an 'industrial legality', in creating order and
regularity; partly because union security seemed dependent on
some formal accomodation with the power of capital; partly
because they had more faith in employer's goodwill than
membership combativity as a source of improvements in
employment conditions; partly because their own control was
consolidated by the new machinery (1975, p158).
This is the central paradox of the shop stewards'
relationship with management - expressing rank and file members' grievances
but seeking to limit their manifestation to forms over which they can exert
control and which do not jeopardise the overall bargaining arrangements
developed with management. The key task of the shop steward is to mediate
these conflicting pressures between conflict and acconinodation.
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* shop stewards' relationship to rank ar1 file nnbers
Secondly, the relationship between shop stewards and
their rank and file members involves a contradiction between the tendencies
towards democracy and bureaucracy. On the one hand, the institution of the
shop stewards is profoundly democratic. Elected regularly and paid the
average wage of those they represent they are the authentic expression of
rank and file experience and aspirations. Tony Lane has contrasted them
with parliamentary MP's:
The shop steward...did not once elected pack his bags and move
off to carry out his representational duties in an institution
alien to the experience of his constituents. Neither was his
constituency so large that he could remain personally anonymous
to the overwhelming majority of his electors...The steward
spent the bulk of his time at work alongside those who had
elected him...He was highly visible, subject to the same
experiences at work as his comrades, and subject to the same
group pressures (1974, p198).
The shop stewards' regular contact with management, other
stewards and the wider official union, often gives them a breadth of
knowledge and experience not readily available to rank and file members
and invests them with some authority and respect on the shopfloor. But this
does not mean stewards' reconinendations are uncritically accepted. If
stewards are to lead, they must be responsive to the changing needs and
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expectations of members for failure to respond can lead to a challenge to
their position. They may be forced to resign by an 'ad hoc' vote of
constituents or replaced informally, if not by loss of office, by others
who coriiiand wider support. Of course, this democratic accountability does
not mean every steward is subject to the beck and call of every demand
placed upon them. Nonetheless, the power of any shop steward is largely
dependent upon the continuing support of their rank and file members and
the ability to carry them in any course of action.
On the other hand, as with 'official' trade unionism, the
pressures towards bureaucratisation clearly operate at the level of the
workplace itself. The problems of organisation, of specialisation and of
concentration of decision making, create a gap that can separate stewards
from rank and file members. Particularly within larger workplaces, a
distinct hierarchy can emerge with a number of senior shop stewards and
Convenors tending to spend all or most of their time on union business
(Hyrnan, 1979; Terry, 1983a). Sometimes, they can have more day-to--day
contact with management than with the rank and file workers they represent.
Provided with a union office and involved in joint management/union
committees they can become divorced from the shopfloor and encouraged to
think in terms of the interests of the company rather than their
constituents. Moreover, because of their extensive networks of information,
negotiating ability and Influence with management, the senior stewards
'machine' of formal and informal sanctions can be utilised to discipline
and bureaucratically stymie workers' militancy. As the Donovan Conission
argued:
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It is often wide of the mark to describe shop steward's as
'troublemakers'. Trouble is thrust upon them. . .Quite commonly
they are supporters of order exercising a restraining influence
on their members in conditions which promote disorder (1968,
p28).
Thus, the predicament of the shop steward whose
relationship to rank and file members is torn between the pressures towards
democracy and bureaucracy.
* shop stewards' relationship to union officials
Thirdly, the relationship between shop stewards and full-
time union officials involves a contradiction between the tendencies
towards independence and dependence (Boraston, et al. 1975). On the one
hand, there is the autonomous basis of shop steward organisation - stemming
from rank and file workers' irrinediate collective pressure - which is able
to carve out a degree of control over the work process and only rarely
involve the outside official union machine. In large workplaces in
particular, shop stewards usually have the resources at their disposal to
acquire the experience necessary to handle a variety of grievances and
negotiations internally, rather than calling for external assistance.
Eployers, on occasion and in certain circumstances, can seek to encourage
steward autonomy for their own bargaining purposes. Crucially, steward
organisations' can often act as an important counter-balance to the
cautious preoccupations of official union leaders, putting pressure on them
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in negotiations with employers, forcing them to call action and, if
necessary, taking the initiative independently, even in defiance, of
officials
On the other hand, because stewards are the key link
between the union as an organisation and the rank and file membership they
inevitably derive a whole range of services from the external
representatives of the official union apparatus. Steward coiiinittees' rely
on the union machine for legal services, mutual assistance and general
information. They quite often find it very important to try and get
official union recognition for strike action, not only to provide dispute
benefit but also to help win solidarity from other workers, in the form of
respect for picket lines or boycotting of goods. Again, stewards may depend
on union officials for top-level negotiations with company representatives
or government ministers. Moreover, although influenced directly by lay shop
steward representation the structure of the official union can also be very
influential on autonomous shopfloor organisation. Thus, the contradiction
between independence and dependence.
Although shop stewards are by no means irrwnune from the
accoriinodative and bureaucratic pressures diagnosed at the level of official
trade unionism they remain qualitatively different from local and national
full-time union officials in their potential responsiveness to rank and
file pressure. Indeed, the steward has several advantages from the point of
view of working class democracy because, despite their sometimes full-time
status inside the workplace, there are major links cementing them to other
stewards and shopfloor workers.
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Firstly, shop stewards are usually paid the average wage
of the workers they represent at a level determined by the strength of
trade union organisation in the workplace, unlike union officials whose
salary is paid by the union and is usually considerably greater than what
rank and file members obtain. Secondly, shop stewards spend most of their
working day alongside those they represent and are usually subject to
annual election by their constituents. Because on the basis of their
performance they can be removed by the members they provide an instrument
that can be subordinated to the rank and file in a way that no (relatively
remote) union official - operating on a geographical basis, often appointed
rather than elected and usually holding office for five years or more -
ever could be. Thirdly, the shop steward 'machine' is far more rudimentary
than the formal organisation of official trade unionism, providing less of
an institutional basis for sanctions against rank and file members. The
dilema of acting as a 'power over' as against a 'power for' the members is
less radical for shop stewards than is the case at the official level of
trade unionism (Hyman, 1975. p65). Fourthly, shop stewards are liable to be
victimised in any management offensive and lose their jobs if redundancies
are imposed or if the workplace is closed down, again setting them apart
from full-time officials whose position is generally secure. Fifthly, the
distinctive material interests of trade union officials - coninitted to the
pursuit of class compromise with employers and the state - are
fundamentally different from those of shop stewards. Although the function
of the shop steward system is exposed to the same accommodative pressures
it is to a much less significant degree. Officials are often prepared to
compromise more than shop stewards who, because they are much closer to the
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workers they represent, are under much greater direct pressure to force
employers to improve pay and conditions. It follows that the dichotomy
within trade unions between the rank and file (shop stewards and their
members) and a trade union 'bureaucracy' (a stratum of full-time trade
union officials) is a meaningful, albeit simplified, suninary of a real
contradiction.
As we have seen, there is a radical tension in the nature
of shop steward organisation - between conflict and accommodation in
stewards' relationship to management, between democracy and bureaucracy in
stewards' relationship to rank and file members, and between independence
and dependence in stewards' relationships to trade union officials.
However, the different elements are not always of the same weight. This
becomes clear if we bear in mind there is a fallacy in posing the shop
stewards' position in terms of an 'either/or' logic. Each of the polar
opposites must be understood not as a fixed proposition, but constantly in
motion reflecting and at the same time changing the social conditions of
which it is part. The result is a continuum of possible and overlapping
shop steward responses, each dominant to a greater or lesser degree at
particular points of time. In other words, each of the relationships are
extremely dynamic.
Moreover, the three contradictory tendencies and counter-
tendencies have to be understood as being relative and not absolute. If,
for example, shop stewards' accommodation to management was absolutely
missing, workers would seize control of production and take over the
running of the factory. That this does not (normally) happen - and could
never do so (on a sustained basis) within the confines of trade unionism -
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indicates that each tendency has to be measured relative to its counter-
tendency. Again, each of the three contradictory relationships cannot be
viewed as entirely separate phenomena that occur irrespective of
developments in the other. On the contrary, they are mutually
interdependent, with each relationship directly influencing and being
influenced by the other. Finally, it follows that the pressures operating
in one specific workplace cannot be viewed isolated from those operating
within other workplaces generally within society.
Thus, in different contexts, the balance struck between
the contradictory tendencies and counter-tendencies within the shop
stewards' position will vary considerably. Indeed, the history of shop
steward organisation has been a history of the shifting balance between
conflict and acconodation, democracy and bureaucracy, independence and
dependence. In other words, the nature of shop steward and workplace trade
union organisation is not a fixed, static phenomonena. As Antonio Gramsci
wrote:
The trade union is not a predetermined phenomena. It becomes a
determinate institution; it takes on a definite historical form
to the extent that the strength and will of the workers who are
its members impress a policy and propose an aim that define it
[1977, p265].
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BALME OF FORGFS
Arguably, it is the changing balance of forces in society
between capital and labour - above all in the workplace where workers
confront employers - that has a profound and usually determining effect on
the nature of shop steward organisation and its relationship to management,
rank and file members and full-time union officials. This balance depends
upon the pressure on, and confidence of, the capitalist class to make
workers' pay for falling profits' or slump, and the confidence and
willingness of the working class to fight back. Every day in thousands of
shopfloor disputes the wrestling for advantage goes on. Hence, time and
motion and productivity deals, go-slows and overtime bans, strikes and
lock-outs, pickets and anti-union laws and all the other tactics and
strategerns used by the contending classes in the industrial struggle. Of
course, the relationship between the base of society and its
superstructure, between economics and politics, is not one of mechanical
determination or automatic reflection (Harman 1986). On the contrary, the
interaction is complex and there is considerable scope for ideological and
political factors to develop their own rhythm and to react back on the
economic. Nonetheless, it is necessary to acknowledge the primacy of the
material over the ideal, of the base over the superstructure, and of
economics over politics. It follows that whilst the balance of class forces
in society is affected by a variety of factors it is the battle in the
workplace (with all its related economic, ideological and political
components) which is of most significance.
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In some respects, it is not straightforward to talk of
the 'balance of class forces' because on the whole the correlation of
forces is such as to give the capitalist class power over the working
class. Whilst some sections of workers may be stronger in individual parts
of the battlefield overall they are weaker than their opponents. If this
were not the case the rule of the capitalist class would be long past.
Nonetheless, workplace trade union organisation does provide workers with
the collective strength to act as a powerful counteracting power to that of
the employers which, although rarely equivalent, is capable of setting
significant limits to managerial authority through a permanent process of
pressure and mobilisation of sanctions. The most important factor pushing
the balance of class forces in favour of the working class is their self-
activity, organisation and independent initiative through collective
struggle in the workplace.
Significantly, workers' consciousness is profoundly
affected by their sense of confidence in what they can achieve in relation
to the employers. On the one hand, workers who discover their ability to
fight together and win against management can potentially develop all sorts
of ideas based on their new found solidarity. Even small victories can give
workers new confidence and new understanding. Of course, there are very
substantial limitations and dileninas for any translation of the radical
potential of workplace trade unionism into a wider movement - not least the
restraining influence of 'Labourism' - although when there is a real
upsurge in struggle there can be a politicisation of quite wide layers of
workers. The belief that trade union leaders and Labour politicians can
substitute their own efforts for the struggle of the mass of workers can be
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undermined and a minority of workers won to revolutionary socialist ideas.
However, this is not an automatic process. It depends on the general
objective situation in society and material constraints, how effective
reformist leaders are in blocking action, the intervention of socialists in
the workplace and so on. The periodic upsurges of revolutionary
consciousness among millions of workers (Russia 1917, Germany 1919-23,
Spain 1936, Portugal 1975) shows the potential in certain circumstances.
On the other hand, even workers with a traditionally
strong sense of class solidarity can have their whole position undermined,
for example by employers' defeats of key sections of the working class
movement and/or by the impact of mass unemployment. Every defeat of workers
can spread some degree of demoralisation, hopelessness and acquiescence to
the status quo. If workers fail to use their collective power to fight
successfully against management that lack of confidence will be reflected
in their political ideas. In such periods the majority of workers can
forget it was struggle that won their gains in the first place and the idea
holds sway that everything derives from the efforts of union officials and
Labour politicans. Ideas which tell them the rule of capital is inevitable
and that 'uneconomic' factories must close will seem reasonable since it
reflects their real life experience.
The key point being made here is that the nature of
workplace trade unionism and shop steward organisation is deeply affected
by the balance of class forces in society and in particular the fighting
strength and consciousness of the working class in the workplace. A variety
of economic, social and political factors directly affect the balance of
class forces including the state of the economy, employers' strategies,
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government policies, the character and size of the class struggle, the
level of workers' organisation and consciousness, the nature of the
political leadership inside the working class, and a variety of other
social and political developments in society. Of course, the state of shop
steward organisation - its strength, cohesiveness and independent
initiative - is itself also an index of the balance of class forces, which
will have a major influence on the pendulum of advantage between capital
and labour. Nonetheless, the balance of class forces cannot be reduced to
shop steward organisation. It describes something much broader than this
complex sphere of steward organisation which affects its nature, its
strengths and weaknesses. As one element in a equation, the state of shop
steward organisation is both a cause and effect of the balance of class
forces.
However, it is clear there are significant variations in
bargaining leverage and in the terrain of management-shop steward relations
in different workplaces, industries and localities. The 'balance of
bargaining power' can be used to describe the specific pendulum of
advantage between management and workers in any particular workplace,
something which is affected by such 'rmicro-level' factors as the state of
product and labour markets, management strategy and the structure of
collective bargaining arrangements, the nature of the production system and
the relationship of workers to it, workers' collective cohesion, the role
of full-time union officials, the nature of trade union organisation and
shop steward leadership and the influence of political activists. Obviously
there is a continuous and overlapping interrelationship between the balance
of bargaining power in the workplace and the balance of class forces In
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society. Thus, the state of the British economy can have a direct bearing
on product and labour markets in a particular geographical area, which in
turn affects individual plant managements' strategy towards shop steward
organisation and workers' willingness to fight. In other words, in
evaluating the nature of shop steward organisation in any single workplace
it is necessary to give detailed consideration to the peculiar 'micro-
level' factors which affect the balance of bargaining power and to locate
these within its much broader 'macro-level' social, economic and political
context of the changing balance of class forces in Britain. The full
relevance of my analytical framework - namely, stewards' relationship to
management, rank and file members and officials - will become apparent by
considering the general background hypothesis guiding my research.
BAKGRXJND BYYFSIS
It is possible to identify two broad phases of the class
struggle between capital and labour in Britain over the last 20 years,
namely the upturn in workers' struggles during the early 1970s in which the
balance of class forces swung in favour of the working class and the period
of downturn which set in from the mid-1970s and continued throughout the
1980s in which the pendulum swung back in favour of the ruling class
(Cliff, 1979). Certainly, the struggles under the Heath Conservative
government were qualitatively different from those that occured under the
Thatcher administrations. The Labour government's 'Social Contract? that
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came between these two periods - with its spirit of class collaboration
between government, employers and trade unions - was crucial in making the
switch (Coates, 1989). Although the downturn preceded the 1979-82 recession
the very rapid rise in unemployment during that period exacerbated the
situation.
During the late 1960s and early 1970s the high level of
class struggle and victory of some workers inspired others to take action.
Strike followed strike. Strong, independent and self-reliant shop steward
organisation emerged that was relatively combative in its relationship to
employers and the government. The confidence of shopfloor members provided
the steam for the engine of shop steward strength, ensuring a relatively
close and democratic relationship between leaders and led, as stewards
articulated members' grievances and proved highly responsive to the demands
of the rank and file. Moreover, stewards were able to act relatively
independently of full-time union officials, sometimes in defiance of their
wishes. The higher the level of organisation and confidence of the rank and
file in fighting the employers the more able they were to break the
shackles of union officials. Finally, sectionalism - both within sections
of workers and between sections of workers - became less central at least
amongst a minority of stewards, who began to go beyond the boundaries of
the workplace and engage in generalised activity of considerable political
content.
By contrast, during the 1980s, the level of struggle was
very low. The confidence of shop stewards to mount an effective fightback
against the employers and government was very rmich on the defensive, a
process reinforced with every major defeat for workers in struggle.
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Equally, sectionalism tended to predominate with little or no political
generalisation among those in struggle or between those fighting and those
not. The result was an atrophy of shop steward organisation, which in turn,
bad an enormous impact on workers' consciousness. Many workers tended to
accept ideas pumped into their heads by management, such as company
'viability' and 'profitablity', as being the only practical ones. Thus, the
dominance of the ideas of 'new realism' within the trade union movement.
The outcome of all this was firstly, shop stewards became generally much
less confident and combative in their relationship with management; instead
the balance tilted towards a more accommodative relationship.
Secondly, there was an undermining of the close
accountability of shop stewards to their rank and file members, as the
tendencies towards bureaucratisation intensified and stewards became more
inclined to restrain than lead shopfloor militancy. Thirdly, stewards
generally lacked the confidence and ability to take action irrespective of
the influence of full-time union officials, with the pendulum swinging
towards a relative dependence on them. As a result, the officials became
even more of an impediment to victory in workers' struggles.
Nonetheless, there were also important countervailing
pressures and informal workplace sanctions to those acting solely to
incorporate, bureaucratise and weaken shop steward organisation. The
process of change was uneven and important continuities simultaneously co-
existed. Certainly, the basic structure of shop steward organisation has
survived the economic and legal assault of recent years and is still
largely intact. Even if the balance of power has firmly shifted towards the
employers they still feel contraints on their 'right to manage' and shop
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stewards are still able to resist, amend or undermine managerial
initiatives on some occasions and win major concessions and gains on others
(Spencer, 1989; Heaton and Linn 1989). An inuiense variety of cicumstances
advance and constrain workers' activity and class consciousness within
capitalism, but always the seedbed of class conflict is being re-sown and
re-fertilised by everyday experience of exploitation. The accommodation of
labour is anything but a simple and automatic process and the potential for
challenge is endlessly renewed. Certainly, there is no justification for
assuming that the present weaknesses of shop steward organisation will be
either permanent or irreversible. Not only could the balance of class
forces be reversed at some stage in the future but the balance struck
between the general contradictory tendencies within shop stewards'
relationships to management, to rank and file members and to union
officials could also be radically altered.
Therefore, to repeat the central tenet of the backgound
hypothesis guiding this research: the nature of shop steward organisation
is not a fixed or static phenomenon, but largely depends on the ebbs and
flows of the class struggle reflected in the balance of class forces. The
relative strength of the internal and external forces bearing upon shop
stewards shifts and fluctuates. The in-built contradictory nature of
workplace trade unionism gives the process a constantly uneven, dynamic
character. My research attempts to document the specific factors
contributing to the changing nature of shop steward orgarilsation within
three workplaces in Liverpool over the last 20 years, whilst locating these
accounts within a broader analysis of the 'political economy' and balance
of class forces in which they are embedded.
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The hypothesis is important, not so much in itself but,
in so far as it helps focus critical attention on the underlying features
of shop steward orgarLisation arid, in particular, provides a mechanism by
which to examine Batstone's reformist model of tmoderatet workplace trade
union unionism, the dialectical relationship between shopfloor
organisation, activity and consciousness, and the distinctive potential
role of alternative revolutionary socialist political leadership within the
workplace.
ThE RFARH
Finally, it remains to consider the research strategy,
technique and methodology - flowing from the analytical framework and
background hypothesis outlined above - that will underpin my empirical
study into the dynamics of shop steward organisation. A case study approach
has been adopted because I believe a more detailed observation of
particular companies and workplaces is necessary to complement existing
large scale surveys. Surveys provide a wealth of data on shop steward
organisation and are particularly useful for providing material on patterns
of institutional arranagements but they usually confine themselves to
reporting certain easily observable features of industrial relations and
present them by means of averages and distributions. The complex elements
which are such an important component of shopfloor behaviour and
organisation often go unrecorded or unremarked in any detail. The great
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strength of a case study approach is that it has allowed me to concentrate
on specific workplaces and to explore, identify and understand the various
interactive social processes at work, and not least the underlying
substantive outcome as well as the procedural forms. In addition, a case
study approach has enabled a longitudinal account, capturing not merely a
snap-shot of developments but the reel of film, documenting the changes and
continuities within an historical context, revealing how present shop
steward organisation is a product of past activity and relationships that
contains the potential for further change and development.
For the last 20 years the focus of much industrial
relations research has been concentrated on manual workers in private
manufacturing industry and my case studies continue within this tradition.
Despite the recent 'post-industrial' claims of 'post-Fordism' Britain still
remains a major industrial economy with total industrial capacity still
amounting to the sixth largest chunk of global production within the
boundaries of any nation state. Notwithstanding the decline of
manufacturing employment relative to the rest of the British workforce its
social weight is still completely out of proportion to and far outweighs
its numerical size (in terms of its importance to the state of the economy
as a whole and in overall levels of industrial action) and its workers
still wield enormous potential muscle due to their strategic position at
the point of production. Traditionally, shop steward organisation in
manufacturing industry has exercised a major influence on workplace trade
unionism in the newer, less well organised sections of the British working
class movement, among white collar and service sector workers. There is no
reason, short of radical de-industrialisation, to believe this will no
Page 43
Chapter One: The Dynamics of Shop Steward Organisation
longer continue to be the case in the future. Moreover, empirical research
on shop steward organisation within manufacturing industry constitutes an
important benchmark by which to assess the significance of the major
changes in organisational strength that British workplace trade unionism
has experienced in recent years.
Significantly, the Merseyside area highlights in graphic
relief the economic, social and political changes that have been wrought on
the shopfloor of British industry. During the l970s and 80s there was a
dramatic reduction in the numbers employed within manufacturing industry in
the region as n&ierous plants were hit by redundancies and closures,
resulting in very high levels of unemployment. Between 1979-85 a total of
449 factories closed with the loss of some 40,000 manufacturing jobs, one
third of the Merseyside's total (Liverpool City Council, 1984). Compared
with other regions large scale industrial capital arrived late in
Merseyside, but during the l950s and 60s swiftly asserted its hold over
areas of Liverpool and new estates such as Kirkby, Speke and Halewood. With
a regional economy characterised by major concentrations of semi and
unskilled manual workers employed in the plants of national and multi-
national corporations, post-war Merseyside became a model breeding ground
for the 'collective worker'. Ironically, Ford's located its plant in
Merseyside partly because of the region's presumed iirinunity from the
industrial militancy of Dagenham and the West Midlands car industry.
Clearly, history was to confound the expectations of the corporate
investment planners. The impact of a distinctive combination of structural
forces and the underlying influence of the region's historical vunerability
to cyclical fluctuations in the national and world economy interacted with
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the legacies of union organisation in the docks and a number of
manufacturing plants closed during the 1970s to create a relatively
cohesive class based identity and consciousness (Lane, 1987). Hence
Merseyside's reputation in trade union circles as a formidably well
organised place with a notoriously strike-prone workforce (Bean and Stoney,
1986). Therefore, on both issues, the decimation of its manufacturing
industry and the alleged militancy of its workers, Merseyside provides an
intriguing place to conduct research and to contribute to the existing rich
source of analysis of workplace trade unionism in the region carried out by
Beynon (1984), Thompson and Bannon (1985), and Spencer (1989).
Case studies have been conducted into shop steward
organisation within three different Merseyside manufacturing plants, the
Ford car plant in Halewood, the Birds Eye food processing plant in Kirkby
and the Bemrose printing plant in Aintree; all three plants owned by
foreign multi-national companies (namely Ford, Unilever and News
International); with established shop steward organisations and formal
bargaining relationships with management stretching back over 20 years;
experiencing during the l980s massive work reorganisation and large scale
redundancies, and in the case of Birds Eye and Bemrose, plant closure.
Fordts, an extremely large plant (employing 8,000 workers) was chosen for
its self-evident importance; the other two much smaller plants (employing
between 600-900 workers) were more representative of fairly average, medium
sized workplaces. The three companies reflect a range of manufacturing
sectors with varied product markets and contrasting trade unions organised
on site; two factories share a predomiriatly male workforce composition, the
other mainly female. Thus, taken together the case studies provide
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extremely fertile ground for comparative assessment.
Most of my data was gathered from extensive interviews
with a cross-section of representatives from different sections of the
three plants, particularly a number of shop stewards, rank and file union
members and plant managers, but including full-time officials; most had
some ten years' experience and active involvement in plant-based affairs
and were able to draw upon their wealth of knowledge to place specific
issues and general events within their historical context. My reason for
choosing to interview 'activists' was not merely because such people had
relevant personal experience to base their interpretations upon but also
because they were more inclined to be able to understand and articulate
that experience in the light of their practical involvement than would an
arbitrarily selected group of shopfloor workers. However, I also
interviewed a number of rank and file union members who were not active in
formal terms in the stewards' corrinittee or union branch but who
nevertheless had very useful insights to shed upon workplace relations.
Such data was supplemented by detailed analysis of company documents, shop
steward and union branch minute books and newspaper accounts.
Interviews were chosen as the primary method of data
collection because they allowed the multiplicity of standpoints of the
various interest groups to be recreated, allowing for a realistic
reconstruction of a three-dimensional picture of shop steward organisation,
activity and consciousness in each workplace. They also facilitated an
emphasis on the subjective aspects of shopfloor behaviour that complement
more structural accounts. Unfortunately, there exists a long line of
research which views workers as the objects of history and attributes a
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passive role to rank and file trade unionists. Prima-fade this may be
considered mistaken, given the active initiative, often involving bitter
struggle, of the workers who establish a degree of control on the shopfloor
and encroach on mangagerial prerogative in the first place. Interviews help
place the emphasis on shop stewards and rank and file members as the
subjects of history who, are not merely objective products of society but
who, subjectively react back to change it.
Methodologically, I have adopted an explicit view of the
mutually interdependent relationship between myself as a researcher and the
social phenomena I have investigated, interpreting 'the facts' obtained
through a unique personal perspective in which subjective and objective
factors are in constant interplay. As C. Wright. Mills (1966) remarked: "I
have tried to be objective, I do not claim to be detached". Naturally, the
reader is not obliged to share the political assumptions underpinning my
case study research, although they do have the right to demand my study
should not simply be the defence of a political position, but rather an
internally well founded portrayal of the actual underlying social processes
of shop steward organisation.
Leon Trotsky answered objections of a lack of
'impartiality' in his writings on the Russian Revolution which is pertinent
to my own research:
The serious and critical reader will not want a treacherous
impartiality, which offers him a cup of conciliation with a
well-settled poison of reactionary hate at the bottn, but a
scientific conscientiousness, which for its sympathies and
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antipathies - open and disguised - seeks support in an honest
study of the facts, a determination of their real connections,
an exposure of the casual laws of their movement. That is the
only possible historic objectivity, and moreover, it is amply
sufficient, for it is verified and tested not by the good
intentions of the historian, for which only he himself can
vouch, but by the natural laws revealed by him of the historic
process itself [1977, p21].
Obviously, in some respects the analysis of specific case
studies of shop steward organisation within three Merseyside plants
provides only a limited basis from which to make wider generalisations, not
least because of sectoral, regional and corporate variations. Certainly,
the specific workplaces at the heart of this study can hardly be regarded
as a representative sample or even 'typical' of the area in which they are
located. Yet in other respects, the very idea of a typical factory is an
artificial construction of those corririentators who conceive of only one mode
of generalisation - the extrapolation from sample to population. There is
however, as Michael Buroway has explained, a second mode of generalisation:
.which seeks to illuminate the forces at work in society as a
totality rather than to reflect simply on the constancy and
variation of isolated factory regimes within a society...this
second mode...is the extension from the micro context to the
totality which shapes It. According to this view every
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particularity contains a generality; each particular factory
regime is the product of general forces operating at a societal
or global level (1985, p18).
Therefore, whilst accepting the limitations of making any
statistical generalisation to a larger population of cases it is possible
to make some analytical generalisations. In this sense, the importance of
the case studies lies less in their 'typicality' than for their theoretical
relevance and for the broad insights which they can provide in highlighting
the underlying patterns of shop steward organisation and behaviour,
particularly in manufacturing industry.
S'flUE']IJRE OF ThESIS
The analytical framework outlined above - with its
emphasis on shop stewards' relationship to management, rank and file
members and full-time union officials - has not only structured the
interpretion of my fieldwork data, it has also shaped the mode of its
written presentation for each of the three workplaces. Although it is only
by observing the interconnections between these relationships that a fully
rounded understanding can be obtained of the dynamics of shop steward
organisation, it is useful to separate them conceptually for reasons of
formal presentation which make it accessible for the reader. It also useful
to separate the decade of the 1970s from that of the 1980s because in
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general terms there is a marked contrast between the two periods with
respect to the contradictory tendencies at work.
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Jimy Bennett: TGWIT rank and file union member in 2-shift area of Unit 2
department
Billy Caldwell: TGWEJ rank and file union member in 3-shift area of Unit 2
department (and shop steward for two years).
Joe Carberry:	 TGWU shop steward in 3-shift area of Unit 2 department.
Brenda Carberry: TGWU rank and file union member in 2-shift area of Unit 2
department.
Paul thin:	 TGWU Branch Secretary and shop steward in butchery
department.
Mary Scoggins: TCWU rank and file union member in beefburger/steaklit
department.
&ywl Lockett: TGWIJ deputy Convenor and shop steward in 2-shift area of
Unit 2 department.
John Wrgan:	 TGWU shop steward in 3-shift area of Unit 2 department.
Eddie Roberts: TGWU local full-time union official.
Ive Worrafl:	 AUEW rank and file union member in engineering department.
CHR(N)LOGY OF MAJOR EVFNS :
1968: Convenor granted full-time status.
1969: One-day factory strike against witholding of pay.
1970:
1971: Three-day factory strike over lay-off pay.
TGWU branch policy on lay-offs adopted.
Negotiating conimittee formed.
1972: One-day factory strike over lay-offs.
1973: Cold store inquiry.
One-day factory strike over May Day holiday.
1974: One-hour factory strike against canteen price increases and
national pay offer.
1975: Resignation of Bobbie Lamb and negotiating committee.
1976: Birds Eye Five Year Plan.
1977: Bobbie Lamb re-elected Convenor.
Two-day factory strike over payment for racque line.
Four-week factory strike over automation bonus payment.
Management lock-out of workforce begins.
1978: Lock-out ends.
Factory overtime ban over short-term contracts.
1979: Two-day factory strike over suspension of two workers.
Joe Barton elected as Convenvor.
Two-week factory strike over demarcation in 3-shift area.
1980: One-day factory strike in support of T1JC Day of Action over
anti-union legislation.
1981:
1982: One-day factory strike across all Birds Eye plants over pay.
One-day factory strike in support of TIJC Day of Action for NHS
workers.
1983:
1984: One-day factory strike in support of Liverpool City Council.
One-day factory strike across all Birds Eye plants over
redundancies in Great Yarmouth.
1985: Workstyle introduced in East Anglia.
Two-day factory strike in support of Gloucester Birds Eye plant
dispute.
Closure of butchery department.
1986: Closure of chicken stripping department.
1987: Negotiating comittee requests introduction of Workstyle.
1988: Deadlocked negotiations over Workstyle.
1989: Closure of factory.
SIK)P STEWARDS' LEADERSHIP 1970s AND 1980g.
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Chapter Two: Birds Eye
CAVFi Tv): BIRDS EYE
nmoinoi
The Birds Eye frozen food plant was a wartime munitions
works until the company took it over and re-developed the site in 1953,
encouraged by regional grants and the promise of an accessible workforce.
In the 1960s Birds Eye became a subsidiary of Unilever, the gigantic Anglo-
IXitch multinational - whose consumer products stretch from Persil washing
powder to Blue Band margarine and Liptons tea - employing 353,000 workers
worldwide, of whom around 32,000 work in Britain. The Merseyside plant was
only one of a number of Birds Eye plants scattered across the country,
including Gloucester, Grimsby and Lowestoft. In 1988 Unilever's frozen food
division made an operating profit of £153 million. In 1989, in the same
month it announced the closure of its Merseyside Birds Eye plant, allegedly
because of the refusal of its 1,000 workers to accept new working
practices, Unilever reported record profits of £1,516 million (1). The
plant was situated in Kirkby, developed after the second world war as an
overspill town from Liverpool, in the borough of Knowsley. In 1988 a survey
of living standards in 459 local authority districts by Liverpool
University's Centre of Urban Studies placed Knowsley at the bottom as the
most deprived area in Britain (2). When the Birds Eye factory closed
Kirkby's unemployment rate was three times the national average, more than
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62 per cent of the population were eligible for family credit and 40,000
residents received housing benefit (3).
The product range varied considerably over the 36 years
the plant was operational but the factory's heyday was in the early 1970s
when it primarily made the Captain Bird's Eye frozen fish range of products
and beefburgers, steak-lits, pies and pastries. The 1980s change in
people's eating habits towards more varied and health-conscious tastes saw
their replacement by equally successful frozen TV dinner convenience food,
namely the highly popular MenuNasters ready meal range (including
spaghettis, curries, vegetable meals and cauliflower cheeses). Changes in
product range saw a corresponding transformation in the nature of work in
the plant. During the early 1970s the machinery was very antiquated, work
was intensive and extremely repetitive and there was a quite marked sexual
division of labour. Most women workers were concentrated on the assembly
lines and most men did heavy manual work, supplying ingredients to the
women on the lines and operating the machinery. This division was even more
marked in certain departments within the factory which employed virtually
exclusively either men or women. After an 18-week management lock-out of
the workforce in 1978, there was a massive influx of capital investment and
'state of the art? new technology into the plant. where it had previously
been very labour-intensive it now changed into a more capital-intensive
operation. Completely new types of assembly lines and high-speed packaging
machinery resulted in an overall contraction of labour although the basic
division of labour between male and female workers remained.
Situated on a sprawling estate and housed in two main
buildings the factory had a number of different departments during the
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1970s, all with their own managers and financial budgets. There was the
cooked foods department - known as the pie room (which employed about 200
mainly female workers); the chicken-stripping department (which employed
about 130 mainly female workers); the butchery department (which employed
about 80 male workers); the steak-lits/beefburger department (which
employed about 160 male and female workers, although predominantly women);
the cold-store department (which employed about 60 male workers); the
freeze and case department (which employed about 30 male and female
workers); the fish department - known as the cod-in-sauce (which employed
about 30 mainly female workers); and the boiler house (which employed about
20 male workers). In addition, a number of craftsmen - including an 80-
strong engineering department - worked on the site. After 1978 the factory
underwent a major re-organisation of work following large scale
redundancies, the introduction of new technology and the closure of a
number of departments. The most important new development was the complete
renovation of an adjacent building complex on the site, known as Unit 2,
where new automated assembly lines were installed to produce the brand new
MemuNaster range of products and where the old pie room operations were
transferred. The largest department within Unit 2 (cooked and prepared
foods) employed about 600 predominantly women workers. In addition, there
was a completely new chicken-stripping department (employing about 130
mainly female workers); the old butchery department (employing about 80
male workers); the old cold-store (employing only about 30 male workers);
and a much reduced freeze and case department (employing about 15 male and
female workers). There was also a small engineering department. By 1987,
after further closures, the only major department in the plant left
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functioning was Unit 2 where all the production lines were situated.
The growing popularity of Birds Eye's frozen food
products led to a sustained increase in employment during the l960s and at
its peak in the early 1970s the factory employed a total of about 1,650
production workers (plus electricians, engineers, supervisors and white
collar staff). But throughout most of the 1970s there were about 1,400
production workers (members of the Transport and General Workers Union)
until redundancies in 1978 reduced the workforce to about 1,000 for most of
the 1980s. Across the factory there were more male than female employees.
Yet among the three-quarters of the workforce represented by the TGWtJ there
was always a majority of women workers, although proportionally it differed
quite considerably from department to department. For most women workers
throughout the 1970s it was a single day-shift operation (8arn-4.3Opm)
although there was also quite a substantial number of women on a twilight
shift (5.3Opm-l0pm) working on the main production lines either in the
cooked foods or the beefburgers/steak-lits departments. The vast majority
of men worked a double day shift (6am-2pm and 2pm-l0pm, alternating weekly)
apart from a handful who were on single day-shift or permanent night work.
Thus, in the beefburger/steak-lit department there was a mixed, although
predominantly female workforce, operating and servicing the assembly lines,
with 20 men each on a double day-shift, 60 women on a single day-shift, 60
women on a twilight-shift and a number of male single day-shift and
permanent night-shift workers.
By contrast, in the cooked foods department - known as
the pie room - it was an overwhelmingly female workforce, with 100 plus
women on a single day-shift and 100 plus women on a twilight shift, with
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only a handful of men working in the department. Elsewhere in the factory,
it was either virtually all women, as in the chicken-stripping department,
or all men, as in the butchery and cold store departments. After 1978, and
until the factory's closure, the vast majority of women (except those in
the new chicken stripping department) went onto a double day-shift
operation as the old twilight shift was disbanded. Meanwhile, a new three-
shift operation for male workers in the preparation side of the cooked
foods department of Unit 2 was opened (which at its height employed about
84 men). Thus, in Unit 2, the major department in the factory during the
1980s, there were concentrated over 600 workers, about 400 women and 200
men, mainly on a double day-shift, plus an 80-strong three-shift of male
workers. By contrast, the other two major departments in the factory were
either virtually exclusively female, as in the new chicken-stripping
department, or exclusively male, as in the old butchery and cold store
departments.
There was no trade union structure in the factory when
Birds Eye opened the plant in the early 1950s. It was only formally
recognised after repeated skirmishes between shopfloor workers and
management led to a closed shop agreement in 1960 with the Transport and
General Workers Union. Nonetheless, management refused to grant the shop
stewards any facilities and there were constant conflicts over time off
work to attend to members' grievances. Plant-wide negotiations were
conducted through the channel of the lay shop stewards' Convenor. Yet in
the late 1960s a number of changes occured in line with the Donovan
ConEuission's recommendations for the reform of workplace industrial
relations. The plant Convenor was granted full-time status and provided
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with a union office and telephone and shop stewards were allowed greater
leeway in the facility time available to them. Later, in 1971, a plant-wide
negotiating coriinittee was set up - composed of the Convenor, deputy
Convenor and three other senior stewards - to bargain over major conditions
of work. In 1970, a national agreement between Birds Eye and the TGWII
established a Joint Negotiating Committee (JNC) through which annual wage
negotiations were conducted by top-level corporate managers and full-time
union officials, although in 1973 the Convenors from each of the four Birds
Eye plants were allowed to attend JNC meetings, and in 1984 the deputy
Convenor also became part of the negotiating forum. At local level,
stewards were still able to negotiate over job evaluation, bonus schemes
and condition rates - until measured day work was introduced in 1978.
The shop stewards' committee throughout the l970s and
1980s numbered between 27-30 members and was always a male-dominated body.
Stewards were elected every two years by secret ballot in each department
of the factory, usually on a shift basis although the larger the department
the greater the number of stewards. It met monthly during working hours.
The five senior stewards on the factory's negotiating committee were
elected by members of the shop stewards' coninittee every two years. They
met with management on a sporadic basis although most day-to--day
negotiations were conducted directly by the Convenor, the only steward with
full-time facility status. The Birds Eye TGWIJ 6/505 union branch was
organised on a factory basis and played an important role in the shopfloor
organisation within the plant. Branch meetings were held every month to
which the Convenor delivered a report on developments within the plant. The
branch coninittee - composed of a mixture of 15-20 shop stewards and rank
Page 56
Chapter Two: Birds Eye
and file union activists - also met every month, usually in working hours,
and was elected annually at a branch meeting.
Most of my research material was obtained through
extensive interviews with a number of key informants in the Kirkby plant.
Unfortunately, despite repeated formal approaches, the top-level decision
by Unilever to shut the plant gave local Birds Eye management in Kirkby
justification for refusing pointblank to grant me 'access' or to offer
assistance of any kind whatsoever for my research. Instead, I was forced to
rely upon informal approaches to sympathetic 'insiders' on the trade union
side able to facilitate the process of 'getting in'. It was the subsequent
three-month campaign launched by the shop stewards' coninittee against the
factory's closure that enabled me to establish a close relationship with a
number of leading stewards and workplace union activists. I was generously
provided with information which was not only of tremendous assistance in
reconstructing an account from one set of combatants but also helped me to
fill in some of the gaps that their antagonists had left me. I was allowed
to observe a number of mass meetings of the union membership during the
campaign against closure, invited to weekly meetings of the Birds Eye
Support Group from which stewards and union members built up corrinurilty
resistance to the shutdown, and provided with invaluable chronological and
documentary material in the form of meticulously kept minute books of the
shop steward's comrnitte, TGWtJ branch and branch committee, stretching from
the period of 1960 right up until 1989. It was from such close
collaboration that I was able to carry out in-depth interviews with a
number of key shopfloor trade union informants.
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STEWARDS' RELAIIC(SHIP IX) MAN 11I4T: ThE 1970s
* t1 early 1970s; tI stewards' strengths arki weaknesses
During the early 1970s the balance of bargaining power in
the Birds Eye Kirkby plant was undoubtedly weighted to the relative
advantage of the shop stewards. Indeed, in 1972-3 the relationship between
the stewards and Kirkby management was considered so strained that Birds
Eye repeatedly threatened to close the plant down; the chairman of the
company personally visited Merseyside on three occasions to lay 'down the
law' to the workforce. A key factor enhancing stewards' bargaining leverage
appears to have been the rapid expansion of the market for frozen TV dinner
convenience foods which led to a dramatic increase in factory output and a
steady influx of new labour. Management's relatively confrontationist
stance was also important. In general terms, management strategy oscillated
between vigorous confrontation over particular issues and congenial
acceptance of shopfloor arrangements based on custom and practice. In part,
this reflected a disparity between the attitude adopted by plant managers
as opposed to those at departmental level. At plant level, day-to-day
relations with shop stewards were relatively much more conflictual although
this was often encouraged by corporate Birds Eye management intervention.
For example, changes in Birds Eye's product range sometimes led to lay-offs
of sections of workers and inevitable outright confrontation with shop
stewards over the guaranteed working week. Day-to-day relations with
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departmental managers were usually more co-operative although this varied
from one section to another.
The election of Bobbie Lamb as the new shop stewards'
Convenor at the beginning of 1971 was another important factor helping to
build the strength of union organisation in the plant. In 1968 Birds Eye
had created a central, authoritative figure in the Kirkby plant in the
shape of a full-time shop stewards' Convenor. No doubt it was hoped that by
granting full-time status and facilities (including a union office and
telephone) the new Convenor's authority over what was becoming an
increasingly more assertive workforce would be reinforced. Yet, Bobbie Lamb
played a quite different role to those previously in office.
Joe Carberry was a 25 year old militant trade unionist
and independent socialist when he started working at Birds Eye in 1973.
Elected to a shop steward's position in the cooked foods department (which
he retained for 13 years) he served for a period of time on the factory
negotiating coninittee and was a consistent activist in the TGWtJ branch. He
outlined the influential, combative and also political, role, Bobbie Lamb
played in the factory:
He was a very influential figure in as much as Birds Eye hated
him. He worked in the plant for 20 years and was a very
charismatic person, articulate, an orator. He could hold an
audience Bobbie, speak on any subject until the cows caine home.
He was a fairly militant Convenor, all right. There were a lot
of disputes in the early '70s and Bobbie Lamb would always get
involved. And in my experience of things, 9 times Out of 10 he
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would win. . .he was very much politically minded - he was a real
socialist - and he allied his politics to his job. It was
through Bobbie Lamb's influence that we got the type of
policies we did.
Such a socialist outlook and overtly combative approach
towards management does not appear to have been matched by most of the
other shop stewards in the factory during the early 1970s. Nonetheless, the
day-to-day battle with management on the shopfloor was another important
factor helping to forge the strength of the Birds Eye stewards'
organisation. Basic wages were negotiated at national level by full-time
officials and the Convenors from the four TGWIJ Birds Eye plants.
Invariably, when the company made its offer the stewards' committee would
recommend rejection - sometimes imposing an overtime ban - only to find
themselves left isolated by the unwillingness of the other less well
organised plants to take any action, although the stewards did organise a
one-hour factory wide stoppage of work in 1974 to bolster the bargaining
leverage of union officials involved in wage negotiations and to protest at
local canteen price increases. Moreover, there was a significant element of
local pay determination inside the Kirkby plant. Joe Carberry remembered:
One of the things you used to measure the stewards by was how
well they performed In writing up job descriptions and getting
the claim submitted through a job evaluation panel. It was a
fairly easy system to understand and even easier to make sure
you got an award out of it. If you look at national pay awards
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we didn't do very well but we did fairly well in local
negotiations within the factory. Basic pay was about £35 at the
time - the top rate on job evaluation was £4.35p.
Job evaluation was not the only way stewards could get
money into the wage packets of their members. Paul Chin - who worked at
Birds Eye for 26 years (mainly in the butchery department), was the TGWIJ
branch secretary for 15 years, intermittently holding a steward's card, and
a left-of--centre member of the Labour Party - explained the importance of
bonus schemes:
They were set up on a weekly basis - in some departments on an
individual basis and in others on a group basis. In theory,
they were subject to review every twelve months but in practice
most of them would be altered whenever there was a dispute.
Often it would be geared to a machine. But if the machinery
broke down and people lost their bonus there'd be a dispute and
the shop stewards would re-negotiate it. There were little
innovations all the time. But the bonus was worth up to about
£l.3Op so it was a fair chunk of money.
In addition, there were condition rates, negotiated by
stewards in particularly hazardous departments of the factory - such as the
cold store - which were worth up to £2.50p.
Perhaps the key cutting edge helping to sharpen the
stewards' strength was the high level of disputes in the factory provoked
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by management's confrontationist approach. Thus, in March 1971, the company
imposed lay-offs on hundreds of workers for four weeks (4). As a result,
one of the first policies adopted by the shop stewards' coninittee under
Bobbie Lamb's leadership, was the 'one-out, all-out' policy aimed at
forcing the company to concede lay-off pay or a guaranteed working week,
although it took two major plant-wide all-out strikes - lasting 3 days in
1971 and 1 day in 1972 - before management finally conceded a lay-off
agreement (5). The stewards' willingness to adopt a relatively militant
approach to crack management's inflexibility was further successfully
demonstrated with another one-day factory wide stoppage in 1973, this time
over the company's refusal to grant workers a Nay Day holiday (6). There
were also quite a few sectional disputes, even if there was a significant
variation in stewards' bargaining leverage between different departments in
the factory. By far the best organised section was the cold-store
department, the final assembly area of the factory where the finished
manufactured products were stacked onto pallets ready for transportation.
The cold-store workers' strategic position meant they wielded tremendous
shopfloor power. Joe Carberry recalled:
It was a well organised part of the factory - no two ways about
it. There was a walk-out practically every week. They were
forever getting into trouble. A lot of it transpired from the
fact that they had this large meandering workforce within the
cold-store that knew its strength in the factory as far as its
industrial power was concerned. Their key tool was the high
reach forklift truck. No one else in the factory was trained to
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drive them, so if there was a stoppage in the cold store
nothing could be done, the factory would virtually come to a
standstill there and then. They held a monopoly of power in
that sense. A lot of the disputes were just parochial issues
that just concerned the cold-store itself. But the stewards
were very capable stewards. They used to gain bonus payments
double what the rest of the factory got. It was the most
militant part of the factory. Actually, they used to say that
if one of the stewards broke wind in the cold-store - they'd
all walk-out.
The next best organised section of the factory was the
butchery department, where the 80-strong male workforce cut the massive
carcases of meat. Because management relied upon a continuous flow of
production - with little space to store the raw material meat - the
butchers' stewards were often able to press home their advantage and were
always assured of a top bonus. For example, in November 1974 they took
industrial action to successfully win improved condition rates (7). By
comparison, in the other areas of the factory where the assembly lines were
situated - such as the cooked foods and beefburger/stealdit departments -
shopfloor workers did not have the same kind of strategic relationship to
production; the work regime was much more controlled, discipline much
stricter and flexibility of labour greater. As a result, the steward
organisation was relatively much weaker. Nonetheless, there were still
quite a high level of disputes, usually because the breakdown of antiquated
machinery often curtailed workers' weekly bonus payments.
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There is no doubt another key factor spurring on the
militancy of rank and file members was the high level of struggle inside
the British working class movement generally. As Joe Carberry recalled:
The union organisation was at its height in the early '70s, no
two ways about that. A lot of the time we had the company on
the run. 'Cause what you've got to remember about the early
'70s is that there was this huge wave of euphoria the unions
were carried away on at the time. You know, the industrial
relations legislation was in force at the time and there was a
massive upswell against that. There was a general air of
confidence on the shopfloor in terms of what people thought
they could win. It was a situation where you felt that if you
did go into dispute you were going to win.
In December 1971, when 600 workers occupied the Thorn
Fisher Bendix plant in Kirkby and launched a highly successful campaign for
the 'right to work' throughout Nerseyside, Birds Eye workers were centrally
involved in solidarity work (8). Running parallel with this campaign in
1972-3 was the battle spearheaded in Kirkby against the Conservative
government's Housing Finance Act, with thousands of Tower Hill council
tenants on rent strike, culminating in the imprisonment of some tenants
(9). Joe Carberry, who was activley involved in the campaign, explained:
A few Birds Eye stewards lived on Tower Hill and were involved
in the rent strike themselves, like Billy Castley from the cold
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store. One of the things we discussed at the time was that a
coninunity based tenants strike would not be successful unless
it was allied to some form of industrial action. That was the
position the Tower Hill Fair Rents Action Group actually took.
So they had a go at bringing the factory out on a day's
stoppage and the Tower Hill group actually picketed the
factory, with women and prams, and that. They caused massive
chaos.
Appealing for a factory stoppage was almost certainly
premature given that it took a few months before Tower Hill's rent strike
was joined by most of the other council housing estates in Kirkby. Yet as
Joe Carberry added: 'It didn't succeed - some came out, some went in but
it created a hell of a stir'.
Notwithstanding its strengths the shop stewards'
organisation in Birds Eye also had significant weaknesses during the early
1970s. To begin with, there was the break-up of its bastion of strength in
the cold-store department. In 1973 the plant's Personnel Manager set up an
internal inquiry into the shopfloor industrial relations situation in the
department. The Convenor, Bobbie Lamb, and two other senior stewards from
the negotiating coniriittee, agreed to participate in its deliberations
because they were concerned the future of the factory was being threatened
by constant stoppages of work disrupting production. Despite the indignant
protests of the cold-store stewards the inquiry report reconinended a
reduction of the department's 60-strong workforce and the dispersal of some
of its palletising operations throughout the rest of the plant. Management
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subsequently offered a much enhanced voluntary redundancy deal aimed at
enticing those not willing to be re-deployed to leave the factory. Much to
their satisfaction and to the union's horror 26 cold-store workers,
including some of the best militants and shop stewards, took the money,
which at £800 was a considerable lump sum at the time. It left the cold-
store department with only about 30 workers. The break-up of the cold-store
- even though it retained some of its potential industrial muscle - dealt a
severe body blow to the strength of the shop stewards' organisation in the
plant and highlighted the underlying ambivalent attitude taken by Bobbie
Lamb towards sectional stoppages. As the stewards' minute books reveal, in
the aftermath of this event, the number of disputes markedly declined.
Another factor weakening steward organisation was the
sexual division of labour in the plant. During the late 1960s, at a time
when the food-processing industry was expanding at a rapid pace, the Kirkby
management welcomed women workers who ideally fitted their need for young,
flexible and unskilled labour. Although women welcomed this new employment
they were at a distinct disadvantage to male workers. Marriage and
motherhood effectively 'deskilled' women, preparing them for only unskilled
or semi-skilled work on the assembly lines. Male workers tended to
gravitate towards work which was either skilled or which offered the
opportunity of substantial overtime, or both. As a consequence, the rates
of pay women received were well below those paid to male workers. Although
the basic pay structure remained the same for everyone (after an equal pay
deal in 1972) the factory's job evaluation scheme introduced in 1971 -
which slotted people into job rates according to skill - entrenched a
significant pay differential between men and women. The result could be the
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difference between a woman day-shift production-line worker on a job rate
of 90p compared with a male shift worker operating machinery on a job rate
of £4.35p. Moreover, the division of labour was compounded by some
stewards' attempts to protect the bargaining position of men's jobs. For
example, the palletising job at the end of an assembly line was
traditionally carried out by a man because it usually involved some heavy
labour. But as Mary Scoggins, a rank and file union member who worked for
many years in the beefburger/steaklit department explained, this had a
double-edged effect:
If managemement happened to be short of male labour they'd
quite often look towards the women. So what the shop stewards
did was get them to agree that whenever that situation arose
they would always put 2 women onto 1 man's job. Obviously, that
suited the women because they could share out the work between
them and the men were happy because they knew they would always
be able to walk back into the job. You never got a take-over
position. It would only be a temporary arrangement.
Some male stewards were prepared, alongside the
relatively few women on the stewards' coninittee, to make attempts to
alleviate the disadvantageous conditions women workers found themselves in.
For example, Bobbie Lamb negotiated an equal pay agreement and formally
pursued with the company a claim for paid maternity leave (10). Moreover,
one important factor facilitating a breakdown of barriers was the stoppages
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of work which emphasised the interdependence of male and female workers
vis-a-vis management. As Mary Scoggins explained:
If the men who did all the heavy physical jobs decided they
were refusing to do a job because it was too dirty or
something, they'd go to the women and say 'will you support us
- we know it'll affect your bonus - but we need your support'.
Mid the women would say 'Ok, yeah, we '11 support you?. And the
same thing would happen if the women walked off the job and
went to the men. They'd say 'we can't work with that machine'.
And the men would back them up - even if it meant they lost
their bonus as a result. There was no real animosity when it
caine down to it in that sense.
But many stewards did accept the in-built demarcation
between men and womens jobs even though the overwhelming beneficiary of
this arrangement was management - far outweighing any advantages and
disadvantages between men and women themselves.
Another underlying weakness of the Birds Eye stewards'
was that, although the formation of a negotiating committee in 1971 had the
effect of ensuring a more collective style of leadership than the
completely Convenor dominated approach that used to prevail, the senior
stewards did not share Bobble Lamb's combative and strategic stance towards
management. Their willingness to engage in militant activity was more
pragmatically based and contingent on sectional pressures and they regarded
him as being 'too political'. Paul Chin outlined the different approach:
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Bobbie was always looking for progession, improvements in one
thing or another, if you know what I mean. But with the others
on the negotiating conuiittee nothing happened unless the
company made it happen. Bather than go to the company and say
'we'll be seeking this, that and the other' it would be the
company who came up with an idea for change and them reacting
to it: 'yes, we'll go along with it, or no we won't'.
The negotiating committee stewards were often reluctant
to give their unequivocal backing to Bobbie Lamb's occasional requests for
industrial action across the whole factory aimed at strengthening his hand
in negotiations with management over particular issues. Eventually in late
1975, after being rebuffed on a number of occasions, Bobbie Lamb took the
dramatic step of resigning from his position as Convenor (although
remaining a departmental steward) whereupon the five other senior stewards,
including the deputy Convenor Joe Barton, resigned from the negotiating
committee (although most remained as departmental stewards). It was an
extremely serious loss to the cohesion of the stewards' body and opened up
the second major phase of shopfloor struggle that can be identified, during
which the balance of bargaining power inside the Birds Eye plant tilted
towards the advantage of management. The new Convenor, George Knight, was
much older than Bobbie Lamb, and as a moderate Labour Party member was also
from a completely different political background. His main concern appeared
to be to build up a new co-operative relationship with management. Joe
Carberry outlined his different approach:
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George was very much a mediator. He wouldn't take a hard line
on anything - he always tended to take the soft option. nd he
was a-political. Those were the main differences with Bobbie.
George was one of those fellas who would sit down with the
management and say 'I'm a professional and you're a
professional - can't we do a deal?'. It was that type of
relationship with the company.
According to the stewards' and union branch minutes there
was not one single dispute inside the factory during 1976. Of course, it
would be wrong to assume this reflected a complete collapse of confidence
on the shopfloor and a willingness of all stewards to acquiesce in
managerial prerogative. Over the previous two years a handful of younger
and more political union activists - including Joe Carberry - had already
begun to transform the TGWtJ branch into a lively forum for argument and
debate, adopting left-wing policies on a whole range of issues (such as the
commitment not to cross workers' picket lines) and having been newly
elected as stewards they were also able, at least in some areas of the
factory, to make important shopfloor gains. For example, on the permanent
night shift in the cooked foods department, the stewards pushed their
members from the lowest band within the job evaluation scheme (il) to the
highest (4.35p) through good sectional bargaining backed up with the
threat of industrial action.
Nonetheless, it was only to be the lull before the storm.
During 1976 the full implications of the threat posed to workplace union
organisation at the Kirkby plant gradually became apparent when Birds Eye
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unveiled their 'Five Year Plan' which threatened a major re-organisation of
production affecting all the company's frozen food plants with the long-
term aim of introducing new technology. Amidst promises of a massive
investment progranine in the Kirkby factory the company stated its intention
of transferring production of some of its major product ranges - steaklits,
beethurgers and all fish-based products - to other plants within the group
combined with drastic changes to established working practices in the
plant, including the introduction of a new double-day shift.
The threat posed to the Kirkby site by the company's
'Five Year Plan' and discontent with the bargaining ineffectiveness of the
new Convenor resulted in a vote of no confidence at a stewards' comittee
meeting and at the end of 1976 the return of Bobbie Lamb to the Convenor's
position. At the same time, two of the 'old guard' senior stewards who had
previously resigned from the negotiating committee were re-elected, along
with a couple of younger, militant stewards.
* 1977-1979: offensive aix! counter-offensive
The changed composition of the shop stewards' leadership
ushered in the third phase of the struggle inside the Kirkby plant. As Paul
Chin explained:
'1hereas people hadn't supported Bobbie before, they wanted him
back because he was the only one who could do the job properly.
Then you saw a change of tactics, because Bobbie now got more
support than ever. It made a hell of a lot of difference. In
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his mind, Bobbie was as militant as he always was, prepared to
use industrial muscle to achieve things. He was shrewed enough
to know when to push the stewards into action or not. But his
ability to get things done was vastly improved. For instance,
he instigated negotiations for a maternity agreement for women.
Previously he would have had difficulty in getting support for
that through the stewards' coninittee - because it was male
chauvinist. But after the experience of George Knight they
backed him on it.
Certainly, Bobbie Lamb's return at the beginning of 1977
appears to have re-vitalised the self-esteem and authority of the stewards'
organisation in general and the younger more political stewards in
particular. Moreover, it seemed to unleash the latent discontent over wage
restraint that existed on the shopfloor. During the first few weeks of the
new year a sudden wave of sectional strike activity swept the plant - with
stoppages in the butchery, chicken stripping and freeze and case
departments - as union organisation began to reassert its power and regain
some of the ground it had lost. The disputes were of an offensive nature
with stewards demanding extra job rates or bonus payments. Then, in
February, a new bout of union militancy erupted on the 'racque' pie line in
the cooked foods department where management had introduced new automated
meat dispensing machinery, that had led to a re-deployment of a number of
women workers elsewhere in the factory. The 'racque' line was seen as
symptomatic of the production changes sought by the company as outlined in
their 'Five Year Plan' and under Bobbie Lamb's leadership the stewards'
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organisation prepared its strategic response - to fight for increased bonus
payments for the extra job responsibilities required. It required a two-day
factory-wide stoppage to force management into a temporary agreement to
increase payments to female workers, although the deal was never
implemented (11).
After months of management evasion the issue finally
exploded in August 1977 when the stewards' coninittee called an all-out
strike, linking the issue of a £7 bonus for running the new 'racque' line
with the wider question of the threat posed to the Kirkby plant by the
centralisation of products and 'Five Year Plan'. Pickets manned the gates
in Kirkby and a delegation of strikers lobbied the other two Birds Eye
plants that were part of the same national pay negotiating set-up appealing
for solidarity action. Yarmouth agreed to impose an irriediate overtime ban
but when Lowestoft shop stewards refused to offer support the IUrkby
strikers mounted a picket on the gate. Whilst the production workers - who
had a very weak union organisation - ignored the appeal for solidarity the
blockade did have an inuiediate and dramatic effect when the Unispeed lorry
drivers - also members of the TGWIJ - refused to cross the picket lines.
Unable to move anything in or out the factory was effectively paralysed and
after two weeks Birds Eye finally backed down and agreed to make a £5
productivity payment. It was a significant victory and the stewards'
committee was jubilant with the outcome. Unfortunately, it proved to be a
false dawn.
The workers' offensive was met with a management counter-
offensive when the Kirkby plant's 80 AUE engineering craftsmen were forced
out on strike a couple of weeks later, after management suspended all
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negotiations on their annual pay claim. TGW[J stewards were approached by
the company and informed that if they allowed supervisors and managers to
take over the striking engineers' jobs they would attempt to provide work
for some of their members, although most would be laid-off without pay.
They assumed that as the engineers had refused to respect the TWEJ's picket
lines in their own recent dispute they would be willing to do the same now.
But following an emergency meeting the stewards' coninittee voted
unaninmously to support the engineers' strike and invoked union branch
policy on lay-offs of 'one-out, all-out'. The stewards mounted a picket
line alongside the engineers and appealed to their members not to cross and
in a magnificant display of solidarity only 197 out of some 1,300 TGWtJ
members broke the union's ranks to go into work. Two days later the company
announced a complete shut-down of the factory and the lay-off of the entire
workforce until the engineers' strike was resolved. Yet the management
lock-out proved to be only the start of a long bitter dispute with the
company that was to last for no less than four and a half months, between
October 1977 - March 1978, before finally ending in workers' ignoininous
defeat. Joe Carberry recalled the predicament the stewards found themselves
in:
We thought it would last a week or two. But after a while it
became obvious the engineers had walked into a closed door.
Five weeks into the strike the company called the engineers to
a meeting and produced a 5-point plan for the resumption of
work. The engineers took it away and agreed to accept 3 of the
points and went back to the company suggesting compromise on
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the other 2 points. But the company then produced a 7-point
plan. And that's how their negotiations went. Every time they
met the company they'd get so far and then no further because
the company would add something else on. It was a deliberate
ploy to prolong the dispute.
The TGWIJ and AUEW shop stewards formed a 'Joint Liaison
Coninittee' which met weekly to co-ordinate activities, organise picketing
of the plant by both union's members and campaign for financial support
throughout the Merseyside area. A number of mass meetings and a huge trade
union solidarity demonstration in Kirkby reaffirmed the members support for
their stewards' defiant stance (12). Yet, as the months went by without a
resolution of the engineers' dispute, it became apparent corporate Birds
Eye management would only consider re-opening the plant after completely
new contracts of employment for both TGWtJ production workers and AUEW
strikers had been signed. Despite continuing defiance from the Joint
Liaison Conimittee, tremendous pressure to recommend acceptance of the
company's terms was placed on the stewards by national full-time TGWEJ and
AUEW officials. After holding secret meetings with the company in London
they eventually foisted an agreement on the Kirkby workforce that conceded
the union's unconditional surrender to the company in exchange for a return
to work. The capitulation included amongst other things: 340 redundancies
amongst the TGWEJ production workers, the loss of the previously agreed
bonus payment for the 'racque' line, the replacement of the women's
twilight shift by compulsory double day-shift working, the introduction of
a new 3-shift systen for some male workers, and the replacement of all
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bonus schemes by a new 'balanced pay structure' involving measured day work
(as well as the loss of a third of the engineers' jobs).
Whether Kirkby management had deliberately provoked the
engineers into taking strike action - as many people subsequently claimed -
is impossible to confirm. But there is no doubt the lock-out provided Birds
Eye with the perfect opportunity, not only to speed ahead with its 'Five
Year Plan' transfer of certain products from Kirkby to other sites, but
also to prepare the ground for a complete re-organisation of production in
the Merseyside factory. It was the start of a new era for the Kirkby plant,
a massive new investment progranine in which the nature of production was
transformed from the old manually operated system to brand new 'state of
the art' automated assembly lines with 'multi-vacuum' self-sealing
packaging machinery. The beefburger/steaklit and fish departments were
completely closed down and the chicken-stripping department was transfered
to a new area of the factory. But the most important development was the
transfer of the old cooked foods department to a completely renovated
building complex known as 'Unit 2', where brand new high-technology
assembly lines were installed. Fiploying over 600 men and women - all of
whom now worked a rotating double-day shift - it became the largest
department on the site.
Despite the fact the shop stewards' organisation
remained intact - after having continued to meet and organise during the
lock-out - it suffered a severe set-back. The return-to-work package
reached by the national union officials placed massive constraints on
stewards' negotiating capabilities, giving management carte blanche to re-
organise production. Although the 350 redundancies were eventually agreed
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voluntarily the balance of bargaining power now swung right back in favour
of management. Paul Chin remembered the stewards' loss of confidence:
From the outset we went back very much with our tail between
our legs. The morale was fairly low, obviously after a major
defeat like that. From the T and G point of view there was a
lot of acquiescence for about the first six months. Management
were quite cocky. In certain departments the supervisors were
dictatorial. They'd say 'well, if you don't like it you know
where you can go' • But stewards had to step back from the
brink, because we'd lost a lot of members, people had been out
of work for four months, you knew they couldn't be motivated
into action. To a great extent the company were laughing at us
for a few months.
Management took advantage of the steward's bargaining
weakness allowing the short-fall in labour created by the redundancies to
be overcome by moving workers from one department to another at
management's discretion. Also Birds Eye ended the element of local pay
determination in the factory, introducing what they termed a 'balanced pay
structure' that combined job and basic rates and had the effect of
significantly widening the differentials between male and female workers to
£3, £3.50, £8.50 or even as much as £17 a week between a day shift woman
worker and a new 3-shift male worker.
Paradoxically, although the stewards' organisation was
initially seriously undermined by the complete re-orgariisation of
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production in the factory it was able to gradually recover some of its
bargaining strength, at least in some areas of the new Unit 2 cooked foods
department, where the installation of the new technology and assembly lines
proceeded apace. Stewards in this department were able to exploit
management ' s predicament - faced with 'state of the art' machinery that
proved impossible to operate on the manning levels originally imposed - to
successfully increase the numbers employed on the new 'multi-vac' assembly
lines. Perhaps the best agreements were negotiated by shop stewards
representing the 3-shift male workers in the new prepared foods section of
Unit 2 where they were able to push up the level from 9 to nearly 30 per
shift. The presence of two or three of the most militant and political
stewards in the factory within this particular area was a key in securing
the new labour. Of course, management clearly envisaged such an arrangement
as only a short-term measure until all the machinery was firmly in place
and working smoothly. To cover the transition period, they began to recruit
new labour into the plant on 6-week fixed term contracts. Although the shop
stewards' committee expressed its opposition to this stop-gap measure, in
favour of the employment of a permanent workforce, they were overruled by
full-time union officials. But after a few months' experiment the stewards'
body took the initiative and imposed a factory-wide overtime ban to force
management to abandon the use of short-term contracts. Within 24 hours the
company had backed down and given an assurance that only permanent labour
would henceforth be taken on (13).
Undoubtedly, it was the massive new investment progranirte
and accompanying increased factory output that strengthened the stewards'
bargaining leverage and gave them the confidence to act. Plant management' s
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concern to keep production running - amidst the launch of the MenuNaster
range - meant ever greater numbers of new workers were hired and manning
levels in the factory practically reached their pre-1978 lock-out level. By
February 1979 the stewards' coninittee felt strong enough to orgariise a 2-
day factory wide stoppage over a demarcation dispute, involving two union
members suspended for refusing to do engineering workers' jobs (14). It was
a further illustration that the stewards' body was beginning to recover its
strength after the lock-out. Of course, the level of union organisation was
still extremely uneven; even in the new Unit 2 department there was only
one sectional stoppage - over a safety issue (15). Elsewhere, shopfloor
peace reigned during 1978-9 despite the imposed new shift patterns and
working practices. Certainly, the pendulum of advantage - in terms of the
balance of bargaining power - still lay overwhelmingly in the hands of
management. Yet the stewards' organisation - at least in some sections of
the factory - was gradually beginning to retrieve some of the ground it had
lost.
Yet the process of recovery was short-circuited at the
end of 1979 when Bobbie Lamb resigned as Convenor, this time to take up a
full-time District Officer's position within the Merseyside Region of the
TGWtJ. It heralded a new era in the fortunes of the Birds Eye stewards'
leadership and its relationship to management, which coincided with the
period of the 1980s.
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STEWARDS' RELATI(}ISJIIP TO MANAGFiFNF: ThE 1980s
* the early 1980s: 'don't rock t1 boat':
The early 1980s economic recession saw an avalanche of
redundancies and closures in the Merseyside area - including Dunlop Speke,
Neccano and Tate and Lyle - and Birds Eye's persistent threat to shut the
Kirkby plant down unless efficency was improved hung like a dark cloud over
the stewards' heads, further reinforcing a siege-like mentality. The
election of Joe Barton as the new Convenor was also a key new factor in the
situation. He abandoned the militant and political leadership style adopted
by Bobbie Lamb in favour of a new 'co-operative' approach towards
management on the basis that only by keeping their heads down and trying to
make the plant as viable as possible could workers hope to retain their
jobs in the long term. In return for exercising his authority over rank and
file members' wildcat action he sought demonstrable improvements in working
conditions through a 'strong bargaining relationship' with management.
Having invested £10 million in new machinery and assembly lines Birds Eye
now launched a number of new products in the Kirkby plant and with
production levels rising substantially the factory operated at nearly full
capacity. In these circumstances, Kirkby management were not only prepared
but willing to make some real, albeit limited, concessions to shopfloor
union organisation, whilst still retaining a distinct advantage in the
bargaining relationship.
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John Morgan started work at Birds Eye in 1975 in the
freeze and case department, immediately becoming active in the TGWU branch
and elected onto the branch coninittee at the age of 24. From 1978 he worked
on the 3-shift system in the prepared foods section of Unit 2, the largest
department in the factory, and became a shop steward in 1980. He described
the new Convenor's concilatory approach towards management:
There was very definitely a more co-operative relationship with
the management. Don't get me wrong - Joe was never weak with
management. He would go in and negotiate and get rewards. But
he didn't have to go in like Bobbie Lamb with his entourage
behind him, banging the table and calling people out. He would
do it quietly. He'd say 'this is what people want and we can
come to some sort of arrangement on it'.
Joe Carberry, who also worked in the 3-shift area of Unit
2 during the 1980s, echoed this description:
Joe's air of co-operation was a lot greater than Bob's ever
was. Joe was a pragmatist. He was the type who would say
'listen you've got to be realistic about this'. There was a
mutual love society that seemed to develop between the union
and the company. They would give us certain things and we would
give them certain things...Joe would bend to certain pressures,
of course. He would always push an issue. But the basic
difference was how far an issue should be pushed. If we had an
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issue that we thought was strong enough and we should push -
Joe would say 'No, what we'll do is keep it in procedure'. Joe
was a great procedure man. There were plenty of times we could
have had a major dispute but we used to step back because Joe
wasn't a fighter in that sense. Any issue that looked as if it
was going to lead to a dispute was fairly quickly circumvented.
He'd get involved and say 'You're not doing that'. The saying
for Joe Barton, especially among the 3-shift workers, was
'Don't rock the boat lads'.
Billy Caldwell, a rank and file union activist, worked in
Birds Eye from 1977, for the most part in the Unit 2 department, where he
served as a shop steward for a couple of years in the early 1980s, and was
a coriinitted, although independent, socialist. He pointed out the key
political difference between Joe Barton and Bobbie Lamb:
Bobbie Lamb was very much a political figure, a Labour Party
man. Under his stewardship the branch took on a definite
political shade. He would allow a fair amount of political
discussion. Joe Barton tended to divorce politics entirely from
trade union organisation. With him it was purely an industrial,
trade union business. He went in, did his job and went home,
and that was it. So under Joe Barton there was a political
vacuum. The stewards from the 70s had never been political in
terms of party politics but they had been politically motivated
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in terms of industrial politics. But that type of politics
gradually disappeared.
Literally within a few weeks of assuming the Convenor's
position Joe Barton was attempting to stamp his new found authority and
restraining influence on the shopfloor militancy that had begun to develop
within the 3-shift area of the new Unit 2 cooked foods department. With new
Birds Eye products coming on stream it was an area constantly changing and
under pressure from departmental managers hell-bent on imposing new
'efficient' working practices. Flexibility of labour and job demarcation
lay at the heart of the constant disputes between the 3-shift stewards and
managers. As the first stage in the production process it effectively
became the 'new cold-store' in reverse, the centre of militancy in the
factory, wielding enormous potential industrial muscle. The all-male
workforce operated as a close-knit self-contained unit in a 'free working'
environment - rather than being tied to an assembly line. With the help of
two or three militant shop stewards they were able to build up strong
sectional trade union organisation.
But from the very beginning Joe Barton made it clear he
would not countenance disputes. At a heated emergency stewards' meeting in
October 1979 - called to discuss a walk-out by the 3-shift area in a
dispute over manning levels - the new Convenor argued vigorously for the
strike to be called off, even though management's stance represented a
direct challenge to union negotiating rights. It was only the company's
sudden imposition of selected lay-offs that pulled the carpet from under
his feet; the stewards' coimtittee invoked the 'one-out, all-out' policy and
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the factory was completely closed down for two weeks before a compromise
settlement was reached (16). The new Convenor was more successful in March
1980 when he used his casting vote at a stewards' meeting against
supporting another walk-out in the 3-shift area over demarcation. He argued
in favour of allowing management to man-up the strikers' jobs, thereby
forcing the strikers' return to work on the company's terms (17). Joe
Carberry recalled the frustration he felt as a departmental steward in the
3-shift area:
Basically, they would negotiate, co-operate, do everything
other than call a dispute. To give examples, I would be here
all day long, there were that many. So many times we stepped
back from the brink and said 'no'. A lot of the issues were to
do with flexibility. They wanted to move us to other areas -
but we wouldn't budge. When we used to put the arguments on
flexibility to Joe in the context of having a dispute over it -
Joe would always say 'You're not going to win that because
we've got a factory-wide agreement that gives them 100 per cent
flexibility. What makes you think you're so bleeding different
in the 3-shift area?'.
Brenda Carberry - Joe's wife - also worked at Birds Eye
during the 1980s, on the multi-vac assembly lines in Unit 2. She explained
how Joe Barton's 'Don't rock the boat' philosophy also applied to the less
well organised sections of the factory:
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There were a number of times when the women would walk off the
lines, 9 times out of 10 because of the cold. We were handling
frozen meat and it was freezing. They wouldn't even give us
jackets to wear. They were just spontaneous walk-outs but we
were always slapped like naughty girls 'get back to work'. The
stoppage would last until the Convenor came down and said
'Right, get to work girls and I'll go and sort it out'. But he
never did.
There was a very marked decline in the number of
sectional stoppages during the early 1980s, only about 4 or 5 a year across
the whole factory and despite the relative strength of the 3-shift area and
the occasional stoppage on the lines in Unit 2, disputes were generally
much more volatile, short-lived and unsuccessful compared with the 1970s.
Of course, in part, this was due to the impact inside the plant of a
hostile economic and political environment, notably the recession, shake-
out of jobs and major defeats for sections of the British working class
movement, notably the miners' in 1984-5. As John Morgan acknowledged:
The effect was apathy amongst the workers. They saw very well-
organised groups of workers being defeated and the attitude
that became inbred was 'we cannot win'. Because of Thatcher you
started hearing rumourings that the trade union movement was
finished. You had to argue with your own membership and
convince them that trade unionism was still alive and kicking.
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But the Convenor's disapproval of strikes inside the
Birds Eye plant also contributed to this lack of confidence on the
shopfloor. Pouring cold water on those isolated sparks of rank and file
resistance that did occasionally ignite only further reinforced the belief
that 'we cannot win'. Although the handful of shop stewards in the 3-shift
area gained a reputation across the factory for their militancy they were
in a distinct minority on the stewards' coninittee as a whole and the senior
stewards never really questioned Joe Barton's activities. Indeed, the
negotiating committee's role was gradually transformed from a body that
made collective decisions on bargaining and strategy to essentially no more
than a vehicle through which management transmitted its ideas. John Morgan
explained:
In the early '80s the negotiating committee didn't function. It
was there in name only. The company would send for them if they
wanted to introduce third-party meat into the factory,
introduce new products or if there was a serious failure to
agree on a factory-wide basis. They got involved in
departmental disputes to tell people they were out of line -
they were wildcatting. But apart from that it played a very low
key role. Otherwise the company just went direct to the
Convenor.
As the general economic situation outside the plant
deteriorated the politics of survival inside it under Joe Barton's
leadership proved a more unifying factor than any alternative which the
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left stewards, marginalised within the 3-shift area, were able to provide.
Joe Barton was able to keep in check those elements within the stewards'
body who were more active and militant by relying on those who were more
passive and less antagonistic to management, balancing the majority of the
stewards against the minority prepared to fight. In the short-term, this
policy created an element of stability in workplace industrial relations,
but in the long-term it had extremely damaging consequences for shopfloor
union organisation.
Joe Barton was able to justify his intense aversion to
shopfloor militancy by pointing to a variety of concessions he was able to
obtain through an alternative 'strong bargaining relations' approach to
management. Yet even a surrinary examination of these gains reveals their
strict limitations. It is true manning levels were substantially increased
in Unit 2 through shopfloor bargaining and Joe Barton broke completely new
ground by getting management to finally concede a bereavement leave
agreement (for close family relations) and a medical leave agreement (for
hospital and dental appointments) with paid time-off work. He also
negotiated a reduction in the working week from 40 hours to 39 hours. As
Billy Caldwell acknowledged: 'The company agreed to things Bob Lamb could
never get off them - Joe got them just like that. He'd get up a meeting
with the members and say 'Lambie couldn't get this, look how I've got
that'. On the face of it, such negotiated concessions seem impressive; they
certainly boosted Joe Barton's esteem and authority amongst rank and file
shopfloor workers. Yet, the underlying reality was rather less convincing.
To begin with, the increase in manning levels in Unit 2,
particularly the 3-shift area, was won almost exclusively through the
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efforts of sectional stewards, rather than the Convenor. As for the other
gains, they clearly did not cost the company very much and nothing of
substance, in terms of any real improvement in working conditions, was
conceded. In fact, when it came to the reduction in the working week, the
contrary was the case. Joe Barton actually presented the company with an
offer they could not refuse; the production of 40 hours work within 39
hours. In effect, the concessions from management were readily traded-off
in return for stewards' compliance with wide-ranging flexibility aimed at
boosting production output, which in the long term only served to undermine
workers' hard-won shopfloor conditions.
Nonetheless, the substantive pressures and incentives
towards more conciliatory bargaining relations and a less militant
perspective should not be underestimated. For many workers these gains,
however limited in nature, were real enough and appeared to confirm the
merits of a strategy of accomodation rather than confrontation. It meant
fewer strikes, less disruption to production and the security of employment
amidst a hostile environment; in the circumstances an alternative militant
approach to management appeared merely self-destructive. In this sense, Joe
Barton's routinised bargaining relations were located within and made
possible by actual material conditions and their reflection in shopfloor
workers' consciousness. The real problem was that the stewards' plant-level
'strong bargaining relations' helped to demobilise collective rank and file
activity.
The uneveness in stewards' bargaining leverage between
different sections of the plant evident in the 1970s, became even more
marked in the 1980s, especially between the relatively much better
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organised all-male departments - such as the 3-shift area, the butchery
department and the cold-store - compared with the much less well-organised
all-women chicken stripping department and mixed male and female assembly
area of Unit 2. This was a consequence, partly of workers' varying
strategic relationship to production, partly of the different organisation
of work, partly of the type of management approach adopted, and partly the
type of shop stewards' leadership provided. Many groups of both male and
female workers -independently of their shop stewards - had managed to carve
out some control over their jobs by operating the 'welt system', an
unofficial system of covering for absent colleagues on a tea break. It was
evidence of workers' collective organisation used to relieve the grinding
monotony of the job and to undermine management's discipline.
But the practice also had its weaknesses, which is
probably why management for the most part came to tolerate the practice.
Not only did it sometimes mean a group of workers probably worked even more
'efficently' than they might otherwise have done but it could also have the
effect of backfiring against other sections of workers. Brenda Carberry
described how the ingenious use of the practice by some men created
antagonisms amongst some women on the lines:
What happened was they didn't just work the 'welt', they worked
the 'welt on the welt'. Say 2 people started work at 6 o'clock
in the morning. Well, someone would take the first break until
half-past 6 and then come in - and the other person then went
off until 7 o'clock. But what actually happened was that one
would go off at twenty five past six and his relief wouldn't
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come in until twenty five to seven. Then one would go off again
at five to and the other wouldn't take over until five past. So
they weren't ever putting half-an-hour in. But that left the
women on the line shouting "where's the work he's supposed to
be supplying us with". And we'd be left stuck on the line for
nearly two hours because our relief was only one-in-five.
Instead of fighting for the women to be granted a better
relief system, to level the organisation upwards, the stewards were more
concerned not to do anything that might jeopardise the men's relatively
advantageous position. Even though the introduction of new technology
provided new possibilities there was very little breakdown of the strict
demarcation between male and female jobs in the factory during the 1980s.
Brenda Carberry recalled: "The Convenor was even known to have said: 'A
woman will get on a fork-lift truck over my dead body' ". Finally, the
earnings of the women compared with the men continued to be vastly
inferior, partly as a result of the new 'balanced pay structure' imposed on
the stewards after the lock-out but also because most male workers tended
to work high rates of overtime and were granted better holiday pay compared
with most women workers. Unfortunately, although unity between male and
female workers was undoubtedly possible it was not in any way facilitated
by the virtual collapse of sectional disputes that occured in the factory
during the 1980s, in part a consequence of the 'Don't rock the boat'
philosophy.
Paradoxically, despite the marked decline in sectional
stoppages of work the Birds Eye shop stewards organised a number of all-out
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plant wide demonstration strikes. At first glance, this paradox may appear
incongruous, but appearances can often be deceptive, masking the reality
underlying them. The nature of the disputes provides an important measure
of their overall significance.
In May 1980 the stewards organised a one-day stoppage of
the factory in support of the TUC's Day of Action against the Tory
government anti-union legislation (18); in June and September of 1982 they
organised two one-day stoppages of the plant, in pursuance of the Birds Eye
national wage claim, and as part of the TIJC Day of Action in support of
hospital workers (19); in March and July of 1984 there were two one-day
plant-wide strikes, in support of Liverpool City Council and against the
redundancy terms being offered for closure of the Birds Eye Yarmouth plant
(20); and in September 1985, the plant was brought to a halt for three days
when stewards convinced their members not to cross a picket line set up by
strikers from the Gloucester Birds Eye plant (21).
On the one hand, the Kirkby stewards' ability to
organise such action showed that they had by no means been completely co-
opted by management and illustrated the potential industrial muscle that
could still be wielded; the willingness of rank and file members to follow
their stewards' lead revealed a deep conimitment to basic trade union
principles of unity and solidarity and was a testimony to the continuing
resilience of workplace union organisation in the plant despite the set-
back inflicted during the 1977-8 lock-out and the series of workers'
defeats inside the British labour movement generally. On the other hand, it
would be a mistake to ignore the actual limitations that were
simultaneously in-built into these stoppages. Firstly, every one of them -
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except the dispute in support of the Gloucester strikers - was initiated
not by the Kirkby shop stewards themselves but by full-time trade union
officials. Secondly, strictly speaking only one of the stoppages, that
concerning the pay claim in 1982, directly affected the day-to--day battle
on the shopfloor between workers and management in the Birds Eye Kirkby
plant itself, and even that was something that could only be negotiated
above factory level. By contrast, virtually every one of the other disputes
was a solidarity strike, taken not so much to extract concessions from
Kirkby management but rather to show support for other sections of the
working class, whether it was within the Birds Eye group (as in the case of
the disputes backing the Yarmouth and Gloucester plants) or outside it (as
in the case of those backing hospital workers and Liverpool City Council).
The key point here is that such solidarity action for external reasons was
not paralleled by and translated into shopfloor bargaining relations
internally within the Kirkby plant itself. It is not a question of
counterposing one to the other. Arguably, building solidarity for other
sections of workers could have been used as an important mechanism for
restoring shopfloor morale and rebuilding an organised core of opposition
to management at local level, the one could have fed into the other.
Instead, what happened was that the one effectively became a substitute for
the other.
There was certainly the potential to revitalise shopfloor
organisation across the plant but as Joe Carberry explained, the stewards
did not seek to exploit the situation to their advantage:
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We specialised in the NenuMaster range on the multi-vacs.
Well, I think it took the company by surprise. It took off
better than their wildest dreams, it was one of our best
sellers, we actually couldn't make enough for the market. So
the factory was booming. After 1983 some stewards felt more
confident that with investment still going into the place that
the time to sit back was finished. We should now progress the
aspirations of our members and push the company a little
further every time. But that didn't rnaterialise because as far
as Joe Barton was concerned the factory was always in a tenuous
state. He wouldn't recognise there was a strength of feeling
building up from amongst the stewards and from the members as
to the terms and conditions they were employed under. We were
always told 'No, it's not the right time to strike'. But it was
never the right time to strike. We kept being told we shouldn't
go for this, we shouldn't go for that, we shouldn't go for the
other. Joe Barton would say: 'we've got to keep our powder
dry'.
But 'keeping the power dry' over a prolonged period of
time was a self-defeating exercise. Despite the willingness of the Kirkby
senior stewards to organise the occasional one-day plant-wide stoppage of
work in support of other workers they were consciously opposed to the
encouragement of similar activity against their own management. Not only
did this strategy weaken their potential bargaining position on the
shopfloor (and their relationship to rank and file members) but it also
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meant that when their organisation was put to the decisive test in the late
1980s it was unable to deliver.
* 1985-9: tJ downward slope
The closure of the butchery and chicken-stripping
departments inside the Kirkby plant in 1985 and 1986 without any effective
shopfloor resistance further weakened the strength of the stewards'
organisation. Although the chicken department stewards appealed to the
stewards' coninittee for plant-wide strike action to resist the closure a
tactical blunder combined with the years of damage to shopfloor union
organisation threw away the chance of victory. Joe Carberry explained what
happened:
There was an argument on the stewards' committee over the
timing of a call for a stoppage. The chicken-roam stewards
wanted to take the issue immediately to a mass meeting of the
members in the November. A number of us, including Joe Barton,
argued against this, that the time would not be right until
after Christmas. But the stewards' committee voted to call a
meeting that Saturday and recommend a stoppage. It was a highly
charged atmosphere because it was such an integral part of the
site and had been for many years. A lot of stewards were really
angry and felt we had to stand up and fight. But the membership
overturned us. We felt we could have got them behind us if we
had gone to them in the January. But all we could do was go
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back to the company with our tail between legs and negotiate
the closure.
Almost inevitably the '])on't rock the boat' policy had
begun to catch up with the stewards' comittee. Instead of encouraging an
irrmiediate strike in the chicken-stripping department and then building for
support in every section before appealing for an all-out strike the
stewards' hesitant and divided stance merely fed the doubts and lack of
confidence they had themselves contributed to so much in the past. The
closure of the butchery and chicken-stripping departments left only the
Unit 2 area of the factory functioning. Although there were no compulsory
redundancies there was a steady decline in the numbers employed in the
plant between 1985-9 - it was calculated that about 270 jobs were lost -
partly through voluntary redundancy, but mainly as a result of natural
wastage, as vacant positions were filled by labour transfered internally
rather than brought in from outside.
Meanwhile, Birds Eye had embarked on a long-term plan
termed 'Workstyle' aimed at introducing radical new working practices into
its plants across the country, provoking the 1985 strike at Gloucester
which spread to Kirkby. The Kirkby stewards' negotiating coninittee
initially resisted Workstyle because of the threat it posed to working
conditions and job security but by 1987 they had approached management
themselves to have Workstyle brought in, partly because with a £7.50 a week
supplement workers at the Gloucester and Lowestoft plants were earning more
money than at Kirkby, and partly because the massive new investment made at
the two plants to accompany Workstyle was desperately wanted in Kirkby as a
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demonstration of the company's long-term corrinitment to the plant. But as
John Morgan acknowledged the stewards had myopic expectations:
What the Factory General Manager did at first was pull the wool
over our eyes. He told us the introduction of Workstyle would
not lead to redundancies. It would be phased in and a
continuation of the levels of natural wastage we had over the
last 5 years would take care of the reduction of labour. Its
introduction would be subject to agreement from a monitoring
group set up in the factory with the negotiating coninittee
being represented. So we thought 'OK, we'll accept that'. We
will go in and negotiate what for us was a lifeline to better
pay and conditions. And a number of stewards including myself
went and visited the other factories to see 'Workstyle' in
operation.
But it soon became clear there would be no real
consultation or negotiation over Workstyle whatsoever. At the end of 1987,
two new Kirkby plant managers, Ted Cowan (Personnel Manager) and Mark
Fitzpatrick (Factory General Manager), were appointed and irrinediately
confronted the stewards with draconian terms for the introduction of
Workstyle. As John Morgan explained:
We knew that Workstyle would mean losing jobs. We thought we
would lose about 60 people. But the company's conception was
that we'd lose 380 jobs, a third of the workforce. That was
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unpalatable to us. My department in the 3-shift area was going
to be ravaged. Where we had 29 a shift we would have 11. We
argued the department couldn' t work on that. The whole thing
was a farce. The reaction from the stewards body was 'there is
no way you're going to get away with it'.
Whilst the stewards were prepared, in principle, to
accept a number of redundancies, the financial terms offered by Birds Eye
were completely unpalatable. Although they were prepared, in principle, to
accept radical new working practices the company's insistence on imposing
them with no negotiation was also unacceptable. But the real sticking point
for the stewards was the company's refusal to give a firm conmitment to
future investment in the Kirkby plant to secure its long term future, even
though this had occurred at the other Birds Eye plants that had accepted
Workstyle. The stewards' resistance took the form of boycotting all formal
negotiations with plant level management for over two years with an
insistence on a company investment plan as a precondition of its
introduction. At the end of 1988 a ballot of the workforce overwhelmingly
backed the stewards' stance.
Finally in March 1989 Birds Eye announced the plant would
be shut down with the loss of almost 1,000 jobs, blaming the decision on
the workforce's failure to agree to changes in working practices, to
increase productivity and to accept 380 redundancies. In fact, the real
reason for the closure was the cut-throat battle with competitors that
challenged Birds Eye ' s former supremacy within the frozen food industry.
The company had lost a third of its market share in the previous ten years
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and was determined to protect profits by making workers pay. Having already
slashed 5,000 production jobs in other plants "in pursuit of maximum
efficiency" the Kirkby factory was merely the latest casualty (22). At the
same time, in the run-up to the removal of trade barriers in 1992, Unilever
was preparing to undertake a massive re-organisation and rationalisation of
its entire food operations across Europe. The need to integrate their
European food business meant reducing costs even further with production
confined to a limited number of strategically positioned factories nearer
to the centre of the European market (23). The result was investment of £30
million in its Grimsby factory - where the company planned to move Kirkby's
production.
A company like Unilever makes tactical decisions on a
week to week basis - whether to raise or lower output, how to deal with
strikes and so on. But strategic decisions - which products to make, where
the main production units will be sited and how these plants are to be
integrated - are decided years in advance. It appears that Birds Eye,
operating under the direction of Unilever, had no intention of introducing
Workstyle into the Kirkby plant - given that its closure was imminent. This
explains why management, after stewards had themselves requested Workstyle,
presented them with conditions which they knew they could not accept.
Birds Eye were able to use their rejection as the pretext for the closure
decision. No doubt the two new confrontationist plant managers appointed to
the Kirkby plant in 1987 were placed there with the pre-conceived purpose
of overseeing the closure.
Between the announcement in March and the plant' s
anticipated closure in September the shop stewards' coninittee launched a
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public campaign aimed at convincing the company to reverse its decision.
They set up a coninunity-based Birds Eye Support Group and weekly meetings
of up to 40 supporters organised visits to other Birds Eye plants to win
blacking of the Meni.iniaster range of products and a 3,000 strong solidarity
demonstration in Kirkby, with delegations from the Gloucester, Lowestoft
and Hull plants (24). But the stewards' strategy of resistance to the
closure was fatally flawed. To begin with, it was considerably compromised
by the 'moderate' Ideological stance adopted to media reports of the
plant's industrial militancy being the key factor behind the closure. The
problem with this 'we are very responsible' approach was that underlying it
was a misplaced hope Birds Eye might be forced to change Its mind through
sheer force of reasoned argument. Secondly, trying to marry a policy of
opposition to the closure with such a defensive strategy inevitably became
shipwrecked on its own internal contradictions. For example, accepting In
principle there would have to be redundancies undermined the stewards'
argument that the workforce was 'efficient' and the plant 'viable' and
should be kept open. If the factory was 'overmanned' where did you draw the
line as to the number of jobs to be lost - the 380 originally sought, all
those wanting voluntary redundancy, or the entire workforce as the company
demanded?
Thirdly, the stewards' committee chose not to call for a
plant wide strike iirrnediately the closure decision was announced. T(WtJ
District Secretary John Farrell warned them against what he called 'stunts
which would provoke management'. Yet there is no doubt a strike at Kirkby
would have had a cumulative effect on the company and would have been a
most effective way of harnessing the latent anger of rank and file members,
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mobilising them for the task of winning solidarity action at the other
Birds Eye plants aimed at paralysing frozen food production across the
country. Joe Carberry explained:
I felt if a strong recommendation to take strike action had
been given from day one the outcome could have been different.
I always argued that there was only one way to save the
factory, that was to have a go ourselves. If that lead had been
given it might have changed things. We would have been in a
position where we could have made sure nothing moved out of the
site and we could have gone round the other sites. But I think
we let a lot of people down in the way the fight was actually
waged. At the end of the day there was no real will to save the
factory.
Not recommending immediate strike action had the effect
of dissipating the mood of resistance on the shopfloor, feeding the
passivity and reinforcing the view that closure was inevitable. Finally,
following the advice of the local IW1J full-time official, the stewards'
committee made the mistake of relying on support from the other Birds Eye
plants to win the fight for them. Although they repeatedly threatened all-
out strike action they were not prepared to act without simultaneous strike
action in the other Birds Eye plants. Eventually three months after the
closure announcement was made a simultaneous strike ballot was organised in
all three plants by the TGWU officials. Kirkby voted 6-1 for strike action
- although the apparent high vote masked the fact that many workers who
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wanted to take voluntary redundancy agreed to vote in favour of a strike
after the stewards agreed to open up negotiations with management over
severance terms. The Gloucester and Lowestoft plants voted against strike
action by majorities of 200 and 30 respectively. From that moment the
campaign against the closure of the Kirkby factory was formally abandoned.
Of course, there was some logic to the stewards' strategy. They were
acutely aware that unless they got solidarity action at the other Birds Eye
plants it was unlikely an all-out strike in Kirkby on its own would force
management's hand over the closure decision and they feared jeopardising
workers' redundancy payments in a doomed adventurist set-piece battle. But
the question arises: unless Kirkby took the initiative in taking strike
action themselves, how realistic was it to expect the other plants to act
on their behalf? As Billy Caldwell commented:
My reaction as an individual was that I was prepared to have a
go. If we couldn't stand up and defend ourselves no one was
gonna come along to defend us. So I felt the cart was put
before the horse to a certain extent. 'Let's have the ballot
first and then we'll all walk at the same time' - that was
utopian. We should have gone on strike and then gone to the
other plants for their support. We would have been in a much
stronger position to make an appeal if we had done it that way
round.
No doubt Kirkby's excellent record of solidarity for
other workers raised expectations amongst the stewards that instead of
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having to take responsibility for fighting the battle themselves they could
rely on support from the other plants, as if the Fifth Cavalry would come
charging to their defence. Thus, at the end of the day the factory was
closed without any effective form of action being taken against the company
whatsoever. It was a graphic illustration of how weak the stewards'
organisation had become in the preceding years.
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STFMARI)S' RELAfl(XSHIP m RANK AND FILE MFlBF1S: ThE 1970s AND 80s
* the 1970s: forging of the links
In the 1960s plant-level negotiations with management
were conducted virtually exclusively through the single channel of the
Convenor, with shop stewards playing very much a subordinate role. The
establishment of a negotiating coninittee shortly after Bobbie Lamb's
election ensured there was a more collective leadership style during the
1970s. Even so the position was still central in the plant; partly, because
although the senior stewards were involved in key bargaining issues
affecting the plant, it was left to the Convenor to conduct most day-to-day
negotiations with management; partly, because as the only steward on 100
per cent facility time the Convenor was constantly called upon by stewards
to deal with shopfloor grievances; partly, because Bobbie Lamb himself was
a charismatic and influential figure. But despite his authoritative
position within the factory Bobbie Lamb appears to have lacked the will or
the ability to systematically concentrate power into his hands and his
dramatic resignation from the Convener's position in late 1976 was a
illustration of the constraints he felt imposed on him by the stewards'
committee in general and the negotiating committee in particular.
Perhaps the most intriguing aspect of the relationship
between Bobbie Lamb and rank and file members was his attitude towards
shopfloor stoppages of work. On the one hand, he demonstrated a willingness
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to call for militant all-out strike action across the factory on a number
of occasions, for example over the guaranteed working week, annual wage
negotiations, bonus payments and fixed-term contracts. Invariably, it was
the anger of rank and file workers at management's heavy handed approach
that created the conditions for such action. But it was Bobbie Lamb who
often took the initiative in recommending a strike. Of course, in most
cases the strikes were short-lived stoppages. Even so, Bobbie Lamb won
overwhelming backing for his appeals on each occasion. The magnificant
solidarity shown for the engineer's strike - that subsequently led to a
management lock-out - highlighted in sharp relief the significance of
Bobbie Lamb's socialist and militant con!nitment to trade union principles.
Joe Carberry related how the Convenor's intervention was critical in
galvanising support for the engineers':
The company thought there would be little sympathy amongst TGWU
members when the engineers walked out. We irrinecliately called a
stewards meeting to discuss what we were going to do about the
threat of lay-offs. We met in the training hut - which was
right by the main gate. It had big windows in it and people
walking past could see the stewards inside. Some of our members
started shouting 'We're not going out on strike'. So we were
under a little bit of pressure from some our members because
they didn't want to become embroiled in another dispute having
just been out on the tiles themselves. And some stewards said
we shouldn't bother supporting the engineers, as they'd walked
past our picket lines when we were out...
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The meeting went on for about four hours. But at the end of the
day it was Bobbie Lamb's very persuasive arguments about the
branch's policy of not crossing picket lines that won the day.
So what we told the company was although we would not withdraw
our labour in support of the engineers - if they mounted a
picket on the gates - then no T and G member would cross it.
It was an extremely difficult decision to have made. The
stewards did not have time to organise a mass meeting to put the arguments
across and convince the members through open debate. They had to agree on a
principled stand in the heat of the moment and then join the engineers'
picket line the following morning so as to turn their members away. Bobbie
Lamb's authority and respect was undoubtedly the key contributory factor in
winning the support of the overwhelming majority of the rank and file, and
retaining it throughout the eighteen-week lock-out.
On the other hand, although he was often very
sympathetic to rank and file members and stewards involved in departmental
disputes he also sought to develop rules governing the rights and duties of
shop stewards and their sections. The real dilemma arose whenever sectional
strikes threatened lay-offs across the whole plant. An indication of the
ambivalent type of response Bobbie Lamb adopted can be seen by considering
two incidents that occured at different periods of time. Firstly, according
to shop stewards' connittee minutes for 1977 there was a stoppage of work
by knock-out men in the freeze and case department - against the advice of
their shop steward Frank Doyle - over demands for an increase in job rate.
The minutes report:
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Bobbie Lamb felt the men had a reasonable claim but was
concerned the factory was in serious danger of closing down
because of the action. He invited them to meet with the shop
stewards' committee to resolve the issue. The men complained
they had repeatedly approached their steward for action of some
description but none had been forthcoming so they had decided
to act by theniselves. The men agreed to return to work after
the stewards' committee agreed to look into their grievance and
report back in a few days time. Bobbie Lamb warned the stewards
about unauthorised stoppages of work and the repercussions it
could bring. He told them it appeared the freeze and case
workers lacked faith in their steward and said stewards should
report back to members as much as possible thereby giving
satisfaction that their problem was being looked into. They
should encourage members to bring their problems to light to
discourage wildcat action and they should have the confidence
of their members otherwise the stewards ability to negotiate
was impaired (25).
Clearly, on this occasion not only was Bobbie Lamb
highly sensitive to rank and file workers' sectional grievances but he was
also acutely aware of the need for the close accountability of shop
stewards to the members. He overcame the problem of the threat of lay-offs
by promising to get the issue resolved in favour of the minority on strike
whilst convincing them to call off their action. The incident provides a
good example of how Bobbie Lamb - as the Convenor of the plant - had to
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balance the irrinediate day-to-day grievances of rank and file members with
the desire to provide a long term strategy to protect the interests of the
majority of workers across the plant. It is clear his main preoccupation
throughout was not only to find a solution that was satisfactory to most
concerned but that also led to a strengthing of workplace union
organisation at management's expense. This example provides a stark
contrast with the attitude adopted by Bobbie Lamb towards workers'
sectional militancy in the cold-store department during the early 1970s.
Shop stewards' minute books reveal that during one dispute:
Bobbie Lamb acknowledged cold-store departmental managers were
being deliberately provocative but warned that walk-outs
threatened lay-offs and advised the shop stewards' committee to
disassociate themselves from the action (26).
When Birds Eye set up an inquiry into the cold-store it
was with Bobbie Lamb's willing approval and participation, despite protests
from the cold store stewards. Why did Bobbie Lamb take this negative
attitude towards sectional militancy in the cold-store? Joe Carberry
offered an explanation:
I think Bob recognised the cold-store lads took things a bit
further than they ought to on some occasions. So much so that
when Bob said to them 'Let's try and negotiate our way out of
this one rather than just walk-out' - even he had a job. There
was always a built-in animosity towards that. There was always
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a gulf between the cold-store and the rest of the factory and
to a certain extent there was an elitist element amongst some
of the cold-store workers who didn't think about factory
organisation, they only thought about their own parochial aims.
Once the cold-store stopped everything else shuddered to a
halt with people losing their bonus and screaming :'It's those
bolshie bastards in the cold-store again'. Bob felt it wasn't
good for the future of the factory to have a massive operation
disrupting the factory practically on a weekly basis.
Yet paradoxically it was the strength of the cold-store
department that gave the stewards' couimittee in the plant its overall
authority vis-a-vis management. Indeed, sectional strength is the bedrock
of any strong shop steward organisation; its success depends upon stewards
in each section of a workplace building union organisation through
successfully taking up imediate issues and involving the members. This is
precisely what appears to have occurred in the cold-store department and
their strategic relationship to production greatly assisted their
negotiating power.
Of course, although sectional strength is vital,
sectionalism - simply being concerned with your own pay and conditions and
ignoring everybody else - is a recipe for disaster. Again, this tendency
towards parochialism appears to have been evident in the cold-store
department but Bobbie Lamb could have made a conscious effort to encourage
a generalisation of the self-confidence and organisational strength of the
cold-store workers throughout the rest of the factory. That would have
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meant involving the cold-store stewards not just in taking a lead on the
immediate issues affecting them in their own department but on the wider
issues confronting the whole workforce as well. It would have meant arguing
with the cold-store workers to link their grievances with those of other
sections of workers, taking united action against management (as well as
raising broader political isssues confronting the workforce). If this had
been done it is possible shop stewards from the cold-store could have set
the benchmark for those less confident and less well organised in a way
that strengthened the power of the stewards generally throughout the
factory.
Undoubtedly, such an approach would have been difficult
and by no means straightforward. Pushing for industrial action across the
plant was something Bobbie Lamb already had difficulties in convincing the
senior stewards to support, although if it had been in pursuit of demands
that affected workers in every department he might have had greater
success. At least such an approach would have had the merit of attempting
to accentuate the positive and play down the negative; strengthening the
level of shop steward organisation in the factory at management's expense.
The alternative approach adopted by Bobbie Lamb was completely self-
defeating. Agreeing to participate with the company's inquiry into the cold
store conceded the problem lay with the level of shopfloor militancy and
workers' organisatlon rather than with the nature of work and management
intransigence. The break-up of what was the best organised department in
the factory only served to demoralise and weaken the stewards' orgariisation
across the plant generally. No doubt it encouraged the reluctance of senior
stewards to back Bobbie Lamb's subsequent calls for action which in turn
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appears eventually to have led to his resignation as Convenor.
Bobbie Lamb's contrasting attitude to the problem of
sectional disputes in these two examples, in 1977 and 1972, had their
origins in a multitude of factors, including the difference in the
regularity of disputes in the two departments and changes in Bobbie Lamb's
authority within the stewards' committee. Yet there also appears to have
been an underlying ambiguity in Bobbie Lamb's approach to sectional
disputes; whilst he saw an important role for workers' struggles it was
essentially as an adjunct to his negotiating abilities as Convenor.
Nevertheless, the pendulum was pulled much more towards a democratic
relationship to the members than under the brief Convenorship of George
Knight.
Although there was significant variation from one
department to another across the factory there appears to have been a
relatively democratic and accountable relationship between the shop
stewards and their members during the 1970s, at least until after the lock-
out in 1978. At the heart of this dynamic interaction was the general level
of confidence and combativity of rank and file workers. Stewards negotiated
over job evaluation, bonus payments and condition rates which helped them
build up the strength of their section and enhance their prestige in the
eyes of their constituents. Not only did they respond to disputes within
their own departments but the stewards' committee took the initiative in
recommending plant-wide strike action on eight or nine separate occasions
during the 1970s, each time receiving the overwhelming backing of the
members. Certainly, holding together the union organisation throughout the
period of the lock-out and maintaining the backing of the members was a
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testimony to the leadership abilities of the stewards' body in the plant.
Paul Chin related:
We had mass meetings with our members every fortnight during
the lock-out. There was good contact there and it was part of
the reason why we kept together for so long. Some of the T and
G stewards used to go to the engineers' mass meetings and boost
their morale by speaking in support of the dispute.
Throughout the 1970s every steward worked on the job in
day-to-day contact with their constituents. Compared with the 1960s
management allowed stewards more lee-way in taking time-off work to deal
with their members' grievances, although it depended on the type of job a
steward was engaged on and the availability of reliefs. Obviously the
senior stewards on the negotiating committee had much greater facility time
available to them - particularly for meetings with management - although
they do not appear to have taken much time away from their shopfloor job.
Formally, stewards were elected every two years in each department.
Examination of the minute books for the 1970s reveals that although a small
core of about 10-12 stewards remained in office for a number of years there
was a constant turnover of the other 15-20 steward positions. Lack of a
detailed breakdown makes it difficult to assess how much variation there
was between different departments, although one of the cold-store stewards
remained in office for over 15 years. Nonetheless, there is little doubt
the contesting of stewards' positions at election time was a regular
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feature, an indication of the interest in union affairs. Joe Carberry
remembered there was a clear difference between the 1970s and the 1980s:
We had more stewards' positions contested in the '70s than we
had in the '80s. And more positions were contested in the
middle '70s compared with the late '70s. We used to sometimes
have two or three candidates for one job. That's because with
the factory booming there was a lot more people in the place.
So it was quite a healthy situation.
Once established as shop stewards there was little
evidence of rank and file members losing confidence sufficiency to demand a
new election mid-term, although the fact that it did occur on occasion -
for example to Paul Chin in the butchery department - was an illustration
of the residual strength of the tradition of direct democracy. There was
not a strong tradition of sectional or departmental meetings in the
factory; such meetings were only organised by stewards on specific
occasions, such as a walk-out of the members. Equally, mass meetings on
site were far from coriiiion. The main formal channel of democratic
accountability between shop stewards and members was the TGWIJ union branch
meeting, held monthly on a Sunday morning, to which the Convenor gave a
report back on failures to agree, national pay negotiations, etc. But in
the early 1970s the branch was in a pretty moribund state. It was only
after an influx of some younger and more political stewards that it turned
into a more lively forum for debate and argument about both industrial and
political issues, as Joe Carberry explained:
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When I started in the factory there was no politics discussed
at all in the branch. Only about 20-30 went to meetings. But by
1974-5 some of the older stewards started to drift away and
relatively new stewards, like myself, came in. With Bobbie Lamb
what we introduced gradually was an element of politics into
the branch. We supported the Right to Work Campaign, the Anti-
Nazi League and that and the branch started to play a much
higher political profile.
Outside speakers were regularly invited to address the
meeting; there was the adoption of some basic trade union principles -
such as respect for picket lines; and solidarity donations were given to
other workers in struggle - such as local strikers at Plessey's, Roneo
Vickers and Ford Halewood (27). General resolutions adopted by the branch
included opposition to the Corrie anti-abortion bill and the Official
Secrets Act (28). By 1977 there were between 50-60 members regularly
attending branch meetings - with up to 200 if there was a dispute in the
factory. The number of stewards involved also increased from about 9 in
1973 to about 15 in 1977 (29). Dave Worrall, who worked as a fitter's mate
in the engineering department at Birds Eye for 33 years and was a member of
the branch coninittee throughout the 1970s and 8Os, confirmed there were
quite a few women actively involved in the branch, including women shop
stewards.
Yet whilst the transformation of the TGWIJ branch helped
to involve more shop stewards and rank and file members in union affairs
there was a tendency for the left union activists - who provided much of
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its initiative and driving force - to over-emphasise the branch's
importance, in the process adopting some rather bureaucratic decisions, for
example decreeing that stewards absent from two consecutive branch meetings
forfeited their steward's card. Instead of an emphasis on day-to--day
political arguments with rank and file members on the shopfloor - for
example, taking collection sheets in support of other workers' struggles
around - the stewards often looked towards passing resolutions in the trade
union branch as the best way to achieve results.
A noticeable feature was the generally low involvement of
women in union activities compared with men in the factory. Of course,
there were specific reasons for this disparity. Unmarried women did not
traditionally expect to be working in the job for more than a few years,
and therefore did not under normal conditions show a great deal of interest
in union activities. The older married women, who returned to work as their
children reached school age, were often impeded from playing a central
organising role in the workplace because of the continued responsibility
for childcare which forced many of them into part-time work and which
limited their ability to go to union branch meetings. Nonetheless, it
appears that women workers at Birds Eye came to the fore most when the
workforce as a whole was moving forward in struggle. During the 1970s their
double oppression acted as a spur driving a number of them to relatively
high levels of activism and coninitment. In 1968-70 the deputy Convener was
a woman, named Sister Kelly (30); when the negotiating committee was set up
in 1971 one of its five members was a woman, Sister Nalvern (31); the shop
stewards' coninittee had 30 members in 1972 of which 14 were women (32); the
branch committee had 16 members in 1974 of which 4 were women (33). But
Page 114
Birds Eye: Stewards' Relationship To Rank And File Members: 1970s/80s
when the workforce as a whole was in retreat in the period following the
lock-out it appears to have had the reverse effect, of being a fetter which
prevented them playing a full and effective role in sustaining low level
union organisation. Shop stewards' minute books reveal the following
information about women activists and the contrast with the period after
the lock-out is stark: by 1978 there were only five women shop stewards out
of about 30 (34); by 1979 only two women on a branch coriuiittee of about
fifteen (35) and none on the negotiating committee of five senior stewards
(36). Mary Scoggins compared the period of the early 1970s with the period
after the lock-out:
I can remember a time when the chicken stripping department and
the freeze and case department had some good, strong women
stewards who wouldn't take any hassle from the company. They'd
stand up and be counted. The factory was larger in the '70s so
obviously the ratio of women stewards was higher. But for a
number of reasons we lost our good women stewards - some
retired, others stayed on but their departments closed down and
they didn't become stewards in the new departments they were
transferred to. Obviously the lock-out and redundancies cut the
workforce and after that there were fewer women prepared to
come forward as stewards.
The sexual division of labour and the male dominance of
the stewards' coninittee placed obstacles in the path of the relationship of
stewards to rank and file members. Nonethiess, the stewards' committee was
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prepared to take up issues directly affecting women workers - such as a day
nursery (37), maternity leave (38) and equal pay (39) as well as other more
general issues affecting them, such as bonus payments on the racque pie
line. Moreover, the active involvement of some women in union affairs and
the participation of most women in the relatively high level of disputes in
the factory ensured that the divisions did not become an insurmountable
handicap, although the lock-out clearly arrested the process.
Arguably, a key limitation of the shop steward&
organisation in the Birds Eye plant during the 1970s, although not sharply
exposed at the time, was the lack of an organised and coherent political
alternative to lLabourismt within its ranks. Of course, Bobbie Lamb and the
handful of younger, activist shop stewards were not only industrial
militants but also held ideas which were to varying degrees distinct from
and more radical than those of traditional Labourism. Bobbie Lamb was a
left-wing member of the Labour Party whilst the others had a basic
socialist, class comitment without any fixed political affiliation -
although one or two had been influenced by revolutionary socialist
organisations in the past. Paradoxically, despite the fact that these
individual trade union activists raised political issues it was usually
outside the workplace in the union branch or in the abstract; in effect,
there was a separation between their political ideas and their non-
political practice on the shopfloor amongst rank and file members. They
took this attitude because they believed that overtly political issues went
beyond the shop steward comittee's bounds inside the factory and that they
should limit themselves to the issues of wages and conditions which would
unite all workers. If one word had to be used to describe them it would be
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'syndicalist' - except this implies they had arrived at a finished
ideological position, which was far from being the case. But they did make
a division between economics and politics, emphasising industrial struggle
to the detriment of political organisation. This did not prevent them from
offering a lead to shopfloor struggles and building up the strength of
union organisation in the plant during the 1970s. On the contrary, it was
often their initiative that pulled the other less militant stewards into
action. Nonetheless, their lack of an independent political perspective
meant they would find it increasingly difficult to challenge the policy of
co-operation with management that was adopted by senior stewards during the
recession years of the 1980s.
* the 1980s: loosening of links
There was a very different relationship between shop
stewards and rank and file members in the Birds Eye plant during the 1980s
compared with the 1970s, with the pendulum swinging towards a relatively
much more bureaucratic interaction. Firstly, there was the role of the new
Convenor. Not only did Joe Barton's 'strong bargaining relationship' with
management result in a concentration of decision making in his hands (and
those of the deputy Convenor) which effectively reduced the negotiating
comittee into a rubber-stamp, but it also served to weaken the close links
with shopfloor members. Billy Caidwell recalled:
Bobbie Lamb very regularly walked round the factory, visited
each department and had a talk with people on the shopfloor to
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see if there were any problems. Joe Barton tended to stick very
closely to the union office...Bobbie was more prepared to back
disputes that started. whereas one of the things that Joe
Barton was most proud of as Convenor was that there'd never
been a major stoppage during his tenure of office. That is not
a boast you would have ever heard Bobbie Lamb making.
The distinction between 'power for' and 'power over' is
useful in comparing Joe Barton with Bobbie Lamb's style of Convenorship.
Certainly, the 1980s saw a shift in emphasis. Joe Barton consistently and
systematically enforced the procedure against departments like the 3-shift
area that wanted to strike, by using the weekly stewards' coninittee meeting
to insist on section stewards' obligations to the wider interests of union
organisation. Of course, one of the factors behind Joe Barton's hostile
attitude towards departmental stoppages was the general lack of shopfloor
confidence to engage in militant struggle compared with the 1970s. In other
words, Joe Barton's approach was, in part, rooted in the 'keep your head
down' mood that much of the workforce themselves often felt, although it
critically depended on whether rank and file members were themselves
directly at the receiving end of management attacks as time and again the
anger and willingness of sections of workers to fight was dissipated by the
Convenor's active intervention. As Paul Chin explained, co-operating with
management inevitably backfired on the leading stewards on some occasions
as rank and file workers lost confidence in their ability to fight for
shopfloor improvements:
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By and large, the rest of the stewards coninittee went along
with Joe Barton's philosophy. To my way of thinking they had
the mistaken idea that every problem could be solved by
negotiation. But a lot of the bargaining we did with the
company we came out with the wrong end of it. A lot of people
lost faith in the shop stewards committee.
Thus, Joe Barton got away with his 'Don't rock the boat'
philosophy, partly because most rank and file workers and stewards were
resigned to it most of the time; partly, because disputes tended not to
blow up across the whole plant but were isolated pockets of resistance that
were easily isolated; partly, because the limited but real concessions
granted by management appeared to vindicate the co-operative policy;
partly, because amidst a hostile economic world and defeats for sections of
the working class movement it appeared to be the only realistic approach;
partly, because the militant left stewards in the 3-shift area were
marginalised and failed to provide a coherent political alternative. The
Convenor's hostile attitude towards departmental stoppages and his co-
operative relationship with management helped in the long-term to loosen
the close links that had been forged between stewards and rank and file
members in the l970s.
Throughout the 1980s all shop stewards, apart from the
Convenor, worked on the job. Freedom of access to members was more
restrictive for stewards who worked on the assembly lines in Unit 2 - where
the nature of the production system and the tight displine imposed by
management meant stewards were unable to take time-off work unless they
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could get somebody to cover for them - compared with the 3-shift area - a
'free working' environment. Formally, the stewards were democratically
accountable to their rank and file members but the substantive links
cementing the relationship became much weaker during the 1980s.
Significantly, the tenure of office of stewards was much longer in the
1980s than in the 1970s, with a majority of stewards remaining in office
for over 10 years. Paul Chin, the TGWU branch secretary, reported:
Compared with the '70s there was less change-over and less
contesting of positions in the '80s because the automation at
Birds Eye, the anti-union legislation and that in the early
'80s meant a lot of stewards were reluctant to get involved,
because it was a bloody headache. In the '70 you used to have
two or three people contesting for the stewards position.
People were more confident about being able to get somewhere.
But in the '80s although there was a lot of disgruntlement no
one wanted the steward's job. Instead, there was apathy. In
fact at one time we had to force a competition by introducing a
policy into the branch whereby no steward automatically stood
for re-election. Some of the stewards thought they were in a
sacrosanct position, they'd been in that long.
Brenda Carberry recalled the problem with women shop
stewards in the 2-shift area of Unit 2:
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The women stewards on my shift were all terribly weak, they
really were. They tended to see management's point of view more
than male shop stewards and take management's side in a
dispute, even with regards to the women. Cathy Brookes was
mouth all-mighty but she was a creep. She put the talk on when
the boss was around, it was so obvious. Marie Kerrigan did take
the bull by the horns a bit and give a little bit of
leadership. But she didn't stick out the steward's job long.
None of them were shop stewards for long - 12 months to 3 years
at the most.
Thus, if there was a lengthy tenure of office amongst
male stewards the opposite problem arose amongst the female stewards.
Despite the efforts of some of the Left activists it was very difficult to
get women to stand and only about five out of thirty stewards were women at
any one time during the 1980s. Joe Carberry explained:
There were a few women who when you spoke to them seemed
genuinely interested in changing things and fighting the status
quo. But you couldn't cajole them to coming forward at the
right time, they wouldn't take it as far as getting a steward's
card. That was a problem we had all during the '80s. The women
stewards were very passive at the stewards' committee, they
very rarely got involved in the discussions and debates that
went on - compared with the '70s when women were leading some
of the debates. Basically, there was a lack of coriinitment from
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the women stewards. Even if you talk about issues you would
expect women shop stewards and trade unionists to raise
themselves - cancer screening, things of that nature - were
never raised by the women. They were raised by the men, the
likes of meself, who saw it as an important element of
collective bargaining. But we found it very hard to motivate
our women stewards to go on courses even and the attendance of
women at branch meetings, even female stewards was pretty poor.
But the shop stewards' organisation was handicapped by
the lack of active participation of women during the 1980s.
The role of the TGWU branch in shopfloor union
organisation also became less significant during the 1980s. Although
meetings passed resolutions in support of workers' disputes, including
Massey Ferguson in 1980, Liverpool council typists in 1981, the miners in
1984 and Moat House in 1987 (40) the number of stewards and members
(including women members) attending declined as Dave Worrall, an active
member of the branch for over 20 years, recalled:
The branch only got about 15 people to meetings in the 1980s.
Mout half of them were shop stewards. But it was much less
important than it had been. The branch committee went down to
15 and then 12. The company knew we were struggling to get
branch meetings off the ground. They knew there was a change of
attitude in the steward organisation in general. They sensed
the trade union side was beginning to buckle, to get weaker.
Page 122
Birds Eye: Stewards' Relationship To Rank And File Members: 1970s180s
Branch meetings effectively became a talking shop where
the corrinitted activists could exchange information and debate about union
policy but without any vibrant connection with union members on the
shopfloor. Despite its limitations during the 1970s the strength of
workplace union organisation inside the Birds Eye plant has come from what
rank and file workers were prepared to do collectively themselves - given
active leadership from the shop stewards. Daily struggles over job
evaluation, flexibility and so on, including strikes - both on a
departmental and factory-wide basis - were the key to building the power of
the stewards' body vis-a-vis management. By contrast, during the 1980s few
stewards had experience of organising strikes at departmental level.
Negotiating skills developed through 'strong bargaining relations' with
management seemed much more important. The result was that in many
departments the stewards found it difficult to move their members into
activity even when they wanted to - for example in opposition to the
closure of the chicken stripping department in 1986.
The overwhelming majority of shop stewards lacked the
socialist politics and self-confidence to reject the arguments of
management and tended to accept the notion that only increased productivity
and profitability could save jobs. They became trapped into accepting the
same range of ideas as management and then arguing about the small print.
Agreeing with the general concepts of 'viability' and 'efficiency' they
were continually browbeaten into abandoning or restraining militant rank
and file struggle. Of course, such arguments had been accepted in the 1970s
although it had not prevented stewards from being prepared, on occasion, to
engage in confrontation with management to win shopfloor gains. The key
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difference in the l980s was that the economic crisis, rising level of
unemployment and overhanging threat to close the Birds Eye plant helped
strengthen the power of such arguments. The result was that the close links
with the rank and file evident during the 1970s - based upon day-to-day
struggle - gradually became loosened during the 1980s
Nonetheless, despite the gradual weakening of the
relationship between stewards and rank and file members it was still
possible for Joe Barton and the stewards' committee to repeatedly make
reconinendations for one-day factory-wide strikes - albeit, with the backing
of union officials and mostly in solidarity with other sections of workers
rather than directly for themselves - that received the loyal backing of
the workforce. The most vivid illustration of this occured in 1985 when the
Kirkby plant was brought to a standstill in support of the strike-bound
Birds Eye plant in Gloucester. The Gloucester strikers - in dispute over
the implementation of Workstyle - had informed the Kirkby stewards that
four pickets would be sent to seek support. Billy Caidwell reported their
reaction:
The reaction of the stewards' conuiittee at first was outright
panic. The decision we had to make was basically .do we uphold
the branch's policy of not crossing picket lines or do we tear
it up into little pieces? The stewards' committee was bounced
into the decision because from a purely self-respecting point
of view, to retain any credibility within themselves, they had
no option but to inform the members that when the picket
arrived they'd expect them to observe the policy of the branch.
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Although there was rumblings against it by sections of the
members when it was put to a recommendation it carried the clay.
They sent four pickets up but they could've sent a dog with a
placard round its neck if they'd wanted. No one would have
crossed that picket line.
It was a powerful display of solidarity. Significantly,
it showed that when the stewards took the initiative and provided a lead,
(in this case independently of trade union officials) the rank and file
membership was willing to take industrial action. Joe Carberry described
the dynamic interaction between rank and file activity and shop steward
leadership:
One thing about Kirkby people, and Liverpool people in general,
is that although they get whacked about the head by various
companies and the media - one of the things you've got to take
your hat off to is that they do have a sense of trade union
tradition that I would say is unequalled anywhere in this
country. When you appeal to their sense of tradition then you
get their support. But it was also down to the leadership in
the factory, the way the stewards' comittee actually got it
together and said this is the line we're taking in support of
Gloucester and that a strike wouldn't last long before the
company backtracked.
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Production at the Kirkby plant was brought to a complete
halt for two days before the Gloucester dispute was settled when Birds Eye
was forced to agree to negotiate - rather than unilateraly impose - new
working practices. Yet the willingness of the members to take such action
in support of other workers was never encouraged as a way of forcing
concessions from management inside the Kirkby plant. Instead, the closure
of two major departments in the factory without effective resistance and
the deadlocked negotiations over Workstyle gradually had the effect of
sapping the morale and confidence of many shopfloor workers. The stewards'
acceptance of 350 redundancies as part of Workstyle meant that when the
closure of the factory was announced a large proportion of workers had
already become resigned to accepting job losses. Although there was still a
substantial minority of workers who were genuinely interested in fighting
to keep the factory open the stewards' equivocal strategy was doomed to
failure. As Jiiniiy Bennett, a rank and file union member in Unit 2
complained:
The problem with the stewards was that first and foremost they
did nothing. They said plenty and they got messages of
solidarity to take secondary action if necessary. But what use
is that if you're not prepared to take primary action. That's
where they lost out. I remember Bryan Lockett coming out with
the absurd argument that it would suit management if we downed
tools and walked out. At very best all they did was shadow box.
They never seriously mounted a campaign of action against the
closure - it was purely verbal. I-lad we taken action and then
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called for support you might have had a very different result.
It might not have kept the place open, but it could have done.
Instead, they basically asked other people to do the battle for
us.
Agreeing to redundancies at the same time as mounting
opposition to the factory's closure effectively cut the ground from
underneath the stewards whole strategy. By playing to the lowest corrnon
denominator the stewards reinforced all the hesitations and doubts of the
less confident elements of the factory and in turn completely undermined
the spirit of those willing to fight. Ultimately, as John Morgan
acknowledged, the stewards' weakness was political:
The shop stewards changed from the hard-nosed trade union style
of the '70s to a less involved, less political, less commited
body of the 'BOg
 - obviously, because the environment had
changed and people's attitudes had changed.
Even the Left stewards, isolated in the 3-shift area,
failed to mount a challenge or pose a coherent political alternative to the
stewards' coriniittee strategy. The lack of political organisation inside the
plant meant that the type of militant action necessary if Birds Eye were to
be forced into keeping the plant open never really became a serious option.
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SHOP STEWARDS' RELATIONSHIP TO UNION OFFICIALS: 1970s AND 1980s
* tI 1970s: relative irkiependence
During the 1970s there were a ni.imber of factors
encouraging a relatively independent relationship between the Kirkby shop
stewards and Birds Eye full-time union officials. Firstly, the size of the
workplace meant there was a well-established and sophisticated stewards'
organisation able to deal with its own affairs in many respects,as Joe
Carberry explained:
If we had a major falling-out with the company, and we had a
failure to agree at local level, then we'd call in the local
District Officer. But we were not one of those factories that
as soon as we had a problem we shouted out for him. Most of the
time we looked after ourselves. They used to say it was the
easiest plant a District Officer could get because we very
rarely wanted him in. It wasn't a question of not trusting the
officials. It's just that we felt we could do better without
having them in.
Significantly, most of the factory-wide strikes held
during the l97Os were initiated by the stewards themselves, sometimes
irrespective of the wishes of union officials. Secondly, the nature of the
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bargaining system meant there was an important element of plant-based wage
determination - over job evaluation, bonus schemes and condition rates - in
which stewards were able to substantially increase the take-home pay of
their members independently of officials. Annual wage negotiations were
conducted by top level corporate Birds Eye managers and national and local
full-time TGWIJ officials through a Joint Negotiating Committee (JNC) on
behalf of the four Birds Eye plants in Kirkby, Yarmouth, Lowestoft and
Eastbourne, and later on in Gloucester. (The Birds Eye plants in Hull and
Grimsby had entirely separate national bargaining arrangements with the
General and Municipal Workers Union). Only from 1973 - after rank and file
pressure, a pragmatic devolving of power within the TGWIJ and Birds Eye's
own reform plans - were the Convenors from each of the four Birds Eye
plants allowed to attend JNC meetings, and not until 1984 did the deputy
Convenors also become part of the negotiating forum. The problem that
confronted the Kirkby stewards was that, despite being the best organised
plant in the Birds Eye combine, their bargaining strength over basic rates
of pay was tied to the lowest common denominator of the other, weaker
plants. Bryan Lockett, deputy Convenor and representative on the JNC during
the l980s, explained the predicament they faced:
We used to do quite well locally in job evaluation and that.
When it came to national level we didn't. We were always sold
out by the other sites. Every year we rejected the wage offer
but to a certain extent the national officers' hands were tied
because Lowestoft and Yarmouth would accept less than we were
prepared to accept and would defeat us if it went to a ballot.
Page 129
Birds Eye: Stewards' Relationship To Union Officials: 1970180s
Because the other sites were not prepared to take any action we
had to accept it in the end. All the other plants were badly
organised. They had a lot of seasonal and part-time labour,
without good union organisation.
Only on one occasion in 1974, did the Kirkby stewards
organise plant-wide industrial action over national wage rates - a one-hour
demonstration stoppage that was tied to a local protest over canteen price
increases (41). Even though they often felt aggrieved at the poor national
awards they tended to concentrate their attention on bolstering pay packets
independently of the officials through the element of local pay bargaining
available to them. In this way they skirted around the problem of wage
restraint under the period of the Labour government's 'Social Contract' by
negotiating local productivity deals. A third factor promoting the
stewards' independent stance was the relatively high level of disputes
inside the Kirkby plant, which encouraged a reliance on local strength.
Finally, from the mid-1970s onwards the Merseyside Region of the TGWtJ
became one of the most left-wing in the country, with the local full-time
official from 1974 onwards, Eddie Roberts, being a former militant Convenor
from the Ford Halewood plant. Not only does there appear to have been a
friendly personal link between Bobbie Lamb and Eddie Roberts but the latter
seemed quite prepared to allow the stewards to act autonomously in many
respects, as Joe Carberry related:
Eddie was very much looked upon as one of us, as one of the
Left. Eddie's role was basically to get involved in wage
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negotiations. We very rarely had him into the factory unless we
had a failure to agree over someone getting sacked or
something. But he didn't take part in any local negotiations in
the plant really.
Of course, the stewards' body was by no means completely
autonomous from official trade union structures. For example, Joe Carberry
was the TGWU branch delegate to the union's Merseyside District Committee
and the union's national trade group for the food, drink and tobacco sector
and, following the election of the Labour government in 1974, most stewards
in the plant also went on both TtJC and TGW1J day release or weekend
educational courses. It was through such involvement that the stewards'
corrinittee was kept informed of industrial and corporate developments and
union policies, as well as providing channels through which they could
express their own demands, thereby reinforcing an identification with the
union on a more official basis than the ad-hoc manner than had previously
existed.
But it also meant the stewards' committee came under
varying levels of pressure from regional and national officials to keep
plant grievances in procedure and avoid plant-wide disputes; official TGWIJ
support for the Labour government's 'Social Contract' tri-partite co-
operation between employers, government and union officials appears to have
underlain some of the senior stewards' opposition to Bobbie Lamb's style of
leadership. On some occasions, national officials were able to exercise a
decisively negative role, as for example in 1976, in the wake of the
resignation of the negotiating coriinittee, when national officer Bert Ray
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unilaterally signed an (appalling) redundancy agreement over the heads of
the Kirkby stewards. It was a foretaste of the type of bureaucractic
approach the stewards increasingly had to endure, even after Bobbie Lamb's
return as Convenor. For example, in 1977 Birds Eye announced its 'Five Year
Plan' - aimed at centralising products and moving various kits from one
site to another across the country - which posed a major threat to the
Kirkby plant faced with the transfer of its steak-lit and beefburger range
of products with little being exchanged in return. Joe Carberry described
the stewards' strategy:
We fought very hard against the Five Year Plan because we felt
that some of the products they wanted to take from Kirkby were
the mainstay of the factory. What the company was doing was
getting a bone and throwing it in the middle and saying 'go on
dogs, fight over it'...We tried to get meetings with stewards
at the other four Birds Eye factories to discuss
centralisation. We wanted them to adopt a very broad policy
which said 'we don't accept your work being transferred and you
don't accept ours'. In other words, what we've got we hold. As
part of our strategy we tried to form a national stewards'
combine committee.
Unfortunately, the combine committee never got off the
ground, partly due the unwillingness of TGWtJ national officials to back the
Kirkby stewards' initiative:
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There'd been attempts in the past to get the stewards together
across the sites to form a national combine but the other
stewards' conimittees weren't as highly organised as we were at
the time and we just couldn't get the coninitment from the other
sites. So we appealed to the T and C to help us set up a
combine coninittee and fund it on a quarterly basis. But the
national officer said no, the union couldn't afford it. We were
left trying to fund it ourselves but when it caine down to it
the other branches weren't prepared to help set it up.
Not surprisingly, without a national combine comittee
the Kirkby stewards' campaign to win the other sites to a strategy of
resistance to Birds Eye's product transfers was considerably hamstrung and
ultimately unsuccessful. Yet, the constraints of national union officialdom
did not prevent the stewards from mounting a four-week unofficial plant-
wide strike in 1977 over bonus payments - involving secondary picketing of
the Lowestoft plant - or organising the magnificant gesture of solidarity
with striking engineers that followed - convincing their members not to
cross ATJEW picket lines. Yet, after management's lock-out of the workforce,
the officials were eventually able to force a return to work on the
company's draconian terms and conditions, although the local TGWtJ official
was completely solid behind the stewards' defiant stance, as Joe Carberry
related:
Eddie Roberts used to attend every meeting of the Joint Liaison
Coninittee [the TCWU and AULW stewards' body set up to co-
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ordinate the strike]. He was under a hell of a lot of pressure
that was bearing down on him from London, from the national
officers and the general secretary of the union to get the
dispute settled. What he told them was 'Look, every time we try
to settle it they move the goalposts again'. He played a
leading role with us in that dispute. There is one thing I
would never fault about Eddie and that was his commitment to
the joint shop stewards' coninittee throughout that eighteen
week dispute.
According to Paul Chin the same could not be said about
the TGWU regional and national officials:
Once the company threatened the closure of the site the T and G
panicked nationally - because you were talking about a booming
factory losing 1,000 jobs down the road. What started to happen
then was the control of the dispute started to drift away from
the Joint Liaison CoramLtte and the national full-time officials
of both the T and G and the AHEW started to get more and more
involved in the dispute. They had clandestine meetings with the
company in London with no lay representation allowed. Dick
Palmer, the T and G Divisional Organiser, was ordered by the
national official Bert Ray and the general secretary of the T
and C to attend the next meeting of the Joint Liaison Committe
and spell out to the AUEW that if they didn't terminate the
dispute forthwith then he would be ordering our members to go
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back to work. Give him his due - Palmer actually told us what
he had been told to say. But he was told in no uncertain terms
by the T and G stewards that we would be sticking to our
policies and that no union official would order us back to
work. We told him we would go back only when the dispute was
properly concluded.
Nonetheless, the Kirkby stewards were not able to hold
out indefinitely against the pressure bearing down on them from the
officials. Joe Carberry related:
The national officers in the eighteen-week dispute never once
came to Kirkby. There was a lot of criticism of them for not
actively participating. They wouldn't even come up to talk to
us. The major input they had into the dispute was bringing it
to a close. The company demanded - before a re-opening of the
site - total and unconditional surrender and that was an
agreement the national officers of all unions reached with the
company. It was put to the members with no options whatsoever.
If you didn't go back to work then the place would remain shut.
So people had no alternative but to terminate the dispute and
return to work. The stewards recommended rejection but we were
overturned because people were worried about their jobs.
The stewards' organisation suffered a severe set-back in
the aftermath of the lock-out, although it recovered sufficient strength by
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1979 to defy national officials and threaten a factory-wide overtime ban,
which successfully forced management to discontinue employment of workers
on fixed short-term contacts.
* the 1980s: relative depeixience
If during the 1970s the stewards' organisation had a
relatively high degree of self-reliance and initiative vis-a-vis full-time
union officials by the 1980s a number of factors pushed the pendulum
towards a imach more dependent relationship. To begin with, the introduction
of measured day work in 1978 ended the element of local pay determination
that existed inside the Kirkby plant and made the stewards much more
reliant on pay rates negotiated at national level by TGWJ officers and
corporate Birds Eye management. Even though annual pay increases were
consistently poor and sometimes below the rate of inflation the stewards
did not feel strong enough to take action either to put pressure on the
officials or bolster their hand at the negotiating table, at least
independently of a lead from the officials themselves. Although the
national officials prefered to secure a 'satisfactory' settlement through
negotiation from above rather than encouraging militant action from below
they felt compelled on some occasions during the early 1980s, when they
found their bargaining role being completely undermined by Birds Eye
corporate managers, to threaten, and even organise, industrial action
within the plants
For example, in 1981 when Birds Eye adopted a belligerent
attitude and refused to improve its 9 per cent pay offer, negotiations
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completely broke down after the company - referring to TGWEJ full-time
officers as 'messenger boys' - provoked a walk out by the union's
negotiators. (42) National officials responded by calling for a one-day
strike at their four Birds Eye factories unless the company improved its
offer, which the Kirkby stewards' conimittee voted to support. But the Day
of Action was called off when the company made a slight concession in the
pay package, sufficient for the national officials to recommend acceptance
of the offer to the membership. The Kirkby stewards' minutes report there
'was a great deal of criticism' of the company-union deal, although it was
eventually approved by a slim majority. Again in 1982, when Birds Eye
refused point-blank to improve its (pathetic) 7 per cent wage offer, TGWIJ
national officials felt unable to accept such a deal without at least a
show of disapproval, although they prefered limited token action. They
called for a 24-hour strike across all the Birds Eye plants to be followed
at a later date by an indefinite strike unless the company improved its
offer. On this occasion the 24 hour strike went ahead and the Kirkby plant
participated. Nonetheless, the TG%U officials' apparent change of approach
was short-lived and did not alter their basic bureaucratic behaviour. Using
the equivocation of General and Nuncicipal Workers Union officials - who
insisited on a two-thirds majority ballot vote in favour of strike action
in the I{umberside plants - they called off the all-out strike even though a
head count of all the factories had recorded a 2-1 majority against the
company's offer. (43) They then put the company's unchanged offer to a vote
of the membership without reconinending acceptance or rejection. Although
the Kirkby stewards' coninittee and membership voted against the deal it was
accepted by a majority across the other plants. Once more in 1984, the
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national officials were pushed into calling a 24-hour strike following
Birds Eye's closure of the Great Yarmouth plant and the transfer of some
labour to its Lowestoft site without an adequate redundancy agreement. (44)
Again, Kirkby joined the stoppage. Otherwise the TtJC's 'new realism'
pervaded national negotiations and although the Kirkby stewards often voted
against pay deals they applied no direct pressure themselves and took no
independent initiatives.
Meanwhile, even though the stewards' committee organised
a number of one-day factory-wide solidarity stoppages during the l98Os the
action was almost always only taken after being initiated, sanctioned and
formally proposed at mass meetings by full-time union officials in line
with TUC or TGWU policy - for example, the TtJC Day of Action against the
Tories anti-union legislation in 1980 (45), the TIJC Day of Action in
support of NHS workers in 1982 (46), and the Merseyside TGWIJ Region's
support for Liverpool City Council in 1985 (47). The only exception to this
was the two-day unofficial strike in support of the Birds Eye Gloucester
plant in 1985, when the Kirkby stewards recorrinended their members respected
workers' pickets lines, but whilst agreeing to the action at the time Joe
Barton immediately set about afterwards ensuring the Kirkby plant would not
be placed in the same situation again. (48) A national meeting of Convenors
from all Birds Eye factories agreed to his policy statement that in future:
'Before any pickets can be placed on the gates of another plant, the action
has to be sanctioned by the national officers or by a full recall of the
national negotiating coninittee'. (49)
The full extent of the stewards dependence on full-time
officials became evident during the campaign against Workstyle and the
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closure of the Kirkby plant. In 1987 a new local TGWEJ official, John
Farrell, was instrumental in helping to establish a Birds Eye national shop
stewards' combine comittee. Paul Chin related:
The impetus for that to be set up was obviously the change in
the company's strategy for the '90s. They had decided that
Workstyle was coming in across the country. The real driving
force behind the combine conimittee, it's got to be said, was
John Farrell. Bobbie Lamb had tried to get a comittee off the
ground but didn't get the backing. Farrell provided us with the
extra impetus. He was the architect of the coninittee. He phoned
round the officers and got it off the ground.
The stewards' combine coninittee linked the Kirkby, Hull,
Gloucester and Lowestoft Birds Eye plants. It held a number of joint
meetings and adopted a formal declaration that each site would take
solidarity action if any plant was faced with enforced redundancies. But
John Farrell's influence on the Kirkby stewards' resistance to Workstyle
was all-pervading; it was on his advice the stewards agreed to the
company's demand for 380 redundancies, albeit on a voluntary basis and if
severance terms were improved. It was probably this strategy which more
than anything else undermined the possibility of a fight back when the
factory's closure was announced.
Billy Caidwell explained how the local official tried to
forge a united front between those wanting to keep their jobs with those
wanting to take the redundancy money:
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It was all John Farrell's strategy. His argument at mass
meetings was to say 'We've always accepted there'd have to be
redundancies but if you do want to go - the only way to get
better money and help yourself is to get behind those who are
fighting for their jobs.' What he did was always haniner home
that he was capable of a getting a good few bob for redundancy
payments. He'd say 'those of you who want out - I can get you a
good deal'. He'd quote figures and of course the pound signs
would be flashing in front of their eyes, ye know. All right,
at the end of the day, certainly if people have to go I agree
they shouldn't be sent out of the gate with nothing but he
shouldn't have been stressing that at the expense of the people
who wanted their jobs.
The stewards' decision to tie any possible strike action
in Kirkby to simultaneous action in two other Birds Eye plants was very
much Farrell's brainchild, backed by TGWU national officer, Brian Revell.
Yet inevitably, the whole strategy backfired when a large section of the
membership succeeded in pressurising the stewards' committee to open up
negotiations with the company over improved severance terms at the same
time as they were organising a strike ballot against the closure.
Although formally Kirkby voted in favour of strike action
the vast majority of the workforce had by then accepted redundancy as a
fait accompli. Ironically, when the Gloucester and Lowestoft plants voted
against supporting Kirkby it provided John Farrell with a convenient fall-
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guy for the collapse of the campaign. Billy Caidwell was highly critical of
the influential role played by the local union official:
When Workstyle was first mentioned it was negotiable and should
have been dealt with by the negotiating corrunittee. Airight,
involve the full-time official in an advisory capacity,
certainly keep him informed of what's going on, invite him to
meetings. But keep control of it, because you're part of the
factory, he isn't. He's not involved to the same extent as we
are and itts your property. But what ultimately happened is
that it was Farrell who was basically running it at the end of
the day. The negotiating coninittee became more or less a
syphon. There is a lesson to be learnt there, it was an over
involvement of the full-time official.
Even though individual members of the stewards' coiiinittee
argued for immediate strike action when the factory's closure was
announced, there was no serious attempt to challenge or campaign against
the dominant strategy adopted by John Farrell and the negotiating
committee. In effect, if the Kirkby workforce were encouraged to look to
the other Birds Eye plants like the Fifth Cavalry coming to their support,
the negotiating coninittee tended to look upwards to the local full-time
official to pull something out of the bag. Their dependence on John Farrell
and national officials meant they were led into what proved to be a fatally
flawed campaign of opposition and to eventual acceptance of the factory's
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CHAVE1 TH1KE: BFiRO3E
ERVIEWEFS:
St.an Livingston: NGA process chapel FoC, chairman of Federated Chapel.
Bob llenderson: NGA machine chapel FoC.
Jimy Wilson: SOGAT chapel FoC, president of Merseyside SOGAT branch.
Barry Caton: SOGAT committee member in machine room, secretary of
Federated Chapel.
Steve Hewes: SOGAT committee member in finishing department.
Cathy Kewley: SOGAT rank and file member in finishing department.
Tiiiuiy Brown: SOGAT rank and file member in machine room.
Frank O'Donoghue: SOGAT committee member in finishing department,
secretary of Federated Chapel.
CHROM)LOGY OF MAJOR EVENTS
1969: 3-week SOGAT strike.
1970:
1971:
1972: Formation of Federated Chapel linking all unions except SLADE.
Reduction of 151 different wage rates to 14.
Bruce Matthews appointed chairman of Bemrose.
1973:
1974: Extra 4 editions of 'TV Times' awarded, making 13 editions in total.
1975:
1976:
1977: SLADE dispute over morning shift pay.
4 night week granted.
FoC's granted 100 per cent facility time off work.
1978:
1979: National TV electricians' strike halts production of 'TV Times'.
1980: Joint Federated Chapel (including SLADE) established.
1981: Loss of 'TV Times' magazine.
Robert Maxwell takes over company briefly.
'SunDay' magazine taken on.
Survival Plan introduced.
1982: SLADE and NGA merge to become NGA '82.
NGA machine chapel dispute leads to formation of Joint Working Party;
parity talks begin with aim of equalising craft wage rates.
1983: NGA Warrington dispute/mass picketing.
100 people taken on in NGA machine and SOGAT chapels.
First year's reduction of craft differential.
1984: National miners' strike.
1985: Jimmy Wilson has SOGAT union card withdrawn.
1986: Final year of equalisation of pay rates - 2 basic craft and 2 new
non-craft rates.
Strikers from News International's Wapping plant picket Bemrose.
Jimmy Wilson expelled from SOGAT.
1987: Loss of 'Sunday Express'.
775 redundancies reduces the workforce to 567.
Jinmy Wilson forced to resign as SOGAT FoC
100 per cent facility time off work withdrawn from FoC's.
SOGAT dispute in machine room
1988: Redundant workers sue company for unfair dismissal.
House Agreements temporarily terminated by company
1989:
1990: Loss of 'SunDay' magazine.




The Eric Bernrose printing plant was established on its
single Liverpool site in 1939 as an independent family company, until
control gradually passed to the News of the World Organisation in the late
1960s, which in turn was itself taken over by the British arm of Rupert
Murdoch's global media empire, News International. Murdoch's British
interests include national newspapers ('The Sun', 'News of the World', 'The
Times', 'Sunday Times', 'Financial Times' and 'Today'), magazines ('New
Woman'), provincial papers (8 dailies and 69 weeklies), books (William
Collins, Lon.gman and Penguin) and television (Yorkshire TV, British Sky
Television). Murdoch's News Corporation also has extensive world wide
interests in media corporations, particularly in Australia and the United
States (including 20th Century Fox and national television networks) and
reported profits of £101.7 million in 1991 (1).
Situated close to the famous Grand National course in
Mntree, Eric Bemrose was, until its closure in 1991, one of the three
major photo-gravure colour printing plants in Britain specialising in long
run, fast speed and high quality printing. During the 1950s and 60s they
printed mainly children's comics such as 'Eagle', 'Swift', 'Robin' and
'Girl', plus other periodicals such as 'Arcade', 'Autocar' and 'Practical
Motorist'; in the 1970s the main print run was all 13 editions of the TV
Times magazine; and in the 1980s it was the 'Sunday Express', 'Sunday
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Telegraph' and 'News of the World' colour supplements and a number of 're-
winds', the colour pages pre-printed and later re-wound into many national
newspapers (including the 'Daily Mail' and 'Daily Express').
The key feature of photo-gravure work is that the
printing surface is a copper cylinder treated in such a way that the
printing areas are lower than their surroundings. Ink flows into these
areas and is drawn onto the paper as it passes over the revolving cylinder
on the printing machine. Because of the high cost of preparing the printing
cylinder the process is generally only economic for very long runs, and is
particularly suitable for the production of large circulation periodicals.
Throughout the 1970s there were four quite separate stages of production in
Bemrose, each with their own department. This was reduced to three in the
1980s. Firstly, there used to be the composing department, where the
orginal text was set in lead type and made up into page form. By the early
1980s this department had been closed down and its typesetting method
replaced by computerised photocomposition. Secondly, the process
department, where illustrative material such as photographs and diagrams
(and from 1981 typeset artwork brought in from outside) was converted into
a form suitable for printing by the production of negatives and the actual
printing surface on the copper cylinders; this department was made up of
ten different sections (including carbon printing, proofing and planning)
until 1981 when it was reduced to five. Thirdly the machine room, where the
cylinders were fitted to the nine printing presses and where the inked
printing surface and paper were brought into contact. Fourthly the
finishing department, where the edges of printed work were trinined,
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separate printed sections collated into single volumes and the finished
product gathered into bundles of a specified size ready for dispatch.
Developments in the highly sophisticated technology of
gravure printing at Bemrose were generally in the form of small
modifications or improvements, such as in the process department (concerned
with the production of artwork and the actual printing surface) and in the
finishing department where various forms of mechanisation were introduced.
Yet throughout the 1970s and 80s, much to the dismay of the unions, there
was no major new investment in plant or machinery despite the rapidly
advancing technology in colour magazine and newspaper production, in
particular web offset printing. For most of the 1970s and early l980s the
factory employed about 1400 manual production workers, including 170
compositors, 350 process workers, 170 machine minders and 640 non-craft
assistants. All but about 100 of these were male; most female workers were
employed in the finishing department. The bulk of the workforce were
concentrated in the process department (about 325), the machine room (about
430) and the finishing department (about 225). In 1981 90 compositors lost
their jobs. But much more severe redundancy exercises took place in 1987
when 700 workers, over half of the workforce, were sacked (leaving only
about 550 workers) and in 1990 when there were 413 redundancies (leaving
only about 160 workers) before the plant was finally closed completely in
1991. The hours of work were as follows: in the process department a 2-
shift system, Monday-Thursday 7aim-3pm, 3pm-llpm and Friday 7am-6pm; in the




The three major production trade unions during the 1970s were
the National Graphical Association (NGA), the Society of Lithograhic
Artists, Designers, Engravers and Process Workers (SLADE) and the Society
of Graphical and Allied Trades (SOGAT). In 1982 an amalgamation at national
level of SLADE and the NGA led to the formation of one trade union, known
as NGA '82, leaving two production unions in Bemrose, one craft and one
non-craft (the amalgamation of the NGA and SOGAT in 1991 led to what is now
known as the Graphical, Paper and Media Union). In common with most large
printing plants a 'closed shop' policy operated at Bemrose for most of the
1970s and 80s, with even departmental managers and foremen belonging to the
same union as shopfloor workers. Union members were organised into
'chapels' of the union within the plant. Thus, until 1982, all members of
SLADE were members of the same chapel, while there were two separate NGA
chapels and one SOGAT chapel. The distribution of union members in the
plant into four separate chapels during the 1970s was related to the four
stages of production outlined above. SLADE was involved at the first stage
of production, that is with the preparation of the cylindrical gravure
printing surface. The NGA was involved at two stages of production; a
proportion of their members were in the composing department, setting the
text material while the majority were in the machine room, in charge of the
printing machines. SOGAT members were to be found in many parts of the
factory, for example transporting the copper cylinders between departments.
Their greatest strength however lay in the two departments where they acted
as assistants to the skilled craftsmen, namely in the machine room and in




Two major changes to these chapel arrangements occured in
the 1980s. Following the closure of the composing department in 1981 the
NGA chapel in that area disappeared; and following the amalgamation of
SLADE with the NGA in 1982 the old SLADE process chapel became known as the
NGA '82 chapel. Thus, to recap: in the 1970s there were four major separate
union chapels in Beinrose, the SLADE process chapel, the NGA composing
chapel, the A machine chapel and the SOGAT chapel. During the l980s there
were only three major chapels, the NGA '82 process chapel, the NGA machine
chapel and the SOGAT chapel (although the EFTPtJ, AUEW, etc also had their
own small chapels).
Each chapel elected a shop stewards' Convenor, known as
the 'father of the chapel' (F0C) together with a deputy FoC (DFoC), a
treasurer and a committee of shop stewards, known as 'committee reps' to
act on its behalf in administering the chapel's affairs and to negotiate
with management. The FoC, DF0C and treasurer were elected annually by the
chapel membership in a secret ballot and the reps - representing the
different shifts in each department - were elected to serve for a period of
two years, with half of them up for re-election each year. The chapel
committee usually met monthly and meetings of the full chapel membership
were held every quarter (one of which was the Annual General Meeting). All
major negotiations with management were entrusted to the FoC, DFoC and
chapel secretary (who was elected from within the committee).
Although reference is sometimes made to the national
agreements between the combined printing trade unions and the British
Printing Industries Federation (BPIF) Bemrose always had its own 'House
Agreement', generally running for one year and determined exclusively at
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plant level. Until 1972 each chapel negotiated its own separate House
Agreement, which specified such matters as basic rates of pay, shift
premia, holiday levels, manning arrangements, etc. The formation of a
Federated House Chapel considerably reduced this fragmentation by bringing
together all the unions in the plant except the SLADE process chapel. It
was composed of the FoC of each chapel plus one other representative,
usually the DFoC, and although it met only infrequently, conducted all
major plant wide negotiations leading to a 'Joint House Agreement'. The
SLADE process chapel continued to negotiate its own separate House
Agreement - fearing a joint body would jeopardise its relatively highly
advantageous position - until it finally agreed to join the Federated
Chapel in 1981.
Each Bemrose chapel was part of a wider trade union
organisation, namely a union branch structure that linked a number of
workplace chapels throughout the region. Thus, in the 1970s both the NGA
compositors and NGA machine chapels were represented by the Liverpool NGA
branch, the SLADE process chapel by the Liverpool SLADE branch and the
SOGAT chapel by the Merseyside SOGAT branch. Since the early 1980s only two
union branches had representation, after the old SLADE process chapel
transfered its membership into the NGA branch and replaced the disbanded
NGA composing chapel. The branches usually met quarterly, with compulsory
attendance from chapel delegates co-ordinated on a rota basis; they elected
a branch coninittee by a ballot of the members throughout the region. Full-
time union branch officials (and national officers) were involved in
negotiations with Beinrose and News International management and were
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responsible for ratifying all House Agreements signed by chapels to ensure
they were consistent with the union's national policy.
Time off work for union business and shopfloor
negotiation was granted by management to the chapels in the early 1970s
although corrinittee reps, including the FoC, spent most of their day working
on the job. This arrangement changed in 1976-7 when management granted
full-time facility status to each of the four major chapel F0C's and
allowed much greater time-off work for DFoC's. In addition, they provided
the four chapels with small union offices on the shopfloor. Only after the
major redundancy exercise that occurred ten years later in 1987, did
management decide to suddenly withdraw these facilities, forcing all FoC's
back onto the job again.
Most of my case study material was gathered from a
number of in-depth interviews with a selection of key trade union
informants from the various workplace chapels at Bemrose (including
different chapel FoC's, coninittee reps and rank and file union members). I
also had access to minute books of the SLADE and NGA '82 process chapel, to
House Agreements of both SLADE and the Federated Chapel and a variety of
union, Federated Chapel and company documents. Unfortunately, repeated
requests to interview industrial relations managers at Bemrose were turned
down; it seems that although the plant management were happy enough to
assist my research News International were not, and the parent company's
disposition prevailed. Despite these obstacles I have attempted, so far as
has been possible, to reconstruct the rationale behind management's
strategy towards shop stewards' organisation.
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Because of the complexity of the trade union organisation
I decided to concentrate particular attention on the SOGAT chapel
coninittee. On the one hand, any understanding of shopfloor industrial
relations in Bemrose is obliged to consider all the major separate chapels;
this is something I have attempted to do, particularly in terms of their
relationship to management (excluding the NGA composing chapel which was
disbanded in the early l980s). On the other hand, I also found it useful to
narrow the focus of my inquiry so as to provide the necessary flesh to the
bones of an account of chapel coninittee organisation. My choice of the
SOGAT chapel was taken for a variety of reasons. Firstly, SOGAT always
organised the largest number of workers in the plant. Prior to the 1987
redundancy exercise SOGAT had over 700 members compared with the NGA '82
process chapel's 225 and the WA '82 machine chapel's 185. Secondly, the
SOGAT chapel, unlike any other, had members in every department of the
factory, providing it with an invaluable overview of developments across
the plant as a whole. Thirdly, in the course of my research I found within
the SOGAT chapel a wider pool of experienced union activists, both able and
willing to be interviewed, than existed in other chapels. Fourthly, I
discovered that developments inside the plant had a dramatic impact on the
SOGAT chapel committee which provided insights into the underlying
processes at work generally, which served to validate my choice of focus.
Finally, unlike the other chapels, SOGAT organised the non-craft and
unskilled workers and was most akin to the shopfloor production workers
that I have examined in the two other case studies.
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STEWARDS' REI1ATI((SIItP IX) MANAGIiFNT: ThE 1970s
* the 1970s: the stewards' strengths
The 1970s unquestionably represented the heyday of
shopfloor union power inside the Bemrose plant as a number of objective and
structural factors, combined with a subjective and conscious attempt to
build workplace union organisation, enabled the respective chapel
committees to wield considerable bargaining leverage. It is possible to
distinguish some of the key ingredients at work. To begin with, one of the
bedrocks of union organisation exercised by all four chapels and their
union branches (craft and non-craft) was their ability to regulate the
total supply of labour through rules that governed the ratio of apprentices
to time served men (district standards that operated a list of unemployed
members from which management had to recruit) and the pre-entry closed shop
which ensured only union members were hired. Such control over the supply
of labour placed the Bemrose printing chapels in an exclusive position vis-
a-vis management.
Stan Livingston, a SLPDE chapel member in the carbon
printing section of the process department, worked at Beinrose for 33 years;
during the 1980s he became the NGA '82 process chapel F0C (after the
SLADE/NGA amalgamation) and chairman of the plant's Federated Chapel. He
described the consequences of control over the supply of labour for the
SLADE process chapel in the early 1970s:
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Skilled process workers were in short supply in the North West
in the 1950s and 60s and that meant Bemrose had to pay
excellent rates of pay to attract people from down south to
move to Liverpool. The knock-on effect was that it raised rates
generally in Bernrose and in other printing establishments in
the Liverpool area. In fact Bemrose became a national leader in
gravure wage rates across the whole country. And it gave the
unions - with a pre-entry closed shop and the apprenticeship
scheme - a lot of control. They were able to say to management
'How many do you want? Four? No, you're getting four, plus two
apprentices'. By the late '60s and early '70s the number of
people in the process department grew from something like 150
to 400.
Similarly, the non-craft SOGAT chapel was able to
restrict and control the supply of labour through its union branch's
effective role as a labour exchange. As Tommy Brown, a rank and file SOGAT
member who worked for 16 years in the machine room, remembered: 'People
used to say 'What, get a job in Bemrose? You've got to get a letter off the
Pope to get in that place'.
A second factor placing the chapel committees in a strong
bargaining position was the state of the product market, notably Bemrose's
heavy reliance upon the production of such ephemeral items as weekly
periodicals. During the 1960s and 70s the factory's production output
boomed as an endless variety of new magazine titles were taken on.
Naturally, it was of the utmost importance to the publishers of the
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magazines that their periodicals were on sale on the usual day of
publication, although as they wanted to be as topical as possible the
original editorial material would be sent as late as possible. This meant
that most printing was done to very tight schedules. Yet the often huge
print runs made this a precarious business. Moreover, by the late 1960s the
'TV Times' contract increasingly took on ininense importance. At 7 million
copies a week it was the largest circulation magazine in Western Europe. By
1974 all 13 separate regional editions were printed at Bemrose; with each
individual copy being composed of two integrated sections it made a total
print run of some 14 million. In these circumstances, management found
themselves in an extremely vulnerable position since often resistance to a
union claim appeared to make little short-term financial sense compared
with the consequences of disrupted production and loss of revenue and
advertisers' confidence. As Stan Livingston observed:
Management's strategy was to get the bloody job out, keep the
thing moving, ye know. We were printing weekly publications,
millions of copies, and any hiccup along the line could
seriously effect production. hen we printed the 'TV Times' it
was dated work. So if the work didn't leave the factory on a
Thursday morning it wasn't going to be in the shops on time.
Obviously, we took full advantage of that situation to gain
some of the concessions over the years. That was the situation
management had to contend with all the time. Oh yeah, Bemrose
was strange, it was something else. Sometimes we'd walk out of
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negotiations and think 'how the hell did we get away with
that'. Basically, we had them by the bollocks in those days.
But it was not just objective factors that accounted for
why the balance of bargaining power was tilted in favour of union
organisation during the 1970s. There was also the subjective element, the
high degree of conscious intervention involved in building up the strength
of the chapel coriinittees. Each of the four chapels had highly efficient
administrative arrangements and an authoritative committee structure that
monitored all day-to-day working practices, drawing up both the overtime
and holiday rotas and allocating them to their members on the basis of
seniority, thereby taking away from management the ability to choose people
on a 'blue-eyed' system. As Toniny Brown recalled:
If a manager had four machines running on a Saturday he would
go to his committee man and tell him he needed so many people.
And the committee man would get the names of the individuals
from the rotas to do the overtime, whether the management liked
them or not. The committee determined who worked, when they
worked and the number of hours they worked.
The SOGAT chapel committee also established powerful
control over manning arrangements: mobility of labour between and within
departments was severely circumscribed, demarcation strictly adhered to and
staffings on machines rigorously enforced. Such control did not materialise
out of thin air; it was directly related to the left-wing political
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involvement of some of the key coninittee activists. Jimmy Wilson worked at
Bernrose for 30 years; elected as the SOGAT FoC in 1971 he remained in
office for 17 years (serving as the Merseyside SOGAT branch president in
the late 1970s) until his explusion from the union in 1987. An active
member of the Labour Party and supporter of the hard-left 'Militant' group,
Jimmy played a pivotal role in building the strength of chapel committe
organisation, particularly in relation to manning.
After I'd become F0C I stopped the mobility of labour, people
transferring from one department to another, with the primary
aim of increasing the numbers employed. The agreed staffings on
the machines were - for use of a better word - policed by the
chapel officials. In the machine room there were supposed to be
10 SOGAT members and 5 A on each press. Well, from a SOGAT
point of view it was obvious you were scratching around some
times with nothing to do, but the union had the ultimate number
of jobs in mind and the committee would discipline members for
being absent from the press, so as to preserve jobs. That was
the strength of organisation on the floor.
Tommy Brown also stressed the controls over the job
exercised by chapel committee representatives:
The movement of labour was very, very strict. If you were part
of a crew on a press in the machine room you couldn't be moved
to the finishing. You could move within the department - they
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would post you from one job to another - but even then if you
worked for a certain period of time on a machine it constituted
part of the day and they wouldn't be allowed to move you again
on that day. Management always accepted that.
Significantly, there were only a handful of strikes or
stoppages of work inside the Bernrose plant during the 1970s. Workers'
strategic position meant there was little need to resort to such tactics in
order to squeeze concessions from management. Indeed, the SLADE process
chapel was never involved in a strike by their members; their only major
dispute was in 1977 when they organised their members on the afternoon and
night shifts to join their colleagues on the morning shift for a week, in a
bid to win shift premium for morning shift work. The SOGAT chapel were
involved in a 3-week all-out strike of their members in 1969 in a
successful protest at management attempts to increase production from
25,000-30,000 copies an hour on the presses in the machine room and a 3-day
strike over a similar issue in 1974, as well as a handful of other walk-
outs of 2 or 3 days duration in the late 1970s. Generally however, major
disputes were few and far between. Bob Henderson, who worked in the machine
room from 1973, with experience as a committee representative and A
machine chapel FoC in the late 1980s, related:
There was only about nine major stoppages in the last eighteen
years and only about two of them involved the NGA. It was
mainly SOGAT. You would get sanctions imposed every other year
in the machine room by the NGA over the House Agreement. It was
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the only way we could make ourselves felt because we were
always chasing SLADE. We'd have one-hour, two-hour stoppages.
Traditionally, we'd have disputes in the summer, because of the
stinking heat in the place, it was like a biscuit tin. But very
little disruption took place really.
Various forms of industrial action that fell short of a
strike, such as an overtime ban, could still cause disruption and financial
damage and were used by chapel committees as a bargaining lever over issues
that were matters of principle, such as manning. Jimmy Wilson described how
even the threat to delay the dispatch of printed material within the
loading bay area of the finishing department was ultimately an extremely
potent weapon in the hands of the SOGAT chapel:
It was a cat and mouse situation, guerilla tactics rather than
open warfare. The 'TV Times' had delivery clauses, penalty
clauses built into them. So the best negotiating tactic was to
get all the magazines printed, get them on the loading bay, and
then refuse to send them out. It would send the management
crazy because they'd paid all the production costs, got it
ready for delivery and the only place it could go was to pulp.
The manager would know that and he'd cave in.
But such examples of industrial action occurred only
occasionally; rarely did any major confrontation between shopfloor workers
and management take place. Indeed, only on two occasions was an issue of
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the 'TV Times' ever lost through action taken by the chapels. For the vast
majority of the time, despite conflicts of interest, chapel committees and
plant management were able to find mutually acceptable arrangements and
compromises with one another through a process of 'strong bargaining
relations'. Nonetheless, as Stan Livingston pointed out, the balance was
clearly tilted in favour of the unions:
It would be 60-40 to the unions. Not over everything of course,
management didn't lose hands down, on some issues they tried to
dig their heels in. But they didn't have it all their own way
either. There again, there wasn't any serious conflict. The
unions were quite strong and we took advantage of that.
The chairman of Bemrose from 1972 (until 1986) was Bruce
Matthews, a key figure in Rupert Mardoch's News International (the parent
company). No doubt the proprietor's goals and constraints set the framework
for local plant management in Liverpool. Based in London, Matthews
conducted all Bexnrose's major negotiations, particularly over House
Agreements, with the FoC's and other chapel representatives. As Jimmy
Wilson commented 'Basically, the plant was run down the end of a telephone
from London'. At plant level managment bargained separately with each of
the four workplace chapels (and full-time officials from three different
unions).
The threat of redundancies or factory closure was often
used by the company, particularly when the contracts for the 'TV Times'
came up for renewal, warning that petty restrictions by the unions were
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hampering productivity and competitiveness (2). Barry Caton, a member of
the far-left Socialist Workers Party, who worked at Bemrose for 11 years
(mainly in the machine room) and served as a SOGAT comittee rep and
Federated Chapel secretary during the 1970s, related:
Management were always threatening redundancies. They'd say if
we lost a contract it will be on your head. Obviously that was
always present in people's minds but it was a bit like Peter
and the Wolf. They were always wringing their hands and saying
the company wasn't making money. In fact, on the books, the
company didn't make any profits from 1957-1987 - in accountancy
terms they lost money every year. So every time they came to us
with their violin stories and sob tales we simply said 'We've
heard it all before. We get the same story from you every
week'.
Despite the repeated warnings the money somehow seemed
to be found, the magazines continued to be printed and the plant stayed
open. Indeed, management appeared much more concerned to keep production
rolling smoothly with the minimum of disruption by avoiding open
confrontation with the chapels. Yet given that, officially at least, the
plant was not profitable, it is interesting to speculate as to why Bemrose
and Rupert Murdoch's News Corporation bothered to continue to keep it open
for so many years. Such a question is very difficult to answer
definitively, although Jinmiy Wilson provided one extremely intriguing
assessment:
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It took me quite a number of years but I eventually found out
why. Obviously we were in receipt of all the balance sheets. We
had access to all the information from the company and all the
information from Companies House. We employed an actuary to
assist us and when we needed them chartered accountants to
advise us. What I believe was happening is this. At the time we
were printing the largest circulation periodical in the
country. Rupert Murdoch and Bruce Matthews (the company
chairman) were presented with gold badges by the Finnish
government for buying paper from them. I believe that the
profit was not in the TV Times magazine, the profit was always
in who ordered the paper. It gave Murdoch high quality paper
which gave him an advantage when it came to purchasing the
'Sun' and 'News of the World' paper, which he got at the same
time probably at considerably reduced prices. Therefore, the
profit went directly into the 'Sun' and 'News of the World'
rather than going into Eric Bemrose. That is why I believe they
ran it and how they ran it.
Of course, such suspicions are impossible to confirm
officially, although it might provide some explanation as to why Beinrose
management appeared content to allow the chapel committees to exercise such
powerful shopfloor control so long as production was maintained at
consistently high rates throughout the l97Os.
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* tI 19703: stewards' 'weakrsses
Despite the formidable strengths of the chapel
coninittees' organisation inside the Bemrose plant there were also some
inherent weaknesses which need to be considered. Whilst sectional strength
provided the basis for many gains there is no doubt the chief handicap to
workplace union organisation was that of sectionalism within and between
the different chapels, unions and departments. Barry Caton explained the
antagonism between the craft union NGA and the non-craft union SOGAT in the
machine room:
A lot of the problems between the NGA and SOGAT arose because
the NGA would always stand on their laurels as being tradesmen,
having served their time. I mean, I left school when I was 16
and worked in the printing industry - in Beinrose - ever since,
for 17 years. But as far as the NGA are concerned you're still
a labourer. They always had the attitude that you're there to
brush up and clean around after them and nothing else.
There was a similar craft antagonism in the processing
department between SLADE and SOGAT chapel members, as Stan Livingston
acknowledged:
Some of the SLADE members were very elitist ye know, very right
wing. They looked down on others, at this riff-raff, if you
like, the unskilled people in SOGAT. I mean OK, I carry a
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briefcase into work - but its full of union stuff. But you
would get some SLADE members coming into work with a briefcase
with their bloody pyjamas or something in it. Anything to look
the businessman type... The pecking order in terms of elitism
and craftism was SLADE at the top, the two NGA chapels
underneath them and all them looking down on SOGAT.
Craft and union demarcations, rooted in a jealous
guarding of control over parts of the production process, were a perennial
source of friction between the chapels, as Jimmy Wilson related:
The hatred on the shopfloor was on a daily basis. when you
placed a cyclinder in a machine it was 2 NGA and 2 SOGAT. The 2
NGA could only hold the bar and if they put the end on SOGAT
just walked away. You couldn' t hold a bar, they couldn' t hold
the cup, that's how strict it was. Then in the finishing
department if you were webbing a machine up you had to have
your correct number up, because if your number wasn't there the
NGA would snitch on you and vice versa. Every job was fought
for, every job was determined. Hence the mistrust, the conflict
came to a head. People could be standing around for a couple of
hours arguing whose job it was.
These craft tensions were exacerbated by changes in work
organisation, such as modifications to machinery which made some of the
traditional operations open to replacement by simpler and quicker
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processes. Ironically, some of the most serious disputes in the factory
occured between SOGAT and either the SLADE or NGA chapels, rather than
between the chapels (whether individually or collectively) and management
(3). Such inter-union rivalry was very damaging to shopfloor union
organisation. At one level this can be seen on the issue of wages. Up until
1972 each chapel negotiated its own separate House Agreement (which did not
necessarily run for concurrent periods). This fragmented negotiating
structure ensured a jungle of competing wage rates and conditions with each
chapel grabbing what it could depending on the strength of its bargaining
position or abilities of its negotiators. There were 151 different pay
grades operating throughout the factory; not only were there, predictably,
different rates for craft and non-craft, but some were also based on the
different types of machinery one person may have operated from another,
such as working with colour as opposed to mono.
Many workers did not know what wages others were getting
- even members of the same union - and when the SOGAT chapel took strike
action in 1969 management conceded an increase of £2.86p for their members
in the machine room but the dispute dragged on for three weeks because both
the NGA and SLADE chapels refused to work with SOGAT until management
agreed to maintain a 12½ per cent differential between them. Only in 1972
after intense lobbying (mainly by the SOGAT FoC) and delicate negotiation
was agreement finally reached to form a Federated House Chapel in Bemrose
(effectively a joint shop stewards coriimittee) which succeeded in reducing
the number of different pay rates to 14. Jiunily Wilson remembered:
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Because of the 1969 SOGAT dispute it was obvious nobody could
go it alone. So I set about to organise the other unions
collectively rather than going in individually and sniping at
one another. I tried to organise a united front, but it was
extremely difficult because of the historical factor of the
print unions and their distrust of one another. You had to try
and rise above that and convince them that as trade unionists
the concept, the principle, was the most important thing, not
individuals. Obviously, at chapel meetings it was easy to stand
up and say 'Fuck the NGA'. But I used to have to convince my
own that whether we liked it or not we had to reconcile the
position that they were always going to be there. And we did
get a Federated Chapel.
Nonetheless, whilst the majority of workplace chapels
(including the SOGAT, NGA machine and composing chapels, as well as the
smaller maintenance union chapels) became party to a Joint House Agreement
between the company and the Federated Chapels organisation, the SLADE
process members (later known as the NGA '82 chapel) proceeded to negotiate
a separate House Agreement right up until the mid-1980s. The highly
specialised skills of SLADE process members encouraged them to guard their
highly advantageous position. In 1976 SLADE members earned on average £72 a
week compared with £63 for NGA members and £42 for SOGAT members. Following
a dispute involving SLADE in 1977 the differential widened even further; by
1980 they earned £26 a week over and above the NGA (4).
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Stan Livingston recalled why the SLADE chapel insisted on
maintaining a separate bargaining forum:
Management did try to get a joint negotiating forum but the
blockage point was the SLADE chapel because we said 'Hang on,
no, we've got an exclusive position here, we want to retain it,
ye know. We don't want to get involved in the zoo, in the in-
fighting t . The other chapels were in a joint negotiating forLlm,
but they spent a lot of their time arguing amongst themselves,
holding on to their own autonomies, whereas SLADE's only
adversary was the company.
Frank O'Donoghue worked for 28 years in the finishing
department, serving as a SOGAT coninittee representative between 1973-1987
and Federated Chapel secretary between 1984-7. A left wing member of the
Labour Party, he emphasised how the 'unwritten law' of differentials
between craft and non-craft workers ensured a continuing sectionalism even
under the new Federated Chapel umbrella.
The NGA machine chapel had loads of different rates but they
used to keep three of their members - the mono hands in the
blade shop - on their lowest rate to make sure they kept the
differential with SOGAT. We used to encourage the NGA to go in
for as much as they could get on the basis that everybody would
benefit, if they got more then so would we because we got 87½
per cent of it. But we couldn't get that home to them. To a
Page 164
Bemrose: Stewards' Relationship to Management: the 1970s
certain extent they didntt want to know. They were that busy
looking over their shoulder to see what SOGAT were doing they
never bothered looking in front of them to see what SLADE were
doing. The NGA fella would be on about £12,000 and the SLADE
fella would be on about £16,000, but the NGA fella was happy
because he was earning more than the SOGAT fella. Those bigots
would sooner keep your wages down than see you fighting
management.
The autonomy of each union and even individual chapels
became a deeply rooted part of print workers' attitudes in Bemrose. It
coloured the outlook of even the most socialist of chapel committee
representatives, as Jimmy Wilson acknowledged: 'We fell in with the macho
image of "our union is better than yours" from time to to time without a
doubt'. Not suprisingly, management were able to exploit such divisions
between the chapels, setting one up against the other, avoiding a situation
where all the chapels could present an effective united challenge.
A second factor weakening the strength of the chapel
committeest organisation vis-a--vis management was the retention of low
level management as members of the craft unions SLPDE and the NGA. Whereas
in most manufacturing plants shopfloor workers belong to one trade union
and supervisors and management to another, in Bemrose as with other
printing plants, the situation was much less clear cut. In SLADE, there
were 'deputy managers', who supervised the process department in a low
level capacity and received 10 per cent better wages. But the NGA had the
more ambiguous arrangement, particularly in the machine room, where not
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only chargehands (known as 'Number One's) and shift foremen (known as
'whitecoats') but also departmental shift managers were allowed to be
members of the union and attend union meetings. Inevitably, they tended to
act as a buffer between workers and management. Bob Henderson outlined the
ambivalent role of the Number One's:
The problem with the Number One 's from a trade union point of
view is getting to grips with them. They're left in an island.
If the chapel want to kick somebody they kick the Number One.
But the Number One's don't want the hassle of slowing down
production because they'll have to answer for it. So they'll
report the problem to the whitecoat and in turn it goes to the
shift manager. But it goes the other way as well. The machine
room management will kick the whitecoat, the whitecoat will
kick the Number One and the Number One will kick the rest of
the workforce. Very often they know they can't win. If they
side with the chapel committee management is against them and
if they side with management they create a friction on the
shopfloor. Its because of that friction we're always kicking
our own union. At least SOGAT have a different union to kick
when it comes to management.
This contradiction was, in many respects, the NGA machine
chapel's Achilles Heel. Barry Caton explained:
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In the NGA the well worn route was to do your apprenticeship,
do a couple of years on the chapel coninittee, get elected as a
chapel officer, become a 'whitecoat' supervisor and then become
a manager arid reach the other side. The vast majority of
chargehands had been NGA coninittee men and one of their longer
serving FoC's, a fella called Eric Lawrence, was a 'Number One'
and went on to be the shift manager in the machine room. In
fact, at the same time as he put his name forward to be branch
secretary of the NGA branch he put in his application to be a
'white coat'.
Many shopfloor NGA members, forever indebted to Number
One's who had protected their particular job niche in the past, continued
to display their loyalty and gratitude even after the latter had advanced
into the ranks of management. As a consequence, plant managers were able to
utilise their network of contacts within the NCA chapel to be kept informed
of confidential comittee deliberations and decisions. The existence of a
transmission belt from the shopfloor upwards to management inside the NGA
had a debilitating effect on the strength of the SOGAT chapel coninittee, as
Jininy Wilson related:
There was no trust between the chapels, we couldn't quite
confidently make suggestions of what we were going to do in an
open forum because within minutes management were well aware of
what we were going to do.
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The third weakness of chapel organisation was the
contradictory nature of the FoCs' position in relationship to management,
in particular the tendencies towards a quasi-managerial role. The House
Agreements were relatively highly formalised and meticulously codified
documents covering many aspects of working arrangements, including machine
ruuning speeds and output anticipated on a daily and weekly basis. Clearly,
there were some merits to such formalised House Agreements from a chapel
committee's point of view; they committed management to honour jointly
negotiated arrangements and made arbitrary or unilateral decision making
and changes in working practices much more difficult to justify. Yet they
also made it more difficult for chapel committees to evade the burden of
responsibility for enforcing the terms of such agreements on their own
shopfloor members, ensuring compliance with some onerous conditions. Barry
Caton recognised the dilemma:
Rightly or wrongly there tended to be little room for
interpretation because the agreement was sacrosanct, enshrined
in 'tablets of stone' which both management and union had to
honour. You couldn't go to a manager and say 'We're honouring
our side - you honour your side of the agreement' if he could
prove that patently you weren't honouring your side. Obviously
you had to enforce that with your members, you had to police
them to an extent.
In effect, the F0C became a key link between the manager
and workers in a department, essential to the efficient and smooth running
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of the plant. A graphic illustration of this was the monitoring of
production figures by the FoCs. In 1976 the Federated Chapel won a 5 per
cent pay increase and a four-night week on the night shift, changing what
had been an llpm-5.3Oam Friday night-Saturday morning shift to a llpm-3am
shift, which made a 32 hour working week (for the night shift). Yet against
the background of the Labour government's 5 per cent wage freeze the deal
was only conceded on the basis of maintaining production output at its
previous level. The deal obliged the FoC's to adopt a new role. Jininy
Wilson recalled what this involved within the SOGAT chapel:
My job as FoC was to uphold our part of the agreement - which
necessitated doing the production with the management. In other
words, every day I got all the production figures from
management and went through them and checked if we were
upholding our end of the deal. That was my first job each day,
to check the figures for the last 24 hours.
The consequences of such a role were not only that it
spurred on members to work faster but it also helped encouraged a positive
attitude towards managerial production priorities and methods, a basis for
the logic of acquiescence in the face of subsequent product market
difficulties.
The final limitation to the power of the chapel
coninittees was evident in the way some shopfloor working practices were
clearly double-edged in their effect. For example, the 'blow system' was
widespread throughout the chapels, with workers operating for two hours on
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the job and then taking two hours off during the shift. Frank O'Donoghue
recalled:
There was a lot of 'welt working' and 'blow time'. You could
say it was rampant, most people were able to take time off the
job and get away with it because the machines were running.
Management would close their eyes to a lot that went on so long
as production was kept up. Some people on nights were virtually
never there and the job was done by somebody else, and the next
week the other bloke would be off, it was the 'week about'.
The question naturally arises why did management tolerate
such workers' job controls - even if they disputed their application in
particular cases? Partly, it was because the chapels had the power to
impose various practices willy-nilly but it was also because turning a
blind eye to certain shopfloor practices kept the chapels relatively
satisfied and encouraged them not to make 'excessive' demands. Moreover,
despite the 'blow system' and 'welt working' the production figures in the
plant were actually kept at consistently quite high rates. Ironically, it
also meant that in some departments a 'work-to-rule', adopted as a sanction
against management by the chapel committees, effectively backfired because
it ended up with workers being even more 'productive' than previously.
The problem of overtime encapsulated the contradiction in
sharp relief. Throughout the 1970s there was a massive amount of regular
overtime working in the plant. Stan Livingston emphasised the obvious
material gain for shopfloor workers:
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The overtime rates were absolutely phenomenal. You could work
four hours a day mid-week and maybe a day at the weekend. We
used to call that a 'chinese weekend'. All overtime was at
double time, something like £14 an hour, so some people were
taking out three or four weeks' wages.
High rates of overtime working resulted partly from the
inherent problems of printing 13 separate regional editions of the 'TV
Times' every week, with many millions of copies, and from the fluctuating
and seasonal nature of magazine production with obvious peaks and troughs
during the week and at different times of the year. Formally, the chapels
and union branches put limits on the overtime they were prepared to accept
- in SOGAT 4 hours a week - after which each member was not offered another
turn until everyone else in the factory had had the opportunity to do a
stint, but in practice much more overtime became available than the chapel
comittee would have prefered, providing management with an extremely
effective carrot to dangle in front of workers to buy shopfloor peace
whilst at the same time creating inter-departmental and inter-union
sectional rivalries. Frank O'Donoghue reflected:
As a trade unionist and socialist I and others felt that what
we should really have been doing is not relying on overtime for
a decent wage. Unfortunately, we saw in those times of high
overtime people thinking pure and simply for themselves, people
prepared to do somebody down to get at their overtime. That was
a problem and management could use that to play one off against
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the other, in some cases one department against another. It
only needed a word in the right ear, 'I see the planning
department are working Saturday', that's all it needed. Before
you knew it there was murder. It was like dogs fighting over a
bone.
Thus, there was an extremely contradictory relationship
between the chapel comittees and management in the Bemrose plant during
the 1970s. On the one hand, the degree of power exercised by the unions
through a 'strong bargaining relationship' with management was much higher
than in most other manufacturing factories. On the other hand, their
internal divisions and peculiar shopfloor arrangements handicapped
shopfloor unity to a level much deeper than was the case elsewhere. It was
a curious mixture. But if the balance of bargaining power lay to the
advantage of the chapel comittees during the 1970s the product market
crisis of the 1980s changed the situation dramatically.
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STEWARDS' RELATICSJ]IP TO MANAGFT: ThE 1980s
* tI early 1980s: product market crisis
The British printing industry, under increasing
competitive pressure from European companies, began to urgently embark on
the task of replacing ageing machinery with new computer technology. At the
same time, the economic recession of the early 1980s put the squeeze on
profitability; shopfloor peace could no longer be bought at any price and
many national and provincial printing companies raced to use the new
technology to break the closed shop, transform working conditions and slash
the number of jobs. For example, in 1978 the 'Times' newspaper management
locked-out its workforce for 11 months in a bid to force changes in working
practices and wrest control from chapel union organisation. Similarly, the
Odhams and Sun plants in Watford and the Purnell plant in Bristol - the
other two of the 'Big Three' gravure factories in the country - suffered
massive job cuts and Bemrose, suffering from a chronic lack of new
investment, was itself under constant threat of closure. It was a crisis in
the product market which saw an abandonment of Bemrose management's 'strong
bargaining relations' towards the chapel committees in favour of a more
confrontational stance.
In 1979, an all-out national strike by Independent
Television companies' electricians blacked out scheduled ITV progranines
throughout the country and brought an abrupt halt to production of the 'TV
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Times' magazine in Berrirose for 10 weeks. Although shopfloor workers were
paid their full wages during this time there was a great deal of
uncertainty as to the long term future of the plant; the threat posed to
jobs (and the impending amalagamation of SI1ADE and the NGA) provided the
spur for the formation of a Joint Federated Chapel Coninittee embracing all
the chapels on site (including, for the first time, the SLADE process
chapel). Unfortunately, the loss of the 'TV Times' magazine, albeit for a
temporary period, was to be a foretaste of what would happen a year later
at the begining of 1981, when Bemroses's single most important contract was
lost completely. As Barry Caton described, the shock was devastating:
Most of the people who had just been taken on at Bemrose like
me, had been taken on, on the understanding that Bemrose was
printing the 'TV Times'. There was a seven year contract up for
grabs and Bemrose was the only individual gravure house in the
country that had the capacity to print the whole thing in one
go. We'd been fairly confident we would retain it because we
were doing the whole job under one roof, everything from
artwork origination through finishing to dispatch. So when we
heard we hadn't won the renewed contract it was like a bolt
from the blue. We were confronted, yet again, with a period of
about 10-12 weeks where we had no work. We were still going
into work and being paid but we just sat there doing nothing.
For me, that was the beginning of the slippery slope, that was
when things started to come unstuck.
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Officially, the loss of the T J Tiniest contract resulted
from the fact that Bemrose's bid to continue printing it was undercut by
its arch-rival BPCC (British Printing and Coniiiunications Corporation) owned
by Robert Maxwell, who subsequently printed the magazine in six different
plants across the country and dispatched it from a seventh. hether
production costs were actually cheaper - dispersing the magazine and
bringing it back together again - is questionable. Certainly, there was
intense speculation that Mardoch did not 'lose' the 'TV Times' contract but
actually handed it over to Maxwell; the constant problem of printing an
allegedly unprofitable magazine were cited; or possibly the Finnish
government connection was no longer central to Nurdoch's global
operations? Such possibilities were impossible to confirm although
tremendous intrigue surrounded the intense behind-the-scenes competition
between media magnates, Rupert Mardoch and Robert Maxwell.
Not suprisingly, losing the 'TV Times' contract threw the
chapel committees in Bemrose into some disarray as, yet again, the prospect
of large scale redundancies loomed over the horizon. Management quickly
seized the opportunity to present a 'Survival Plan' docunent, aimed at
involving the unions in a collaborative effort to make the plant more
efficient through wide ranging changes in working practices and manning
arrangements. The company produced a barrage of figures to demonstrate
their poor financial performance and bad labour productivity. As Stan
Livingston emphasised, negotiations over the Survival Plan opened up
against the background of great uncertainty as to the long-term future of
the plant:
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Management said they were going to negotiate the 'Survival
Plan' with us. It contained things like changed job practices,
more mobility and interchangeability. It was a dramatic
announcement. They told us we were under threat of the whole
factory collapsing, we were losing so much money. They said
they had to make maximum use of the workforce availiable.
They'd used threats of job loss in the past but this was much
more serious.
Whilst talks over the Survival Plan continued, House
Agreement negotiations (which had been deadlocked over disagreement with
the NGA machine chapel) were abruptly suspended following a direct order
from Rupert Murdoch who threatened a 7½ per cent pay offer had to be
accepted within two weeks or the plant would be closed; any dispute in the
interim would also precipitate closure (5). Such unexpected belligerency
was enough to force the Federated Chapel's hand and the House Agreement was
signed within the deadline stipulated.
Iniiiediately afterwards, in June 1981, there were even
more dramatic developments, when all FoC's, local branch secretaries and
union full-time national officers were summoned to a 'Future of Bemrose'
crisis meeting held at the Adelphi Hotel in Liverpool. kich to everybody's
amazement they were informed of the complete takeover of Bernrose by Robert
Maxwell's BPCC (6). Despite the fact that Maxwell - owner of the Mirror
Group Newspapers (including 'The Daily Mirror', 'Sunday Mirror', 'People'
and 'Sporting Life') and with extensive interests in publishing (including
Macmillan and Pergamon) and television (including Central TV) - had been
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engaged in cut-throat competition with Nurdoch for a number of years in the
scramble to control Britain's press, he was being handed Bemrose on a plate
by his foremost adversary. Barry Caton takes up the story:
Suddenly the ownership of the company changed hands. Nurdoch
gave the company lock, stock and barrel to Robert Maxwell. He
gave him the factory, the contracts, the machinery, the
management, the workforce, the whole lot. All he wanted him to
give him in return was the pension fund, in cash.
The chapel committees viewed Maxwell's sudden and
immediate takeover of the Bemrose plant with deep foreboding, as Stan
Livingston related:
People were terrified of Maxwell, because they thought 'Here's
the wheeler dealer'. He could have bought it just to flog it
off. Although the funny thing is, he wasn't buying it, he was
being given it by Nurdoch. The way we looked at it Maxwell was
picking it up so he could dispose of it, a classic asset
stripping operation. We were pretty certain he would have
closed us down as a way of getting rid of the competition to
his BPCC plants. Maxwell owned two of the four gravure houses
in the country. He'd made massive redundancies after a day or
two of taking over Sun and Odhams in Watford and we could see
exactly the same kind of scenario in Liverpool. We knew the
only reason he would want Bemrose would be to close it down and
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transfer the work to his other two plants so they could be run
at full capacity. Bemrose was expendable.
On the surface, at least for a period of 10 weeks, the
Nurdoch-Maxwell deal was apparently in effect. Maxwell actually visted the
plant, addressed a meeting of the workforce declaring 'I now own Bernrose'
and moved his appointed managers onto the site, taking over operational
day-to--day control. But behind the official veneer, the exchange deal had
not been conclusively signed and eventually fell apart just as
spectacularly as it had been cobbled together after Maxwell was apparently
unable to stump up the pension fund cash required. The machinations that
lay behind the on-off deal are quite complex and impossible to fathom out
entirely, even if Jiriiny Wilson provided a plausible explanation:
I'm convinced from what we have found out since that Rupert
Murdoch was attempting to take full control of Collins, the
publishers. He only had 40 per cent of the shares and Maxwell
had x amount of the shares. 'What he attempted to do was give
him Bemrose, which was worth nothing - at the time we estimated
the factory was worth about £5 million over the 10 years
Maxwell was going to pay him back. But for that Maxwell would
get rid of a major competitor in Eric Bemrose. In return, he
would sell the shares in Collins to Murdoch. They definitely
did a deal. But basically the main reason Maxwell dropped it in
the end was because he couldn't stump up the cash for the
pension fund and the deal didn't go through.
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Whatever the stratagem that lay behind the takeover deal,
the whole thing had been cancelled by October 1981 when Murdoch resumed
ownership of the Bemrose plant. But the ininediate practical outcome was an
acceleration in the implementation of the Survival Plan, placed on the
table for negotiation earlier in the year. Certainly, the takeover debacle
deepened the chapel comittees' fears of future job prospects and induced a
greater willingness to make major concessions to improve the plant's
efficiency. This 'new realism' was further spurred on when the company
confirmed speculation they would be launching a new, large circulation
magazine to be printed at Bemrose to replace the 'TV Times'; at 6 million
copies the News of the World's 'SunDay' magazine would be the second
biggest gravure job in Western Europe. Although it held out the prospect of
job security the company skilfully exploited the vunerability of chapel
organisation by making acceptance of the terms and conditions of the
Survival Plan a pre-condition of the Beinrose plant receiving the new
contract. The chapel comittees could see their counterparts in other
printing plants across the country acquiescing in massive changes and felt
they could do little to defend their own formerly highly advantageous
position.
With the benefit of hindsight it is clear the chapel
committees were unduly pessimistic about their predicament; even at the
time it was apparent, at least to some chapel committee representatives,
that a complete capitulation by the unions was far from necessary. Once it
had been announced Bemrose wished to take on the new 'SunDay' contract it
became clear that News International (the owners of the News of the World)
had known for some months beforehand they would be launching a new in-house
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magazine, even if they were not exactly sure where it would be printed. But
once Murdoch had resumed ownership of Bemrose's the Liverpool site was the
obvious choice, particularly as by now the 'TV Times' contract no longer
existed. In other words, Bemrose had no real intention of closing the plant
down; (if they had wanted to do that they had thrown away three perfect
opportunities to do so, namely during the 10-week TV electricians strike,
following the loss of the 'TV Times' magazine contract or irrinediately after
the collapse of the Maxwell takeover).
Preparing to take on the 'SunDay' magazine was a clear
signal that News International intended to continue production at Bemrose,
at least for the ininediate future. In these circumstances, it should have
been possible for the Federated Chapel to have mounted shopfloor resistance
to the Survival Plan, confident that the company could have been forced to
backtrack at least on some of their more draconian measures. But tremendous
weight was also being placed on the SOGAT chapel committee from another
quarter, as Jimmy Wilson related:
The main aim of the Survival Plan from the company' s point of
view was to make the place more efficient. But there was also
pressure coming from the national union, so we were getting
kicked from both ends, from the company and the national union.
We had to be seen to be doing something. What we didn't want
was to have the union officials coming in, because they would
have agreed to anything.
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The full-time officials claimed the Survival Plan was
essential for the survival of Bemrose and that resistance would not only be
futile but akin to a modern form of Luddism. A pincer movement between News
International and union officials effectively forced the Bemrose workplace
organisation to reluctantly submit to the bulk of the changes in working
practices stipulated in the Survival Plan. Even though the Federated Chapel
were subsequently able to bargain over the details of its actual
implementation the Plan was severe in its overall effect. To start with,
the old 'hot-metal' composing department became a victim of the new
computerised technology sweeping the printing industry and was completely
closed down with the loss of 93 jobs; the I'GA composing chapel was
disbanded (leaving only three major chapels on the site). Enforced
retirement at the age of 65 reduced the workforce by another 61 people,
mainly from the process department. But the most serious development
involved the introduction of wide-ranging flexibility in working practices
throughout the plant. The Survival Plan document stated:
The following measures have been agreed between the management
and chapels in a determined effort to try to restore the
company to a viable operating condition, to improve the
company's ability to compete for work, both at home and
abroad...the principle is accepted that, in departments where
there is insufficent work, there will be no manning up to
predetermined numbers...in SOGAT departments full
interchangeability will apply within each department...there
will be no overtime, either mid-week or at weekends, to make up
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shift numbers and all overtime will relate to production
requirements...there will be no restrictions whatsoever on
outputs...the officers of the various chapels undertake to
discourage any activity which appears detrimental to the
efficency and/or economic performance of the company. (7)
Despite the highly adverse circumstances in which the
Survival Plan had been introduced the Federated Chapel were able to force
management to make a quid pro qo agreement to reduce the number of
different wage rates in the factory from 14 to 4 (although this still
excluded the SLADE chapel which remained on its own) helping to overcome
some of the traditional rivalries between the unions in the plant.
Moreover, an indication of the continuing resilience of workplace chapel
organisation was the campaign for parity of craft rates that ensued in
1982. The driving force behind the demand for parity was the NGA machine
chapel who had seen the differential between their pay rates and the NCA
'82 process chapel (formerly SLADE) widen considerably. The recent
amalgamation of the two craft unions, even though separate chapels remained
in Bemrose, provided a further incentive for the machine chapel to seek a
levelling of craft rates within the plant and the consequential adjustment
to the rates that would be paid to the non-craft SOGAT members ensured a
much broader layer of support for parity generally.
After an overtime ban and work-to--rule the NGA machine
chapel walked out on unofficial strike for a week before management finally
agreed to open up inunediate preparations for a phased equalisation of craft
rates of pay. A 'Joint Working Party' was set up between the Federated
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Chapel and management and by 1986, after a four year phasing-in exercise,
only two craft and two non-craft rates of pay within the factory remained.
In some respects, it was a most unusual achievement. Traditionally,
differentials are sacrosanct within the printing industry; agreeing to
uniform rates heralded a unique development. For the vast majority of the
workforce in Bernrose it meant a substantial pay increase. At the same time,
despite persistent internal rifts the Federated Chapel was eventually able
to steer a course that united all workplace union representatives towards a
common objective. Nonetheless, parity was achieved at a tremendous price to
the strength of shopfloor chapel organisation. The final terms of the deal
were only agreed after management threatened to cancel a new contract to
print the 'Sunday Express' magazine and after full-time trade union
officials had signed their agreement over the heads of the chapel
committees. Moreover, the key principle underlining the deal, on which
there was unanimity from chapel committees and union officials alike,
stipulated:
The cost of equalising craft rates and the proportional
adjustment to non-craft rates will be funded through the
productivity savings generated through changes in working
practices and manning arranageinents aimed at improving
efficiency and maximising output in all departments of the
factory (8).
In other words, management only agreed to parity on the
basis that it was a self-financing arrangement; the £1^ million necessary
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to fund it was actually raised by shopfloor workers themselves. Each year
for 4 years, the productivity savings made by workers in each department
were put into a 'corriion pool' on a pro rata basis, and a proportion of it
was distributed to the workforce. For example, in the first year 80 per
cent of the savings went to the unions and 20 per cent to management.
Parity was achieved in four stages, 20 per cent, 40 per cent, 20 per cent
and 20 per cent. Any small additional savings which exceeded the cost of
parity were shared out equally among all chapels. Having previously enjoyed
disproportinately high rates of pay the NGA '82 process chapel were placed
in the extremely invidious position of having to agree to make productivity
savings which would contribute towards achieving parity for the other
chapels; apart from receiving the national printing industry minimum award
their pay levels were kept at a relatively static level. Yet with the
introduction of new technology, particularly laser scanners and a litho
conversion unit, the process department also faced a severe cutback in
jobs. However, by virtue of being half the workforce, it was the SOGAT
chapel that had to make the most exorbitant sacrifices to fund the parity
exercise. Barry Caton acknowledged:
Management agreed to parity because on a long-term basis it was
in their interest. It was a way of whittling down staff because
the major savings from it came from the non-replacement of
labour. If they could make the workforce more efficient they
could bring more work in and thus generate more profit...We did
several things, we gave up the right to overtime cover on
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holidays, we de-manned on the presses, speeds went up wherever
possible, there was faster changeovers.
In the absence of any substantial investment by the
company, new working methods were accepted that led to what Jimmy Wilson
referred to as 'NF1' or mobility, flexibility and interchangeability;
traditional lines of demarcation between departments were cut out,
particulary in the process department where a new negative assembly area
was set up combining the retouching, planning and camera sections (9); a
programme of natural wastage which had begun earlier continued, resulting
in an overall reduction of the workforce from 1400-plus to 1338; and
overtime levels were virtually eradicated throughout the plant reducing the
company's bill by £1.5 million. By 1986 Bemrose's apparent loss making
position had been turned into a profit of £4.7 million (10).
The chapel committees lacked the ideological and
political resources to resist management's encroachment on shopfloor power;
their acceptance of self-financing wage increases - like their acquiescence
in improved productivity - followed managerial rationality. Yet there were
some important countervailing tendencies to those working to undermine
shopfloor bargaining leverage. Ironically, despite the reduction in labour
achieved through natural wastage, management soon discovered the sheer
volume of production meant they had to employ an extra 100 INCA printers and
SOGAT assistants in the machine room and other departments; this brought
the overall numbers employed in the plant by 1986 back to previous levels;
even the amount of overtime was Increased slightly in certain departments.
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This meant that for many shopfloor workers the plant
appeared to have been cushioned from the full rigours of the recession and
avalanche of redundancies occurring elsewhere in Liverpool. Moreover,
although management had encroached on previously 'excessive' shopfloor
working practices and 'overmanning' of machines, the chapel conmLttees
still retained control over many aspects of their immediate work situation;
even if management felt much more confident in confronting the power of the
chapels they were by no means able to get their own way on every issue.
On the other hand, the relatively much more co-operative
relationship with management established during the 1980s did reflect a
significant shift of the balance of bargaining power to the disadvantage of
chapel union organisation. Two factors, both internal and external,
reinforced this trend. Firstly, there was the removal of Jimmy Wilson as
SOGAT chapel FoC and his explusion from the union by full-time officials;
this dissipated the energies of the SOGAT chapel committee and impaired its
bargaining effectiveness vis-a-vis management (see forthcoming section).
Secondly, there was the impact of the defeats in struggle for key sections
of the trade union movement. In November 1983 ranks of riot police
repeatedly baton-charged MA '82 pickets outside the printworks of the
'Stockport Messenger' in Warrington, where with the help of Tory government
anti-union legislation, Eddie Shah had set up a non-union factory equipped
with computer technology. The effect on many shopfloor workers from Benirose
who attended the nearby picket line was devastating, as Stan Livingston
described:
Page 186
Beinrose: Stewards' Relationship To Management: The 1980s
When people saw what was going on they said 'GOOd God, is this
Britain?' They were very shocked by it, when they saw that
militia coming out smacking people over their heads with
truncheons. The effect it had was the opposite of what we had
wanted. It was clearly shown to the people who went what was to
come if you tried to beat Thatcherism, if you ever really tried
anything on. If anything it fed the feeling you can' t win. The
MA had a hut there and it just got turned over, smashed to
bits. I mean, its like someone knocking your house down, ye
know. That's our little castle, it was a psychological blow.
The effect was to terrify many people.
The defeat of the national miners' strike of 1984-5 was
another psychological blow; having regularly made financial contributions
to NUN pickets from local pits in Lancashire its impact was felt quite
deeply in Bemrose. Even more important was Rupert Murdoch's defeat of the
bitter long-drawn out strike by 5,000 sacked print workers at News
International's Wapping plant in 1986-7 which signalled the scale of the
transformation taking place in Britain's newspaper and printing industry.
Two direct appeals for solidarity industrial action by Beinrose workers,
made by coachloads of pickets from Wapping, were turned down out of fear
that it would only give Nurdoch the excuse to shut the Liverpool plant. It
was a painful reminder of how weak chapel organisation had become.
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* 1987-1991: redurKiancies arxl closure
The decisive blow to shopfloor chapel strength was
delivered in April 1987 when management announced 775 redundancies, a 60
per cent reduction of the workforce from 1342 to 567, involving the total
closure of certain areas of the factory, including the 'front-end' of the
process department, the replacement of the in-house transport department by
News International's own TNT distribution network and the sub-contracting
of catering, cleaning and security. The justification offered for such a
massive re-organisation of production was the loss of the 'Sunday Express'
magazine contract to Robert Maxwell's BPCC organisation, a loss of revenue
of £10 million. There was no room for negotiation either on the level of
the job losses decreed by management nor on the company's arbitrary
selection of individuals. The Federated Chapel launched an irr!nediate public
campaign of opposition to the redundancies; publishing a 12-page glossy
information brochure and winning support from local Labour NP's. But the
unions' response was fatally handicapped by a number of problems.
Firstly, the chapel committees' previous acceptance of
management's ideological justification for increased labour productivity to
hold down costs in face of external competition had effectively led to an
acceptance of the logic of job losses; it also helped to demobilise any
militant rank and file opposition that could potentially have been mounted.
Secondly, there was the continuing dispute between the SOGAT F0C and full-
time local and national union officials, which considerably undermined the
authority of the chapel comnittee and resulted in the union's refusal to
provide assistance whilst Jininy Wilson remained in office. Thirdly, the
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redundancies caine shortly after the company had announced outline plans to
build a completely new newspaper printing plant on a 'greenfield site' in
the neighbouring borough of Knowsley (to print the 'Sun', 'News of the
World', 'Today', 'Times' and 'Sunday Times'). Many workers not chosen for
redundancy believed that, despite a reduction in manning levels in Aintree,
they would be able to get jobs in the new Knowsley plant, undermining their
opposition to the job cuts. Fourthly, the high average age of a sizeable
proportion of those chosen for redundancy encouraged many shopfloor workers
to accept the decision as a fait accompli.
'What had been once an extremely powerful shopfloor chapel
organisation effectively collapsed without so much as a whisper of a
fightback as management rode roughshod over the Federated Chapel's muted
protests. Barry Caton explained:
The argument was about having some control over redundancies
not about the principle of redundancies, that was accepted
virtually from the word go. All along the negotiations were
aimed at minirnising the redundancies. There was never a
fightback as such. Don't forget all this came after Wapping. We
just tried to keep as many people as possible. We suggested a
'last in, first out' and management categorically rejected
that. We asked if they would accept volunteers first, they said
no. Every proposal and every step on the road they said no.
The redundancy exercise effectively broke the back of
shopfloor chapel organisation in the Bemrose plant. The NGA '82 process
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chapel saw a reduction in labour of 75 per cent from 208 to 52; the SOGAT
chapel was cut by more than half from 706 to 338 and the NGA '82 machine
chapel from 174 to 86. At the same time, each of the chapel committees
suffered a deep haemorrhage within their ranks; every member of the NGA '82
process chapel committee was made redundant except for the FoC (and
Federated Chapel chairman) Stan Livingston; many of the key SOGAT coimmittee
activists were also sacked, except for Jimmy Wilson - who having been
forced to resign as F0C and facing explusion from the union no longer posed
any serious threat to the company; there was a similar loss of union
activists in the NCA '82 machine chapel, although the FoC actually took
voluntary redundancy. Management continued to press home their advantage
with the remaining workforce. A number of union facilities were immediately
withdrawn, including 100 per cent time off-work for each of the three
chapel FoC's, and the facility to hold both chapel committee and full
chapel meetings within the factory was taken away. The balance of
bargaining power was wrenched decisively in favour of management. Tommy
Brown recalled:
Management's attitude totally altered from the Monday morning
after the redundancies when they came in wielding the big
stick. 'You will do this, you will do that'. No negotiation.
'If you don't like it get your coat on and get out' • At every
opportunity management tried to ridicule the unions, 'Now I've
got you down I'm going to keep you that way'.
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To all intents and purposes, management ignored
previously negotiated House Agreements and treated the Federated Chapel
with utter disdain. For example, in 1988 they announced the termination of
all existing agreements and issued draft proposals for a completely new
package that included: pay rises that took no account of the British
Printing Industry Federation national minimum awards, an agreement that
would last for fifteeen months instead of twelve, no strikes and no
involvement by local full-time union officials in the chapels' affairs
(11). In 1989 they even threatened to introduce individual contracts and
withdraw recognition from the unions for negotiation purposes unless the
Federated Chapel accepted a 7.5 per cent pay offer (12). Management
eventually backtracked on most of these original demands but only because
such threats successfully enabled them to force compliance over some key
issues of dispute; they were able to ram through many other significant
changes despite the chapel coninittees' protests. Stan Livingston explained:
The last two or three years' House Agreements were almost a
non-negotiation in real terms, there wasn't any free collective
bargaining by any stretch of the imagination. It was a matter
of what you could persuade them to keep - never mind improve
things. It was looked on almost as a victory if we held onto
something, if we stopped them taking something away from us.
The transformation of working practices proceeded apace.
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In the process chapel the changes in production methods and
changed work practices accounted for something like a 40 per
cent increase in output per man after the redundancies. For
instance, in my own department - the carbon printing department
- I had to develop a cyclinder in a tank and prepared my next
job at the same time whereas I would only have done one at a
time before. Managers involved themselves in the job where they
never did before. There was a lot more flexibility. SOGAT
members were moved from the finishing department to the machine
room and back again if they were wanted later on in the shift.
Ironically, the massive cutback in jobs and changes to
working practices of the past had been justified on the grounds of low
productivity, providing international rivals with a competitive advantage.
Now that particular barrier had been removed and the company had been
returned to profitability. But the long-term threat of closure remained. It
illustrated how the 'efficency' and 'viability t of the plant had little to
do with the productivity of the workers involved. Significantly, rapid
advances in printing technology had made it possible to directly print
colour pages into many daily newspapers (such as the 'Daily Mirror') making
the pre-printed colour re-winds that Bernrose specialised in increasingly
outmoded, whilst new printing methods such as web offset were overtaking
the factory's photo-gravure operation. Yet despite repeated shopfloor
requests throughout the 1980s Bemrose had consistently refused to embark on
an investment progranine in either machinery or plant to secure the site's
future. In fact, despite a profit of £9 million in 1989 Bemrose
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provocatically declared its intention to repay News International
'accumulated losses' from previous years of £12 million (13).
Finally, in May 1990 News International effectively
declared the death knell of the factory after confirming the transfer of
the contract for the 'SunDay' magazine to the West German publishing and
printing group Burcia QnbH. The £220 million deal - the largest in the
European magazine market - was part of Rupert Murdoch's strategy to prepare
for the removal of trade barriers in 1992 (14). The loss of the 'SunDay',
which accounted for 85 per cent of the Bemrose workload, led to a further
413 redundancies. There was no resistance to the job losses. About 160
workers were kept on for another twelve months to complete various
contractual obligations before the factory was finally closed at the end of
1991, whilst only about 90 ex-Bemrose workers were employed at News
International's high-tech newspaper plant in Knowsley.
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S1]iARDS' REIAIIONSHIP 1D RANK AND FILE MF4BS: ThE 1970s AND 80s
* tbe 1970s: benevolent control from above
In many respects the Bemrose chapel committees' had a
relatively close and accountable relationship to their rank and file
members during the early 1970s. The SOGAT chapel committee was composed of
about 15 shopfloor representatives elected from production areas such as
the machine room and finishing department (on the basis of one committee
member per shift) and non-production areas such as the warehouse and ink
mill (on the basis of one committee member per department). Each individual
committee rep was elected by a ballot of the entire chapel membership for a
two year term of office, with half the committee up for re-election every
year. Monthly committee meetings were held inside the factory, although
usually outside working hours. A small executive committee - composed of
the Father of the Chapel (FoC), deputy FoC, secretary, chairman and
treasurer - administered the chapel's day-to-day affairs. All committee
members (including the FoC until 1976) held full-time jobs on the shopfloor
but were able to obtain a limited amount of time-off to attend to
grievances and union business at management's discretion.
At the heart of the committee's shopfloor strength was
the day-to-day control It exercised over the manning of jobs, movement of
labour and overtime rotas, through the operation of a seniority system.
According to Tommy Brown, the job experience and bargaining ability of the
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SOGAT committee members was viewed with some respect by rank and file
members:
When I started in Bemrose I was shown round the factory by the
conrnittee man who told me the do's and don'ts. Well, you
couldn't really sneeze without consulting the committee man
then - they'd boxed everything, the overtime, they sorted the
holidays out. At the time management accepted quite readily the
unions were in charge.
Contesting of committee positions varied between chapels.
Apart from the Father of the Chapel (FoC) there was not a great deal of
competition for other places on the SLADE process chapel committee,
although this did not necessarily reflect a lack of participation. On the
contrary, in many areas of the process department chapel members took it in
turns to hold a committee position with the incumbent stepping down after a
short period in office, thereby nullifying the need for a formal election
contest. By contrast, there was a much more obvious level of involvement
within the NGA machine chapel. According to Bob Henderson:
All through the '70s everyone wanted to be on the committee,
well let's say ten per cent of the chapel wanted to be on the
committee. There'd be a regular contest, you'd get a couple of
candidntes for the position...Once we had a vote of no
confidence in the FoC because of a shabby deal he'd made and
all the coninitte resigned. About half the committee were re-
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elected but there was about ninteen candidates for the ten
positions.
There was a similar level of active participation in the
SOGAT chapel. Barry Caton related:
It was very rare for someone to be elected unopposed. You would
generally have someone, young and up and coining, and the
sitting tenant. Once you ousted the sitting tenant you could
guarantee the next election he would be nominated to oppose
you. So you would always have two people vying for positions,
sometimes there was three or four.
The tenure of office also varied. Within the SLADE
process chapel the turnover of many coninittee positions was generally quite
regular, about every two years. In contrast, within the NGA machine chapel
there tended to be a larger core of longer serving committee
representatives, whilst in the SOGAT chapel only a handful of committee
reps were permanent fixtures, namely the FoC, deputy FoC and treasurer and
a few other individuals. Mass meetings of the whole workforce, embracing
members of all chapels, were rarely held; sectional meetings, of members
within particular departments, were occasionally organised; but the chief
forum for the direct accountability of committee representatives to rank
and file members were chapel meetings, held at local union branch offices
three, four or six times a year in the NGA machine, SOGAT and SLADE process
chapels respectively. The procedure at these membership meetings was
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usually extremely formal, complementing the highly efficient adminstrative
arrangements of the chapel coninittees and their meticulous minute book
keeping. Strict union rules enforced by the committee - such as fines or
disciplinary action for non-attendance at meetings - reinforced the
cohesiveness of the chapel and its collective interests.
About 90 women were employed in the plant prior to 1987,
concentrated in the finishing department where they worked alongside male
SOGAT members. The chapel committee successfully negotiated an equal pay
agreement in 1972, the first SOGAT chapel on Merseyside to do so; holidays
and general working conditions in Bemrose were also the same for both men
and women. Partly, this was a result of the influence of the two women
representatives on the chapel committee, including a Mother of the Chapel
(MoC), and the pressure of rank and file women members themselves. Partly,
it was because of the role played by the left-wing SOGAT chapel FoC. As
Jirruiiy Wilson related:
By and large there were always two women on the committee. They
weren't that trade union or politically orientated, they were
just women looking after women's issues and quite rightly
making sure they weren't being given inferior conditions. You
had to pressurise them to take on the positions, on the basis
that if you didn't have a woman representative on the committee
you wouldn't get a fair crack of the whip. You had to force
them into the position. It depended on the characteristics of
some of the committee men - if they were anti-women you always
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got a woman on, because there were people who did take
advantage of the women in terms of doing their job on overtime.
Cathy Kewley, a rank and file SOGAT member in the
finishing department throughout the 1970s and '80s, described some of the
problems the women faced on the shopfloor:
There was an argument when I first started in the area where
the girls worked, where we sorted out the 'TV Times'. The
committee man wanted his men to work overtime on the job the
girls were doing and there was murder between the committee man
and the M0C. There was fighting and arguing and everything on
the floor. He was working downstairs but he wanted the men to
come up and take the job off those girls and get the money for
it. It was the same when the girls were working the 3-11 shift
- they were working at night but they weren't allowed to work
overtime until the morning, it had to go to the men. It was a
bit bad really. But Jimmy Wilson sorted it out and the women
went onto a night shift and the overtime went to the women on
whose job it was, and it was fair.
Yet the prejudices of some male committee members did not
prevent the women from seeking representation from others whenever
necessary:
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You always had coninittee men you could go to. If the M0C was
off - say on her holidays or something - the women would go to
a man who was on the committee, depending on who he was. A lot
of times you would be wasting your time talking to the
committee man we had upstairs, so you would go downstairs and
find another one or take it straight to the FoC.
It is significant that, compared with the FoC, chapel
committee members generally did not play as prominent a role in shaping the
outcome of most of the key issues facing rank and file workers. Of course,
it is true committee members were involved in dealing with shopfloor
grievances and formulating chapel policy. Monthly chapel committee meetings
were also an important forum for debate, as Barry Caton pointed out:
If there was a situation that occurred outside of an agreement
that wasn't of major consequence, then we would debate a
policy. The corrntLttee discussed everything that went on in the
factory, the fair and equal distribution of the overtime, the
production requirements and production outputs. The committee
decided a policy that would be uniform throughout the factory.
On the other hand, committee members were viewed purely
as an auxiliary to the key bargaining role carried out on behalf of the
chapel by the FoC (and deputy FoC and secretary) who for example, travelled
down to London for House Agreement negotiations with Bruce Matthews of News
International. The pivotal role of the F0C was considerably enhanced in
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1977 after management provided office facilities for each of the four
separate chapels within the plant and successfully encouraged each of the
FoC's to take 100 per cent time-off work to represent their members. Jimmy
Wilson outlined the key factor underlining management's new strategy and
his misgivings about his full-time status as SOGAT chapel FoC:
Management offered it in my opinion because of the thread they
were on on a daily basis. You've got to picture it that when
you went in on a Monday morning it was a powder keg - that only
went phsssshh every week - but nevertheless it was ready to
explode. They were obviously aware of the tactics being adopted
by the union. Hence they thought we might as well have him here
so we don't have to send out for him, so they can deal with the
problems as they arise every day. But it was certainly not my
wish to be a full-time FoC because I firmly believe, and I did
then, it was one of the fundamental mistakes in the trade union
movement, of isolating people. Because as has been proved right
you do become isolated from the feeling on the floor.
Yet Jimmy Wilson was undoubtedly regarded with tremendous
respect by SOGAT chapel committee and shopfloor union members alike.
Representing a wide range of members scattered across every department in
the factory he was uniquely placed to keep abreast of day-to-day
developments and offer a strategic form of leadership. Barry Caton
commented:
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I can't remember anyone ever being put up against him. As an
FoC, as far as I was concerned, he was superb. He was the most
complete FoC you'll ever come across. His facts, figures, his
contacts - pensions, wages, anything you wanted to discuss. He
was a shrewed organiser, a negotiator, he was the type of guy
who could put a price on anything.
Steve Hewes, a SOGAT chapel committee representative for
a number of years in the finishing department, spoke for many others when
he paid tribute to his role within the plant:
The first thing he would do when he went into work he went to
every department, he went through all the transport
information, so he knew what was going in and going out. He
would go into every office, look what was on the board, what
was getting produced, how many, where for. Every aspect Jimmy
knew and management let him because they knew he was competent
in his job. He knew everything about the place, he was an
oracle. People wanted to tell him everything so he had that
ability. Jimmy's committee was such that whoever was on the
shift that touched him - earlys or afternoons - he took them
into meetings with management, they were his men. They didn't
speak around the table independently, everything went through
Jimmy, but he made sure they were well aware of the agreements,
the history of the place.
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Certainly, the substantive gains achieved by the SOGAT
chapel committee with Jimmy Wilson at the helm during the 1970s - including
high wage rates, substantial control over manning and strong union
organisation - are testimony to the FoC's influential leadership
abilities. His lengthy tenure of office - which lasted for seventeen years
from 1971-1987 - was further evidence of the confidence consistently
expressed by shopfloor members. (By comparison, during the same period
there were five different FoC's in both the SLADE process and NGA machine
chapels.) Nonetheless, the nature of the bargaining system - with its
formal House Agreements - and the structure of workplace union organisation
- with its highly autonomous collection of separate chapels and full-time
FoC's - faciliatated the development of a highly centralised form of
leadership within the chapel coninittees, a process accentuated even further
within the SOGAT chapel by the long-standing intervention of the highly
influential FoC. As Barry Caton reflected:
The general was on the pinnacle of the pyramid, there was no
sort of intermediate structure, there was no heir apparent. One
of the things I used to say is that it would be a disastrous
day if Jimmy Wilson ever walked out onto Long Lane and got
knocked over by a bus. A lot of us on the committee wouldn't
have known what was going on. Jimmy kept a lot of things to
himself. Obviously he had confidantes but two of his deputies -
although they held office - they certainly never did the job,
and that suited Jimmy. He could go and do his own thing and he
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had them in tow. Jimmy could run rings round them and get
virtually everything he wanted.
J:iiiy Wilson himself recognised the problem of a chapel
coninittee whose role was strictly circumscribed:
That's right. Regrettably on looking back, that was one of the
mistakes we made. The responsibility was left more with the F0C
and deputy and the commit tee men, other than holidays and
overtime, the coninittee men didn't play much of a role. They
just reported the issue, went to see the FoC.
Contact between the FoC and departmental managers and
supervisors was frequent and concerned not only negotiable issues of terms
and conditions of employment but also production difficulties, work
allocations and output levels. Frank O'Donoghue explained:
He met with management on a regular basis to discuss
productivity - which was monitored by both parties - so that
agreed levels of productivity were arrived at, so that could be
used for negotiating purposes. He was always constantly made
aware of exactly where we were on production schedules at any
given time of the day. If there was a problem on any particular
job, where we were likely to be behind the schedule, he was
always made aware of that and he always kept his eye on it.
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Having previously negotiated House Agreements stipulating
production targets the FoC was obliged, on occasion, to encourage shopfloor
rank and file members to increase their pace of work. Tommy Brown remarked:
Say we were coming round to pay negotiations. He would say
'I've told management that we'll produce x amount of copies per
week. Now you've got to be seen to be making it work - if you
want the extra £10 a week pay rise'. If people were sluggish -
with some people trying to create overtime - he'd have a say
so.
Despite the fact this involved Jiniiiy Wilson in a quasi-
managerial role the FoC's advice was, if sometimes reluctantly, complied
with, essentially because in general terms his bargaining approach appeared
to 'deliver the goods' in terms of high pay awards and advantageous working
conditions. As Steve Hewes noted:
There was always that much more to gain in respect to overtime
and working conditions that whenever the F0C said 'management
are within their rights, it's within the agreement' it was
generally accepted. People might voice their disagreement, and
it would be taken on board and dealt with. In the main, it
didn't occur because they were all doing so well.
At the heart of the relationship between the chapel
conniittees and rank and file members was the nature of sectional
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organisation inside the Bemrose plant. As was noted earlier, the sectional
strength of the various chapels was dependent not simply on their strength
against management but also on their ability to exclude other workers who
were not members of the same chapel from certain aspects of the production
process, maintained by job demarcation. This sectional organisation was
traditionally very successful. For many years workers could improve their
wages and conditions without engaging in widespread or militant activity.
The number of actual strikes was quite small and they usually involved very
few workers and ended very quickly.
But this had an inevitable impact on the organisation and
consciousness of Bemrose workers, breeding among the great majority a
tradition of moderation and of only being interested in what happened in
the particular section of the particular union they belonged to. It also
meant they tended to rely on the chapel officials to do things for them, to
act on their behalf. The strength and loyalty to the chapel arising from
this sort of organisation meant that when the chapel comittees called for
action they got it. But it also meant there was no opposition when the,
usually token, action was called off, and there was little independent
initiative outside of established chapel procedures as hardly any of the
rank and file were prepared to challenge the official chapel leadership.
Even though sanctions aimed at hitting production were
often collectively agreed at SOGAT chapel meetings they were usually
initiated, tightly organised and strictly controlled from above by the FoC
and committee members. Frank O'Donoghue related:
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If we were coining up to the yearly House Agreements and
management were sticking on particular points that we felt we
had an excellent case on, we might threaten to use a tactic
such as working to rule, or an overtime ban if necessary. We
would pick on a department with the least amount of people but
who could cause the maximum amount of chaos to take action on
behalf of the chapel to put pressure on management.
Spontaneous rank and file disputes were few and far
between and on the rare occasion a 'wildcat' stoppage of work did occur it
was invariably quickly brought under chapel comittee control. For the FoC,
such shopfloor discipline helped bolster a 'strong bargaining relationship'
with management. As Jimiiy Wilson remarked:
Once the management seen that you'd evaluated the situation and
done your homework and you were quite as strong with your own
members as you were with the management in an organised and
disciplined form of way - that you wouldn't take arbitrary
stoppages on the shopfloor willy-nilly, everything had to be
conducted through the meetings - once they seen that there was
a person of authority, whilst they didn't like you at least
they caine to respect you, because you meant what you said and
when we pursued a claim we justified it.
A comparison can be made with other manufacturing
workers, many of whom are much worse organised and much less powerful than
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in Bemrose. It is partly because of this very weakness that sections of the
rank and file in such workplaces are more likely to act independently of
the 'top table'; paradoxically, it is their weakness that forces them to
generalise, to seek support from other sections. Clearly, this was not the
case at Bemrose where chapels were able to stop or threaten production
without the need to ask other chapels for solidarity. The idea grew up that
solidarity action was not only not needed but that it was better for
workers to go to work and take the money than to stop work in support.
After all, with strong dernaraction no workers would do the work of the few
striking workers.
Not only was this attitude adopted towards members of
different chapels in dispute but it also meant members of the same chapel
would usually continue working normally. Yet the isolation of action to the
particular section of the particular chapel in which it occured had the
general effect of demobilising the self-activity of rank and file workers
and reinforcing interdepartmental sectionalism. It threw away the valuable
opportunity of forging shopfloor links across individual chapels and
building up a united approach to management across the plant. Whilst there
was a layer of activists at chapel level engaged in day-to-day union
activity there was no equivalent of the joint shop stewards' coninittee that
predominates in manufacturing industry. The Federated Chapel was merely an
umbrella body that came together for formal House Agreement negotiations.
Not only did it exclude the SLPDE process chapel (effectively until 1986)
but it also played only a minimal role in terms of formulating claims, day-
to-day negotiation and the monitoring of agreements, which instead was
undertaken by the respective chapel coninittees.
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* tI 1980s: flawed political leadership
Throughout the 1980s the influence of left-wing political
activists within the chapel coninittees inside the Bemrose plant was an
important factor to be taken into consideration. Jimmy Wilson, the SOGAT
chapel FoC was a leading supporter of the far-left 'Militant Tendency' and
actively involved in the Liverpool Labour Party. A number of other
individual SOGAT members, some of them coninittee members, were also left-
wing Labour Party activists. At first glance this left-wing influence may
seem a paradox. After all, print workers have traditionally been regarded
as rather conservative politically. Seemingly within the NGA machine chapel
this picture appeared to have been the case, at least among a section of
the rank and file membership. According to Bob Henderson:
I would say that about 40 per cent of the chapel voted Tory.
You see the more money they have the more they change, they
move in better circles, their spots do fade. You couldn't
really talk about Labour Party politics in the golf club or
yachting club where some of our members went.
Despite this apparent conservatism the NGA machine chapel
had within its ranks a sprinkling of left-wing Labour Party activists and
the deputy FoC of the NGA composing room chapel during the early 1980s was
Tony Muihearn, a leading supporter of 'Militant', President of the
Liverpool Labour Party and one of the 47 councillors surcharged and
disqualified from office after being in the forefront of a bruising battle
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against Tory government ratecapping. As Bob Henderson acknowledged, they
were elected to office because:
They were the best of those who put up irrespective of
politics. The average person voted for them to represent them
on the shopfloor because a person who was not going to open
their mouth was no good.
Even in the highly craft conscious SLADE process chapel
the role of certain socialist inclined individuals was important. Stan
Livingston explained:
A handful of individuals were instrumental in building up the
chapel besides myself, like Bob Henning. We all thought the
same politically as far as socialism was concerned. We were all
socialist minded, but not active in terms of the Labour Party.
All our activities were centred on Bemrose, we weren't involved
in anything outside the factory.
Undoubtedly, 'Militant' had the most political influence
in Bemrose, particularly within the SOGAT chapel. Barry Caton observed:
Right up until the redundancies in 1987 'Militant' had a lot of
supporters in the factory, about a dozen at least. Tony
Muihearn was the star man, he was a leading light in Militant.
He was the deputy FoC for the NGA comps - but that was more a
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honorary position given his other responsibilities on the City
Council. On the SOGAT committee there was Dave Power and Paul
Kinnington. Geoff Barker was a Labour councillor on the Wirral.
And there was Jimmy Wilson.
'Militant' also had supporters in the NGA machine chapel.
Bob Henderson recalled:
Within the chapel we had a lot of people in the Labour Party
and there was a hard core of 'Militant', we had quite a section
of those people. Nicky Sandiford was a Militant Left and there
were some on the committee.
Operating inside the Labour Party Militant's fortunes
changed dramatically after 1979 with the rise of the Bennite Left. In 1983
their supporters captured control of Liverpool City Council. The prominence
of the Labour Council's fight against Conservative government ratecapping
led to a substantial growth in their support on Merseyside, although by
1986 this had begun to falter as 'Kinnockisni' began to take deep root
inside the Labour Party and the trade union movement in the wake of the
miners' defeat and the collapse of the councils' resistance. Significantly,
partly because of their particular brand of politics (necessarily ambiguous
given the constraints of the wider social democractic organisation to which
they attached themselves) and partly because of a Labour Party witchhunt
(notably the expulsion of 5 menthers of the editorial board in 1983) the
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supporters of 'Militant' in Bemrose did not openly organise politically on
the shopfloor. Barry Caton explained:
They stood for comittee men but they never operated as a
political faction in the factory. hen we had a meeting you
could tell they's caucused beforehand though but they didn't
have a real workplace base to their politics. They saw their
role as being active in the Labour Party. Whilst they were good
trade unionists they saw the way forward as moving resolutions
in the Labour Party. Organising on the shopfloor was secondary
to that. They were more concerned with achieving positions
within the chapel and using that as a springboard to get
positions within the Labour Party. They saw the Labour Party as
a panacea for all ills and all their energies went into trying
to transform it.
The other side of the same political coin was an emphasis
on trying to replace right wing full-time union officials with left
wingers, through 'Broad Left' groupings, with 'Militant' supporters in the
SOGAT chapel seeing their primary task as backing up the bargaining
activities of the FoC and his attempt to capture control of the lower
echelons of the union machine for the Left at quarterly branch meetings.
Because Jiriiny Wilson was in a prominent position in both the chapel and
union branch they did not consider the strengthening of independent
shopfloor organisation through workplace struggle that built workers'
confidence, organisation and political consciousness to be the main
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priority. But their strategy merely served to nurture a reliance on Jimmy
Wilson which discouraged rank and file activity, neglected independent
political intervention and disarmed chapel members from preparing for the
kind of all-out fight that would have been the only real guarantee of
successfully resisting management's offensive (and of defending Jimmy
Wilson from his removal as F0C and expulsion from the union).
All the inherent shortcomings in the relationship between
the chapel comittees and their rank and file members in the Bemrose plant,
particularly in terms of the political leadership provided, were exposed in
bold relief during the product market crises of the early 1980s. The
Maxwell takeover debacle and subsequent Murdoch re-acquisition was a severe
test of the chapels' capacity to defend shopfloor organisation. But the
chapel conirtittees were unable to provide the political justification for
mounting a rearguard action to resist the terms and conditions of the
'Survival Plan' subsequently introduced by Murdoch. Even the Militant
supporters, despite general expressions of opposition, did not put forward
a concrete plan of action around which resistance could be generated. Many
rank and file members, for lack of an alternative approach, accepted the
arguments put by management and full-time union officials, that their
highly advantageous shopfloor position of the 1970s could no longer be
maintained in the 1980s; wide ranging changes in working practices were the
necessary price for long-term job security. As Stan Livingston emphasised:
To some extent a lot of us accepted there had to be changes,
that eventually change had to come. You had to be realistic
about it, with government legislation against the unions and
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everything going on around you. Of course you had to accept
there was going to be some changes.
Reluctantly accepting change in working practices as part
of an organised retreat was one thing; actively co-operating in its
application as part of a joint effort to improve 'efficiency' was, however,
something else entirely. In many respects, the quasi-managerial role
adopted by chapel FoC's in the 1970s had not helped prepare the ground for
an independent shopfloor response to the product market difficulties of the
1980s. Moreover, the newly formed (joint) Federated Chapel effectively
transformed itself into a Joint Working Party, bringing together up to 20
chapel corrinittee members (excluding branch and national officials) in semi-
permanent meetings with management; at least 50 meetings of the JWP were
held over a four year period to negotiate the equalisation of craft rates
(15). Underlining the whole process was a belief that changes in working
practices were necessary to achieve parity and to help make the company
profitable. Yet by accepting shopfloor responsibility for the 'viability'
of the Bemrose plant the chapel comittees hamstrung any effective
challenge to the re-organisation of production that ensued. It was an
illustration of how far the shopfloor leadership accepted managerial logic
and lacked the political resources to pose any alternative approach. Not
that the chapel coninittees lacked such resources any more than they had in
the 1970s. But in the 1980s there was a disproportion between this
deficiency and its practical consequences. It was precisely in this
disproportion that the ebb of shopfloor power in Bemrose was expressed
during this period.
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Of course, there was no certainty that if the chapel
committees had raised the banner of militant resistance rank and file
members would have responded. But arguably, there was no fatalistic
inevitability about the unfolding drama. The quality of shopfloor
leadership, although only one element in a complex equation, could
potentially have altered the outcome of developments, even if not
decisively given the lack of investment and ultimately outmoded nature of
the plant's machinery. This is not to underestimate the real problems posed
to a purely plant based trade union locus of action in times of economic
recession to thwart managerial intentions, especially at the level of
corporate activity. But for all its sophistication and corporate power News
International were still dependent upon the goodwill of the Benirose
workforce, whose collective strength could potentially have given them an
important leverage.
Despite the disciplinary action taken against him by the
national union the SOGAT chapel membership in Beinrose provided loyal
backing for Jiririy Wilson, spurning demands he resign from the F0C position.
Yet in general terms the chapel coriinittees' more co-operative relationship
with management inevitably had an effect on their relationship with rank
and file members. There is no real evidence of a dramatic reduction in
attendance at chapel meetings or of a change in the contesting of committee
positions or tenure of office. But with virtually all key decisions
affecting the life of the plant being taken at top-level Joint Working
Party meetings the chapel cormiiittees' role became much diminished. Rank and
file members became even more passive spectators of decisions taken from
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above rather than being actively encouraged to shape the outcome of events
themselves from below.
The atrophy of chapel organisation was exposed in graphic
relief by the redundancy exercise of 1987. Instead of campaigning for
strike action to defend jobs the chapel committees accepted the company's
decision as fait accompli. Attempting to force News International to
withdraw the redundancies was a formidable hurdle that was by no means
guaranteed to succeed. Yet it is possible determined action at an early
stage - to stop production of the 'SunDay' magazine - could have put
sufficent pressure to force Murdoch's hand. Even if some of the older
shopfloor members were prepared to take the redundancy money there was a
sizeable section of the workforce who were not. With a decisive lead from
the chapel committees it is possible they could have been galvanized into
action. Steve Hewes noted:
When we heard about the redundancies there was a buzz on the
shopfloor. The people I worked with, they were all new. We got
together and were amazed the machines were still running. But
stopping the machines would have created a problem on the
shopfloor which Jimmy Wilson would have had to go down and
address. People were aware of that and that's why it didn't
happen. People said 'No, keep it going, wait for Jimmy Wilson
to come down and administer the bread, there's no way Jininy is
going to let 775 people go out of this plant, he's never lost a
job before and he never will.
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Barry Caton believed a potential focus for action was
thrown away:
The company told us the transport was being given out to TNT.
TNT weren't thought off very highly in the light of the Wapping
dispute. When we went into work one day there was a TNT trailer
parked outside. Our members approached the committee man on
site including myself that he shouldn't be loaded in view of
what had gone on at Wapping and in view of the fact that
management were clearly not negotiating with us at all. We went
to the loading bay and the lads said they didn' t want him on
the premises. So we told the driver to fuck off out of it. At
the end of the day though we had a site meeting of coimiittee
men and fellas off the loading bay. We were advised by Jimmy
Wilson it would be in our best interests to load the fella up
and what a difficult situation the company were in. That would
have been a focus for a fight with the company, not necessarily
a full scale dispute but at least it would have said to the
company you haven't smashed us, we still find certain issues
disagreeable and this is what we're going to do about it. But
the company never budged on any issue right throughout the 90
days and we never forced them to do anything, and that is a
criticism.
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The tradition of relying on the FoC's bargaining
abilities meant that instead of acting for themselves most rank and file
members continued to look upwards for something to be pulled out of the
hat. Barry Caton pointed out:
Jimmy Wilson was looked upon with a great amount of awe because
he had delivered the goods. Every year he delivered a better
deal than the national union. I think our members thought - and
you always got the impression from Jimmy - 'he's got something
up his sleeve' and 95 per cent of the time he had. But on this
occasion he didn't.
The tradition of 'strong bargaining relations' with
management in which the chapel committees had felt little need to call on
their members to take action meant they became paralysed by Bemroses's
instransigence over the redundancies.
After the 1987 redundancies the relationship of the
chapel comninittees to the members was completely transformed. To begin with
each chapel committee suffered a loss of personnel within its ranks
including a number of left-wing activists, Jimmy Wilson was forced to
resign from the FoC position within the SOGAT chapel following pressure
from national and local full-time union officials and management withdraw
100 per cent facility time from all chapel FoC's. The emasculated chapel
committees found themselves with little authority in the eyes of either
members or management. Bob Henderson, who took over the F0C position in the
NGA '82 machine chapel reflected:
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The FoC was tolerated by the membership but was not going to be
permitted to get out of line. I felt as if my committee had
been appointed for me by the management not by the workforce. I
had two chargehands on the committee, that would never have
happened prior to '87. But it was to keep the FoC in check,
'l)on't go off with any ideas about taking management on over
anything'. They feared that any rocking the boat was going to
lose them their job, their redundancy money. Really the effect
of '87 was for people to keep their head down.
In conclusion, it is clear there was a marked
transformation in the relationship between the chapel committees and rank
and file members in Bemrose during the 1980 g . At the heart of the problem
was the Federated Chapel/Joint Working Party's co-operative relationship
with management which diminished the importance of the respective chapel
committees and in turn impoverished the relationship with shopfloor
members.
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STEWARDS' RELATIONSHIP To UNICI OFFICIALS
* the 1970s: a gull between chapel ar1 officials
Each of the separate chapels in Bemrose fell under the
wider authority of geographically organised trade union branches - for
example linking together all the different SOGAT chapels across the
Nerseyside area into one umbrella structure - connected to union
representation at regional and national level. With a combined membership
of between 1,500-2,000 the Merseyside SOGAT branch met on a quarterly basis
at its union offices in north Liverpool and elected a branch coninittee
through a workplace ballot of the whole membership, consisting mainly of
chapel FoCs and other lay members. The branch secretary was a full-time
union official responsible for overseeing the branch's activities and
assisting workplace chapel organisation. The Bemrose SOGAT chapel regularly
sent delegates to union branch meetings and played an active part in its
affairs.
Each union branch had two quite distinct roles to play.
Firstly, they acted as labour exchanges. If Beinrose wanted to employ
additional labour it notified the FoC and local branch of the union
concerned, which nominated a number of workers for the jobs. In this way,
the trade unions were able to ensure that only union labour was hired and
also to control the amount of such labour offering itself for work at the
plant. Secondly, the branches gave advice and support to members and their
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representatives. Administrative contacts took place between the chapels and
branches fairly frequently on matters concerned with employment, wages,
interpretations of agreements, union communications, the conduct of
ballots, finance, etc. There was also contact between the chapel committees
and union full-time officials whenever disputes occured or when major
changes in working practices or methods were proposed.
On the one hand, chapel committees at Bemnrose enjoyed a
considerable degree of autonomy. The relatively large size of each of the
chapels at Bemrose - among the largest in their respective union branches -
ensured a highly sophisticated form of autonomous workplace organisation,
which was further enhanced with the provision of 100 per cent time off work
for FoCs. Although the level of struggle was not high it was the general
level of confidence on the shopfloor vis-a-vis management that underpinned
this autonomy. A key factor was the ability of the Benirose chapels to
achieve wage increases and day-to-day working arranagements through their
own bargaining efforts - superior to those negotiated elsewhere in
Liverpool and across the country through the involvement of local or
national full-time officials. Nowhere was this more evident than in the
manning controls carved out by the SOGAT chapel committee in Bemrose during
the 1970s. Frank O'Donoghue related:
The chapel deliberately kept everybody at arms length because
we had better agreements than anybody else. We didn't want
anything to do with some of the agreements that had been made
at other firms. The branch officers very rarely got involved.
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At one stage they only attended the place about once in two
years.
Not suprisingly, the local SOGAT branch full-time
official felt his traditional function and authority undermined by such
independent chapel organisation and even national SOGAT officials had to
adopt a cautious hands-off approach to the Bemrose chapel, as Jimmy Wilson
explained:
If we got to a point where we couldn't reach agreement with
management we would call in not the branch, but the national
officers. Their attitude towards the chapel was that nothing
could satisfy the chapel. 1 oe o thec wted. t da.a1 rLth us.
In the end though they gave a national officer called Jimmy
Pointing the job of signing agreements with the company. It
turned out that that suited the chapel, because Jimmy Pointing
took the attitude that if the chapel were prepared to do most
of the negotiating themselves and honour the agreements, he
went along with it.
A vivid example of the powerful autonomy exercised by the
SOGAT chapel occured during the mid-1970s with the signing of a House
Agreement containing a disputed clause on pensions. Jimmy Wilson takes up
the story:
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On two occasions when the company had threatened to close the
place down the branch secretary came in, and I refused to
endorse the agreement, refused to sign it. We didn't feel it
had come up to the aspirations that we felt the company should
be giving the members. while we could improve the day-to-day
conditions in the factory we had great difficulty improving
pension rights. They gave us so many hours and said if we
didn't sign it they were closing the place down. The branch
secretary signed the agreement but the chairman of the company,
Bruce Matthews, said he wasn't interested in his signature, he
wanted the FoC's signature - who was on the premises on a daily
basis and would make the agreement work. That sort of thing
never helped the relationship with the branch.
On the other hand, not all the chapels had such an
antagonistic relationship with full-time union officials. Certainly, the
SLADE chapel enjoyed a much closer partnership, although this was partly
due to the fact that the union was a relatively small organisation whose
very existence was under threat from new technology. The NGA chapel also
had a less abrasive relationship, although at local level this was partly
explained by the fact that the local official, Ray Williams, was a
'Militant' supporter who was very sympathetic to chapel concerns. But even
in SOGAT the notion of a blanket chapel autonomy would be misplaced. Local
and national officials were involved in House Agreement negotiations, if
only in an advisory capacity. Moreover, whilst all plant based claims were
formulated and negotiated by individual chapels, all draft agreements were
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required to be be submitted to the branch committees for ratification. The
vetting of chapel draft agreements by branches could lead to the amending
or even rejection of certain items.
Chapels were also integrated into union affairs through
their participation in the quarterly branch meetings and through
representation on the branch committees of their respective unions. For
example, the SOGAT chapel were entitled to send one delegate per 25 members
to union branch meetings. As one of the largest chapels in the branch -
with about 750 members - that meant they were allowed about 33 delegates.
The chapel ensured its full quota was representated by the method of a rota
system of volunteers, usually consisting of committee representatives, ex-
committee reps and other union activists. Not surprisingly, the chapel's
power base gave it considerable weight to influence the outcome of
decision-making within the branch, both through force of argument and
through its bloc vote. The chapel was also entitled to 2 representatives on
the union's branch committee. From 1978-82 the branch president's position
was held by the Bemrose chapel FoC, Jimmy Wilson. Inevitably, a
considerable amount of Jimmy Wilson's time was taken up with branch
affairs, for example attending officers' meetings, held each Monday for the
whole day at the union's offices, and visiting other union members in the
Liverpool area (although an important distinction should be drawn between
lay branch officers and full-time branch officials).
If the relationship between the Bemrose chapels and their
union branches and full-time officials was characterised by both autonomy
and integration, independence and dependence, the balance between these
contradictory elements did not remain static, particularly within the SOGAT
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chapel. As has already been noted, there was a constant source of friction
over the level of manning established in the Bemrose plant by the SOGAT
chapel, which in the 1970s increased from 620 to over 700 and proved to be
a source of some embarrassment to local and national union officials, as
Frank O'Donoghue explained:
In the '70s there was no way we would entertain anything such
as making one person redundant or de-manning exercises. In fact
we were going round the country against the wishes of the
national union trying to organise to bring about a coninon
policy in the union for national manning, which the union
fought against.
Another contentious issue was the 32 hour week, which had
been established on the night shift at Bemrose in 1977 by the chapel
committees. Jiuuiiy Wilson recalled:
We assured the company that as far as we were concerned we
would go out to the four corners of the country and shout it
out that we bad achieved the 32 hour week without loss of pay,
with increased production to give them the opportunity to bring
more work in. But obviously no way did the general secretary
Bill Keys and the national executive council want to achieve
the 32 hour week by the people of Liverpool.
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The gulf between the SOGAT chapel and full-time officials
led to the formation of unofficial FoC Fellowships inside the union, both
within the Liverpool branch and within the national gravure industry,
operating as 'Broad Left' groupings with the aim of influencing union
policy decisions and replacing right-wing officials with left-wingers.
Although the Coninunist Party was the key political force behind the FoC
Fellowships it pulled together a much wider, if relatively small, network
of Left activists. The chairman of the Merseyside FoC Fellowship was Jinnny
Wilson:
We used to get FoCs from different plants across Merseyside and
exchange agreements - it was a sort of educational for the
FoCs. The branch officiers wanted us to do everything through
the auspices of the branch itself. Their idea was that they
would exchange agreements because they were there to do a job
and they would do it on behalf of the members. But quite
clearly some of the terms and conditions some of them were
working under were appalling, and because of the attendance at
the FoC Fellowships we did see one or two factories get
involved in disputes which got the support of the Fellowship,
and we did enhance the standard of living of many of the
chapels who caine along to the Fellowship.
Although only about 20-30 activists attended the
Merseyside FoC Fellowship it was quite an influential force within the
local union branch. Yet under the strain of constant attacks and threats of
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disciplinary action by local and national union officials alike the
Fellowship tended to disband after eighteen months to two years, only to
re-group again at a later date.
We had three or four attempts to set up local or national
Fellowships but every attempt was made to stop us, each time we
were thwarted by national and local officers who saw it as a
threat. The branch used to use the argument that it was only a
platform for Bemrose, that Bemrose was only looking after
themselves. Even before my time they turned the whole of the
branch against Bemrose on the basis of the conditions that had
been achieved. The conditions hadn't been achieved by the
branch or national officers doing the negotiating. So there was
always some resentment. And the national union would charge us
under rule if we were going to meet the other gravure factories
Odharns Sun and Purneils. You were subject to disciplinary
action if they found you were meeting.
After 1978 the Bemrose SOGAT chapel became virtually
completely estranged from the Merseyside branch following the election of a
new full-time branch secretary, Arnie Martin (who beat Jimmy Wilson in the
ballot). Frank O'Donoghue explained:
Relations with the branch were never very happy once Martin
became branch secretary basically because he wasn't happy with
the control we had over our own destiny. He wanted to be able
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to get in there and be seen to be a branch secretary and we
deliberately kept him at arms length. Only under sufferance
would we have him on the premises. The attitude of the
officials was one of anti-Militant, reds under the bed, and
anybody who doesen't agree with their type of philosophy must
be in Militant. They were only really concerned with their own
positions and how to further their own interests.
Steve Hewes confirmed the antagonistic relationship that
existed between the SOGAT chapel and union branch:
Arnie Martin always seen Jimmy as a threat. The Bemrose chapel
were always a law unto themselves. They were so well protected
by each other at the chapel and through the leadership that it
was like a spinning top - the branch wouldn't go near it
because they knew they would be deflected right away. The
chapel was where Jimmy got his support within the branch. He
used the structures within Bemrose to perpetuate his
aspirations within the branch to get policy passed.
During the early 1980s there was a constant battle for
control waged within the Merseyside SOGAT branch between Jirriiiy Wilson as
branch president and Arnie Martin as branch secretary and a sharp division
arose over an attempt by the Bernrose chapel to move a resolution to be sent
to the union's biennial delegate conference insisting on the regular re-
election of full-time 'union officials. In order to stamp their authority
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the branch conrnittee resorted to organisational measures, for example
introducing a rule change that reduced the number of delegates entitled to
attend union branch meetings from the Bemrose chapel to a maximum of 20,
effectively disenfranchising about 350 members.
* ti 1980s: t1 officials nove in
During the early 1980s the clash of interests between the
chapel comittees and full-time officials - particularly within SOGAT -
eventually came to a head over the advantageous terms and conditions carved
out in Bemrose and the officials' view that the changed economic and
political climate necessitated a change of attitude towards manning and
flexible working practices to retain the long-term viability of the plant.
Jininy Wilson recalled:
We realised we were coming under pressure from the national
union, with attacks against the chapel. They used to say that
our ideas were outdated, that we had to come to reality because
of the number of people we had on the presses. We had
considerable pressure on myself and the chapel. The national
union used to treat the number of people we had on the machines
as a joke. We used to try to explain to them that in Liverpool
it was 9 men to a press and we wanted 9 men to a press because
it was 9 people employed instead of unemployed. It was
difficult to get that across to say the people in London and
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Bristol and the south west where nobody seemed to be unemployed
in the print in those areas at the time.
The turn of events during the early 1980s (loss of 'TV
Times', Maxwell takeover, Survival Plan, Joint Working Party) greatly
increased the role of full-time union officials in the Bemrose plant. Not
only did management encourage them to play a more interventionist role but
even the chapel coninittees - involved in constant deliberations with
management to make the plant 'efficient' - found themselves becoming more
and more reliant on them, even though in the case of SOGAT there was a deep
distrust of their intentions. To begin with in 1981 it was the full-time
union officials who were instrumental in pressurising the chapels to accept
the terms and conditions of the Survival Plan as the price for long term
job security. Similarly, in 1982 it was full-time officials who pressurised
the NGA machine chapel to end their unofficial strike for parity of craft
rates. As Bob Henderson related:
We ended up with a meeting with Tony Dubbins [general
secretary] and Les Dixon [general president] from the union. It
was a shouting match with them saying 'If you don't go back to
work they'll close the place'. They refused to make the strike
official or get support from the national council. But it was
the branch secretary, Ray Williams, who persuaded the
membership to go back to work where the national officers'
couldn't. The terms of going back were that we would work
normally, ending our overtime ban and work-to-rule. They gave
Page 229
Bemrose: Stewards' Relationship To Union Officials: The 1970s/80s
us a conrnitment to parity with the provislo that it was self-
financing, that we had to achieve the productivity.
Full-time union officials also played a key role in
overseeing the series of 50 Joint Working Party meetings that subsequently
took place between the Federated Chapel and Bernrose management to discuss
the phased introduction of parity. 1When management insisted on an ininediate
agreement on parity as a pre-condition for taking on the 'Sunday Express'
magazine contract in 1983 it was the full-time union officials who
instructed the chapel comittees to accept management's terms (16). Frank
O'Donoghue later wrote up an account of what happened:
It was disclosed by management that they had secured the
contract for the printing of the 'Sunday Express' magazine. The
unions were told that they must accept the deal put forward on
that date and had until 12 noon to do so. The SOGAT and Process
FoCs refused to sign anything, saying it was under duress. The
deadline was extended, and we were further told that it could
mean closure for Bemrose if this contract was not accepted. The
deadline was extended more than once, with management claiming
they only had 'Heads of Agreement' (meaning in essence that it
was not legally binding) and that they needed signed acceptance
by the unions before the contract was valid properly.
Management then repeated that it could mean closure of the
plant in Liverpool. Two FoCs remained adamant that they would
not sign, arid eventually Messrs Parish (NGA) and Pointing
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(SOGAT) National Officers and Messrs Williams (NGA) and Martin
(SOGAT) Branch secretaries, signed this document over the heads
of both FoCs. The drama however, was not yet done. At a meeting
in the plant the following week, local management then insisted
that they needed the signatures of each individual F0C on the
document. (This had never been deemed necessary before). Again
the two FoCs refused to sign the new document, and both branch
secretaries implored them to change their minds, as it wou].d
mean massive problems for Liverpool if the factory were to
close. At around 6.3Opm that night the SOGAT FoC called an on-
plant emergency Chapel Meeting, and put his position four-
square to the members. Only on their instruction did he
reluctanctly agree to sign the document (the Process MIA F0C
having just signed also). The effect of this left a feeling of
deep bitterness (17).
In 1984-5 there was a major confrontation between the
SOGAT chapel coninittee and the local full-time branch secretary, Arnie
Martin. It centred on Martin's sacking of four women secretaries, who had
all worked closely with him in the Merseyside SOGAT offices, after they had
made a series of complaints against Martin to the general secretary elect,
Brenda Dean concerning alleged financial irregularities. (18) Dean
overruled the womens' concern and Martin sacked them for gross misconduct.
But under the leadership of Jininy Wilson the Bemrose SOGAT chapel took the
initiative in organising an unofficial branch campaign in defence of the
women, refusing to cross their picket line and supporting the call for a
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full membership meeting to hear details of the allegations against Arnie
Martin. Subsequent 'official' branch meetings were boycotted and an
'unofficial' membership meeting of 2,000 was held with nearly half the
Merseyside branch withholding their union subscriptions for a number of
months. Frank O'Donoghue recalled:
The girls had a lot of respect. They picketed the building for
12 months in rain, hail and snow, tremendous spirit amongst
them. We began to organise not only support from the Bemrose
chapel but from a number of other chapels throughout
Merseyside, including from as far afield as Bebbington. It was
starting to build up, the pressure was tremendous. We actually
half filled the Central Hall at one meeting and got signatures
of everybody that went in, hundreds. So it wasn't just us, an
individual chapel who had a disagreement with Martin, there
were a lot of people who felt exactly the same.
Yet the local full-time official, with the backing of the
national union, wasted no time in taking retaliatory action. More than 100
union members had their union cards withdrawn for non-payment of subs and
Jimmy Wilson, the instigator and figurehead of the campaign to have the
women reinstated, was expelled from the branch comnittee and lost his
position as president of the Merseyside branch; eventually he was expelled
from SOGAT by the national executive for bringing the union into disrepute
and the Beinrose chapel was ordered to elect a new FoC.
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Arguably, the campaign against Arnie Martin suffered a
number of tactical and political mistakes. Although support for the sacked
women was garnered from union branch members there was an emphasis put on
looking upwards to other left-wing national full-time union officials to
help remove Martin. Moreover, instead of confronting Arnie Martin's right-
wing policies where they had the greatest strength, in the workplace
against management's offensive, they fought virtually exclusively on the
terrain of the branch, which left them much more vulnerable to the union's
disciplinary measures. Although in a magnificant gesture of loyalty rank
and file chapel members continued to back Jiiriny Wilson as F0C the local
union branch refused to acknowledge the chapel coniiiittee or assist it in
any way. As a result, the FoC was effectively neutralised from the point of
view of both management and the national union.
Meanwhile, other simultaneous events served to reinforce
the weaknesses of the chapel coninittees' relationship to full-time union
officials. In some respects, the NGA Warrington, miners' and Wapping
strikes provided the political activists within Bernrose with the
opportunity to organise solidarity activity that could have reverberations
in terms of resisting their own management's offensive. To an extent this
potential was grasped. Barry Caton related:
Most of the politicos were involved in Warrington. We had a
constant shuttle laid on three times a day at the end of the
shift to take people down to the picket. It was organised and
paid through the Federated Chapel. Probably something like 50-
60 members went down to the picket.
Page 233
Bemrose: Stewards' Relationship To Union Officials: The 1970s/80s
Again, during the year long miners' strike the chapel
committees organised shopfloor solidarity. The NGA '82 process chapel had a
£1 weekly levy and contributed about £3,000 to the Lancashire NUN strike
fund. The SOGAT chapel also had shopfloor collections and levies. Yet the
defeats of both these disputes served to reinforce the 'new realism' of the
trade union movement - the view that Thatcherism could not be beaten, the
law had to be respected and strikes were both counter-productive and 'out
of date'. Unfortunately such attitudes became even more accentuated after
Bemrose workers voted against taking solidarity action in support of the
print strikers at News International's Wapping plant in 1986.
Only ten weeks after the dispute started did Bill
Freeman, a member of SOGAT's national executive committee responsible for
co-ordinating support for Wapping, appeal for blacking of all News
International work, including printing of the 'SunDay' magazine. It was a
cynical manoeuvre by the officials designed to head off strikers' criticism
of their handling of the dispute. Instead of organising mass picketing of
the Wapping plant or calling for solidarity strike action across Fleet
Street at the beginning of the dispute, the print union leaders, including
Brenda Dean of SOGAT, insisted the way to fight the world's most powerful
media baron was through a public relations campaign. Given that they did
absolutely nothing to campaign for effective solidarity action either at
Bemrose or elsewhere it was not suprising their belated appeal was turned
down by the Bemrose chapel. Undoubtedly, the distrust of national SOGAT
officials, particularly from the way they were handling the dispute over
Arnie Martin within the Nerseyside branch, gave the chapel committee
activists little confidence to support their recommendation.
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Even a direct appeal by the Wapping strikers was turned
down (19). Stan Livingston related:
We had a coachload of pickets up from London on two occasions
asking us to get involved by not producing for Murdoch. They
said to us 'If you don't come out you will be next'. ' j:ii fact',
they said, 'you'll be next anyway'. The FoCs met with them and
explained we didn't have the support of the members. We really
did believe that if we had got involved at that particular time
Murdoch would have closed Benurose down. They agreed that rather
than picket they would lobby our members and put their case.
But they were right in the end, we were next on the list.
It is conceivable that if full-time union officials had
mounted a campaign to win sympathy action in Bemnrose at the very beginning
of the Wapping dispute they could have encouraged some token action, such
as a one-day strike, that might have been a springboard for further action
alongside Fleet Street. Such action would also have had the effect of
strengthening chapel resolve vis-a-vis Bemrose management. Tragically,
refusing to take action in support of Wapping did not protect the jobs of
Bemrose workers. The Wapping dispute ended in February 1987 and 775
redundancies were announced at Bemrose in April 1987. Inevitably, the SOGAT
chapel corrinittees' resistance to the redundancies was severely impeded by
the stance adopted by local union and national officials. As Barry Caton
explained:
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SOGAT nationally and at branch level didn't have a reaction to
the redundancies. They wouldn't get involved while Jimmy Wilson
was still the FoC. Having been expelled from SOGAT the
membership said 'He's our FoC and we're sticking with him'. So
basically they refused to get involved. 'The principle of one
man being your F0C far outweighs those 775 going out the door,
when Jimmy Wilson's gone we'll come in'. At the end of the day
quite a large number of people, branch officers, national
officers in SOGAT were delighted with what went on at Bemrose
because we had been an example to them and to a certain extent
we'd held them up to ridicule because we created so many jobs.
They were busy presiding over job losses while Bernrose had been
recruiting people. So when the balloon burst they just sat back
and said 'We told you so'. We ended up losing the redundancy
issue, we lost the FoC and we came out of it with a divided
chapel. Everything that had come out of 20 years had gone.
After the redundancies Jimmy Wilson agreed to resign from
the F0C position in order to allow the union branch to represent the chapel
membership, many of whom believed further resistance was self-defeating,
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CHAVE FOUR: FORD
IIffERVIEWEES:
ITarry Craig: Production Manager, Trim Assembly, Assembly plant.
John Bohanna: TGWTJ senior steward and chairman of Body plant shop stewards
comittee.
Don Daunt: MSF senior steward, Assembly plant.
Frank Druniiund: TGWEJ senior shop steward, Assembly plant.
Gordon Cook: Employee Relations Manager, Body plant.
Ritchie O'Connell: TGWtJ senior shop steward, Assembly plant.
Eddie Roberts: TGWIJ Convenor, Assembly Plant (1968-70).
Terry Seagraves: TGWU senior shop steward, Body plant.
Barry Senior: Emnployee Relations Manager, paint shop, Assembly plant.
Ray Storey: TGWU shop steward, Assembly Plant.
Barry IJphain: senior Fmployee Relations Manager, Body plant.
Peter Warden: TGWTJ rank and file union member, Body plant.
CHROK)LOGY OF MAJOR EVITS:
1969: 3-week national 'penalty clause' strike.
4 Convenors (including 2 from Halewood) admitted to NJNC
1971: 9-week national 'parity' strike.
2-week }Ialewood strike over John Dillon (1st 'Riot Act').
1975: Procedure Agreement, Work Standards Agreement and Union
Membership Agreement.
1976: 2-week Halewood 'trade union representation' strike (2nd 'Riot Act').
1978: NJNC reconstituted - all Ford UK plant Convenors admitted.
9-week national pay strike.
1980: Re-tooling of Halewood and introduction of new technology.
1981: 2-week }{alewood strike over discipline code (3rd 'Riot Act').
1983: 4-week Assembly plant strike over Paul Kelly.
1985: 2-week Halewood line-workers re-grading strike.
1988: 2-week national pay strike
1990: 7-week national craftmens' strike and lay-off of production workers.
1991: 3-day production week.
ir ONVRS:






1983- : Peter Moore
Assnbly Plant: 1970-87: Billy Maguire




The Ford Halewood factory was opened in 1963 when, along
with other multinational companies, Ford's were attracted to Merseyside
largely as a result of the government's favourable regional policy, the
existence of an 'adequate pool of labour' and the lack of an organised
workforce. The Ford Motor Company, the third largest company in the world,
manufactures, assembles and sells cars in over 100 countries (including the
United States, Canada, Brazil, Australia, Mexico, Argentina, South Africa,
Germany, Spain and Britain) employing over a quarter of a million people
(1). It is the number one US based motor company outside North America and
sells more cars in Europe than many European manufacturers. Mass
production, economies of scale and internationalisation of production and
markets have been the key to Ford's route to power and influence. Despite
its spread across the world it remains very much an American company with
control of the vast emprire firmly held in World Headquarters, Dearborn,
Michigan.
The last two decades have seen continuous profits for
Ford of Britain, the UK subsidary, with a record pre-tax profit of £673
million in 1988 and its second best ever profit of £483 million in 1989,
although it suffered a pre-tax loss of £274 million in 1990 largely as a
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result of declining car sales and its acquisition of Jaguar (2). The
Halewood complex now covers 346 acres - equivalent to more than 30 full-
sized football pitches - and is Ford's second largest manufacturing centre
in Britain, comprising of three plants, the Metal, Stamping and Body plant,
the Paint, Trim and Assembly plant and the Transmission plant. Unlike the
two other case studies, the plant has not been closed down despite
suffering job losses. At its peak during the late 1970s, the plant employed
nearly 14,000 workers, although for most of the 1980s it hovered around the
8,000 level. By the early 1990s, with about 6,500 hourly-paid manual
workers (and 1,000 salaried white collar workers) still on the payroll,
Halewood remains the biggest private employer on Merseyside. The Ford
Escort - produced at the Halewood plant since 1968 - was Britain's top-
selling car during the 1980s.
My focus of attention is concentrated on the production
workers in the Body plant and Assembly plant, both housed in one giant
building on the Halewood estate. The nature of the work is rather different
within the two plants. In the Body plant, employing over 2,000, it is heavy
manual labour. Shopfloor workers operate the presses as the sheet steel is
stamped to produce panels, which are then spot-welded to form sub-
assemblies and finally a rigid body shape. By contrast, the Assembly plant,
employing over 3,000, is much more semi-skilled and labour-intensive. The
welded bodies are cleaned, primed and painted and thousands of parts are
installed, including the interior trim, engine, transmission and wheels.
Despite computerisation, welding robots and years of technical innovation,
car manufacture at Halewood is still firmly dependent on the line worker -
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with work organised so that each operation is sub-divided into its simplest
fastest components. Within both plants there is a basic two-shift pattern
with workers on a two-week turn-around, alternating between nights and days
- although in the press shop of the Body plant there is a three-shift
system. The vast majority of production workers (87 per cent) are members
of the Transport and General Workers Union with one TGWLJ factory branch
(6/562) spanning the two major plants.
During the early 1960s at Halewood the day-to-day life of
the plant was characterised by one endless battle along the 'frontier of
control' over the job; the right of a shop steward to have freedom of
access to his members on a section and his right to negotiate with the
supervisor over the allocation of work only being established by way of
periods of severe conflict and stoppages of work. It was this sectional
opposition to work pressure that helped consolidate factory-wide steward
organisation and a measure of shopfloor counter-control. Only in the late
1960s did management amend its policy, granting the Convenors and senior
stewards full-time status and providing facilities, such as union offices
on site. Throughout the 1970s and 1980s, the formal structure of shop
steward organisation remained constant. Huw Beynon's 'Working For Ford'
reported that there were 45 members of the Assembly plant shop stewards
committee in 1967; 36 were TGWIJ members and the remainder were members of
craft unions representing the various maintenance workers in the plant,
including the AEtJ and EFTPU. By the early 1980s, there had been a slight
increase in the number of TGWIJ stewards - up to 44 - despite a gradual
reduction in the overall size of the workforce, which included 22 stewards
on the day shift and 22 on the night shift. In addition, there were a
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handful of craft stewards represented on the committee. Similarly, in the
Body plant, although the number of workers employed was reduced from
between 5-6,000 workers in the 1970s to about 3,000 in the 1980s the size
of the shop stewards' committee remained roughly constant at about 63
members (40 in the TGWU and the remainder in craft unions). Thus, across
the two plants there were about 88 TGLT stewards during the period of the
1970s and 80s.
Shop stewards are usually elected through a secret ballot
vote on an annual basis - although in some sections it is every two years.
Representation is determined by geographical sections that tend to
correspond to supervisory areas. For example, in the Assembly plant, each
moving line in the final trim area is divided up into three sections or
workgroups with about 25 people on each. A shop steward would normally
represent a whole line. Although there are wide variations across the two
plants the average number of union members in a steward's constituency is
about 60. Both plants have their own shop stewards' committees which
function and organise semi-autonomously, each meeting on a monthly basis.
Formally, they meet together as a site-wide joint shop stewards' committee
overseeing both plants only irregularly for annual pay negotiations or to
discuss some particular local issue that affects the whole Halewood
complex, although informally senior stewards from the two plants are in
daily contact. In the Assembly plant, the shop stewards' committee annually
elects from its number a Convenor, two deputy Convenors and five other TCWU
senior stewards (plus one craft steward) to serve on a Joint Works
Committee which meets monthly with the plant and personnel manager and
conducts all major negotiations. All JWC members have 100 per cent time off
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work. The full-time Convenor remains permanently on the day-shift and is
concerned exclusively with negotiations with management. Along with the
other JWC members (who follow the shift system of their constituents) they
form a group of senior stewards who give advice to other sectional stewards
and represent the central workers' leadership in the plant. Exactly the
same type of JWC structure exists in the Body plant, although there are a
greater number of senior stewards represented.
Basic pay, occupational grading and major conditions of
employment are negotiated at a company-wide level through a quarterly
meeting of a 70-strong National Joint Negotiating Coninittee (NJNC) composed
of senior British Ford managers, full-time national union officials
representing the 12 different unions with members in Ford plants across the
country, and the 21 plant Convenors. With the rate for the job agreed at
national level, day-to-day conflict on the shopfloor invariably revolves
around questions of job control, such as the speed of the line, movement of
labour and discipline (although pay strikes related to the national
bargaining forum are also a feature of shopfloor relations). The tasks and
responsibilities of shop stewards (and the JWCs) are carefully defined in
Ford's 'Blue Book', the handbook of official rules and procedures that
govern the relationship between the unions and company, including an
elaborate 5-stage grievance procedure aimed at reducing the level of
conflict in the plants.
I was granted permission to visit the 1-lalewood complex on
two separate occasions and provided with a full-length guided tour of the
shopfloor, enabling me to conduct interviews with key senior shop stewards
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and - unlike the two previous case studies - with managers, from both the
Body and Assembly plants. Nonetheless, the vast majority of my empirical
material was collected outside working hours through informal in-depth
interviews with contacts that were established and followed up by visiting
individuals in their homes. This rich source of data has been supplemented
by secondary material, much more of which was available than for the two
previous case studies, particularly in relation to managerial strategy. My
research is greatly indebted to the pioneering study of the dynamics of
workers' organisation, struggle and consciousness in the Ford Halewood
plant conducted during the late 1960s by Huw Beynon (1984) and draws
substantially on the analytical and methodological approach adopted in
Beynon's earlier study. Nonetheless, I have also attempted to make a
significant original contribution to an understanding of the contrasting
shopfloor developments within the Body and Assembly plants over the last 20
years. Firstly, I have sought to provide a much more detailed account of
the underlying processes and key events that occured during the mid-late
1970s, the period that ininediately followed the era described in the first
edition of Beynon's book (1973) and which is only briefly comented upon in
his second edition (1984), and in documenting the most recent events of the
late 1980s and early 1990s I have attempted to extend the account beyond
even Beynon's updated edition, providing a useful basis from which to place
contemporary trends within their historical context.
Secondly, whilst Beynon discussed some of the dilennas in
the stewards' experience and activity both in relation with members and
management, and on occasion developed a critical appraisal of the
limitations of their views, he chose a methodological device that utilised
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the shop stewards' organisation and consciousness as a 'prism' through
which the broader dynamic of class relations could be focussed and
understood, which significantly, provided the basis for the close
analytical symmetry between Beynon's own account and the perspectives of
the stewards. By contrast, I have attempted to stand far more independently
removed from the senior stewards' vantage point and to consider the
underlying interests of rank and file members. Thirdly, unlike the 'more or
less continuous non-participant observation' underpinning Beynon's research
method, which tended to short-circuit an explicit theoretical analysis of
the complex relationship between structure and consciousness which he
documented (Elger, 1986), I have endeavoured to draw out the wider
analytical implications of my empirical material more explicitly, for
example in terms of the relationship between the volatile nature of rank
and file sectional activity and the coherence of the stewards' strategic
perspective (providing some comparative theoretical and practical
conclusions in Chapter Five).
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STEWARDS' RELATIONSHIP TO MANAGEiENr: ThE 1970s
* the 1970s: the stewards' strengths
The early 1960s inside the Ford Halewood plant were
characterised as being the years of the 'ball and chain' approach by Beynon
(1984). Production line managers took a 'no nonsense' approach which had
been tried at Dagenham in the 1940s and 50s and was taken to the new
Halewood plant when it opened in 1963; it involved a very heavy-handed
management strategy aimed at preventing any effective shopfloor trade union
organisation able to bargain over conditions of work. Eddie Roberts was a
shop steward in the paint shop and one of the most prominent figures in the
emerging stewards' organisation, becoming Convenor of the Assembly plant
between 1968-70 before leaving the factory to take up a TGWLT full-time
officer's position. Although a militant shopfloor activist he was not a
member of any political party. He offered a vivid description of the plant
in its early years:
It was a fucking hell-camp, total liberty taking. People were
spoken to like fucking dogs. You'd get Cockney supervisers
coming down saying things like 'You fucking lazy scouse twats'.
It was a totally autocratic management style...The turnover was
massive - they just walked through the place. As people poured
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into the factory one end you could see them going out the other
end, sacked or under their own steam.
Spontaneous and militant rank and file workers'
resistance to managerial intransigence during the 1960s provided the steam
on which the engine of a powerful shop steward organisation could be
driven. The right of shop stewards to have freedom of access to their
members or to negotiate with the supervisor was only established through
bouts of severe conflict that sought to carve out a 'frontier of control'
over the job. The plant was constantly hit by sectional and plant-wide
stoppages of work over issues such as the speed of the production line,
movement of labour and discipline. It was through such battles that
individual stewards 'cut their teeth' and a powerful plant-wide collective
stewards' organisation began to take shape. Both Frank Druninond and RI tchie
O'Connell started working as line-workers in the Assembly plant at lialewood
in 1967 and have been long-standing trade union activists in the plant over
the past 20 years; they are now both senior stewards and 'mainstream'
Labour Party supporters. Frank Druimond related what the 'ball and chain'
strategy meant:
It was an unbelievable atmosphere. You were insulted all the
time and expected to kow-tow. Numerous stoppages occured
because stewards weren't made available for people - because it
was at the whim of the supervisor whether they were released or
not. So the only way the steward could get to meet his members
was to call a strike.
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It was this management 'ball and chain' approach which
precipitated the 'penalty clause' strike of 1969. Against the backcloth of
a Royal Commission and White Paper from the Labour government advocating
control of the activities of shop stewards, Ford's annual pay package for
its British workforce contained a series of penalty clauses aimed at
penalising unofficial stoppages of work. Ritchie O'Connell remembered:
The 1969 strike was tied into the Labour government's 'In Place
Of Strife' which proposed legal fines for 'unconstitutional
action'. The Ford Motor Company - anticipating things as they
always do - tried to impose it before it had become a reality
nationally.
Militant shopfloor opposition to the 'penalty clauses'
was spearheaded by the shop stewards at Ford's Halewood plant. As Eddie
Roberts commented:
A number of us recognised the role and significance within
Ford's that what they were doing today would set an industrial
relations trend elsewhere tomorrow. The eyes of other car
workers right across the engineering industry were going to be
looking at Fords. So some of us accepted we had a wider
responsibility and others outside were encourging Ford workers
to have a go.
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Initiated by shop stewards at Halewood and Swansea in
defiance of national union officials on the NJNC (which at that time
excluded rank and file representation) the first ever national strike
across all Ford's British plants lasted 3 weeks and succeeded in
substantially watering down the company's conditions. The democratic reform
of the union's negotiating forum followed in the wake of the 1969 strike
and the victory over the company at national level boosted the confidence
and willingness of rank and file workers and their stewards to resist
managerial prerogative at local level, inside Ford's Halewood plant.
Halewood stewards led numerous sectional disputes over 'speed-up' on the
lines, work standards, manning and the 'blue-eyed system' - the favouritism
practised by supervisors in allocating work or in moving men from one job
to another. The wave of strikes, many of them unofficial, reflected the
'upturn' in workers' struggles that was taking place more generally inside
the British labour movement. In 1971 the Halewood stewards' activities
reached a new height during the 9-week national 'parity' pay strike which,
although ending ignominously after the intervention of full-time officials,
successfully won comparable earnings with the hitherto better-paid piece-
work car factories of the Midlands. Again, it was the Halewood stewards'
organisation that provided the backbone of the strike leadership
nationally.
Within days of a resumption of work Halewood management
attempted to regain the initiative by announcing that workplace industrial
relations would be 'played by the Blue Book' with shop stewards being given
a full 60-minute work allocation and not allowed off the job without prior
permission of the supervisor. The result of this '1st Riot Act' - as it
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subsequently became colloquially known - was a series of disciplinary
measures and suspensions against shop stewards which led to constant
stoppages of work for a period of 10 weeks, finally culminating in the
sacking of John Dillon, a steward in the Assembly plant. Ritchie O'Connell
related:
After the '71 strike the Company thought they had beaten us
into submission. We hadn't had a full week's wage packet for
about 20 weeks. They thought this is the time to go in and kick
them, when they're down. It was a sustained attack on the shop
steward organisation but we were strong enough to come through
it.
The Assembly plant took all-out strike action and after 2
weeks forced management to reinstate the sacked steward, although in a
different job and without recognition as a union representative. But even
if it was not a complete victory it successfully blocked the attempt to
destroy the shop stewards' authority.
By the early 1970s, the balance of bargaining power
inside the Merseyside plant was undoubtedly weighted to the relative
advantage of shopfloor workers. A similar picture existed in many other
Ford plants across the country and as Sander Meredeen, a one-time Ford
manager at the company's British headquarters in Warley, put it: 'The
company realised that it had to come to terms with this "challenge from
below" (Friedman and Meredeen, 1980. p229). At Halewood, management
responded by abandoning its 'ball and chain' approach in favour of a
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combination of strategies, which can be characterised as the 'carrot and
stick' approach. My typology of management strategy differs sllghly from
Beynon's at this point. whilst acknowledging the very real initiatives
aimed at 'accommodating' to the strength of shop steward organisation taken
at senior Ford executive level, I believe Beynon does not adequately
describe the contradictory but simultaneous policy of 'conflict' evidenced
at plant level inside Halewood. The coherence of Ford's national strategic
initiatives stood in sharp contrast to Halewood managinent's insistence on
unilateral managerial control. It was a contradiction rooted in a
fundamental inability to devise a successful policy for curbing shopfloor
militancy.
On the one hand, there was the 'carrot' component - which
involved a policy of accommodation to and incorporation of trade union
representatives. For over 20 years Ford had operated a strongly unified and
centrally controlled organisational structure within its UK plants with the
power of policy-making concentrated at the centre and closely prescribed
limits on the autonomy of local line management. That traditional policy
and collective bargaining structure now began to change as the company took
a series of initiatives, both nationally and in the plants, designed to
make a significant contribution towards reducing the number of shopfloor
disputes. The first fruit of this accommodation policy was the admission of
4 plant Convenors (including two from Halewood) to the Ford National Joint
Negotiating Coninittee (NJNC) (Friedman and Meredeen, 1980. p264).
Ironically, the 1969 strike had revealed in sharp relief
the inability of remote national full-time union officials to carry their
members, support for new agreements. This failure persuaded senior Ford
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executives of the need to 'work with the newly selected leaders of the
trade union side to develop a more businesslike and trusting relationship'
(Friedman and Meredeen, 1980. p226). The preservation of the NJNC as an
authoritative joint union-management bargaining forum was regarded as the
company's top priority and Ford therefore welcomed the arrival of the plant
Convenors on the NJNC, recognising the changed locus of power and the need
to reach agreements in future with shopfloor union leaders. Over the next
decade the NJNC was reconstituted and democratised even further, leading in
1978 to the admission of all Ford's 21 plant Convenors. Thus, the 2
Halewood plant Convenors became much more closely linked to the formal
trade union machine and exposed to the dangers of institutionalisation and
bureaucratisation. The attempt to accommodate to the presence of the shop
stewards was also reflected in a national 'Procedure Agreement' signed in
1975 which aimed at providing a more effective role for stewards by
requiring that in future most problems would be settled at plant level
without the need to refer matters to the NJNC for resolution.
Simultaneously, the first ever 'Work Standards Agreement' was negotiated
which provided a 5-stage procedure through which grievances could be
resolved; a status quo clause was conceded in return for an agreement by
the unions to take no industrial action over proposed changes to 'well
established working practices' during a 15-day period. This was followed by
a union membership clause in 1976 which conferred exclusive bargaining
rights to the NJNC unions, with provision for a 100 per cent post-entry
closed shop and the collection of union dues by deduction from wages
through the payroll.
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Inside the Halewood plant, Ford's accommodation policy
led to the Convenors and senior stewards in both Body and Assembly plants
(numbering about 15 individuals) being given greatly enhanced recognition
and status, as well as 100 per cent time-off work to conduct union
business. If during the 1960s workers had struggled for the right of their
shop steward to be released from the line to negotiate, by the 1970s
Halewood management adopted a generally more relaxed, if unevenly applied,
policy. A new layer of senior shop stewards began to emerge who were
generally allocated light duties, allowed a degree of freedom of movement
within the plant and regular access to the Convenor's office. In the event
of a serious dispute emerging on the section the operation of Ford's new
industrial relations policy meant the almost inhl1ediate involvement of
senior stewards. John Bohanna, a steward for over 20 years, chairman of the
shop stewards committee in the Body plant and an independent socialist
militant, related:
There were that many stoppages of work that Ford did everything
to utilise the senior stewards as policemen of discontent.
Consequently they were not on the job. They had to give them
facility time to help them solve disputes. But the company blew
hot and cold on this issue. When they wanted to use the shop
stewards to settle disputes, to exercise a restraining
influence on shopfloor militancy, it suited them to allow even
some sectional stewards virtually 100 per cent facility time.
But if they thought the stewards were abusing their authority
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and leading opposition they would quickly put them back on the
job.
Therefore, on the one hand, the decade after 1968 saw the
Ford Motor Company opt for a strategy of accorruodation and integration of
the Convenors and senior shop stewards within the Halewood plant. This was
the 'carrot' part of the approach. On the other hand, the Halewood plant
management simultaneously pursued a strategy of tight shopfloor discipline
with the aim of securing high and continuous production. This was the
'stick' component of the approach. It was an element which was clearly the
more dominant of the two as far as the shop stewards were concerned.
Certainly, management repeatedly took a confrontational approach to
workplace industrial relations, for example operating a policy of laying
workers off whenever the consequential effects of 'unconstitutional'
stoppages of work by one section prevented another from doing their normal
jobs. Barry Upham, a senior Eployee Relations manager in the Body plant,
outlined management's predicament:
As a production superintendent on the night shift, whenever a
problem occurred the steward's answer, more often than not,
would be 'well, give us another man on the line'. And with the
only alternative being a stoppage of work you would bang a man
in. That was fine on a temporary basis but once you'd put him
in you'd couldn't get him out. Because of that we were heavily
overmanned. A lot of supervisors felt demoralised because they
had lost control, they knew they had lost control of the
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situation because every time they went in on an issue to get a
change of some sort they were met with resistance or blackmail.
So the place was running amok and the labour and the stewards
were controlling it more than the management. It got so bad
that locally the management said 'If we go on like this we'll
go under, we'll have to try something different'.
In 1976, frustrated with its lack of authority,
management wielded the 'big stick' with tremendous ferocity. A new
management team - mainly Industrial Relations managers from Dagenhani - were
drafted into the IJalewood plant. The measures they took to 'regain' control
of the shopfloor became known as the '2nd Riot Act'. Until this time
sectional stewards had negotiated with supervisors. But now the whole
relationship changed as the new IR managers started to go down on the
shopfloor and, acting over the heads of front-line supervision, 'put the
boot in' by insisting on adherence to the 'Blue Book' with no form of
appeals procedure. Barry Upham justified the approach thus:
It was simply an intention on management's part to stand up to
the issues and not run away from them, to take them on. We had
to lose volume to restore control. So the shopfloor was flooded
with Personnel Offices. Whenever there was an issue where
somebody refused a request from a supervisor we introduced an
'off-pay situation'. But of course, when we took one guy off-
pay the rest of his mates on the section went off-pay, went out
on strike with him, maybe the whole line went on strike with
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him. So a lot of people got laid off. We went through a long
period when they were in and out like fiddlers' elbows.
Eventually, although it took awhile, some sort of confidence
began to build up within the supervision again and we went into
a quieter period where we were more in control than we had
been. It wasn't perfect but it was better than it had been.
The '2nd Riot Act' lasted for a few months and produced
numerous stoppages. As John Bohanna explained:
It was a bit like Germany in the l930s. The IR were the
'Gestapo' and the production management the 'Weimar'. The
position of the shop stewards was completely undermined. We
felt the value of trade union representation in Halewood meant
nothing to management.
Eventually the issue blew up into a 2-week plant-wide
'representation strike' initiated by the Halewood shop stewards in defence
of basic workplace trade union organisation, which was only called off
after senior Ford UK executives and national union officials agreed on a
new appeals procedure on discipline. But the 'big stick' component of
Halewood management's strategy was a continuing feature during the late
1970s. Barry Senior, flnployee Relations Manager of the paint shop in the
Assembly plant, arrived at Halewood in 1977. As a young graduate he well
remembered the old-style bombastic Ford manager:
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In many respects it was macho-style management in the 1970s.
The view was that shop stewards were gob-shites. They were not
to be consulted. Management had the right to manage and you
were a wimp if you made any conciliatory gesture to the trade
unions. Senior management and supervision took the view that
the only thing people responded to was the 'big stick'; the
only way to manage the moving line was like the slave galleys,
they had to be flogged into it. Everything was confrontational
and the stewards responded to that. We had a lot of disputes
because we were too precipitate in our action.
Barry Upham also acknowledged that heavy-handed
management was directly responsible for provoking much shopfloor militancy:
This company has always been dominated by numbers, the number
of cars you produce, the cost of it, the numbers employed. It's
always been a numbers' game. And there's always been a pressure
on volume production. The managers in the 70s were obviously
under pressure from their bosses higher up the tree to turn the
volume out and if there was a risk that they wouldn't get it
they would resort to whatever measure they could to achieve it.
A lot of them were tough, extremely autocratic and dictatorial.
It wasn't so much the consultation or negotiation so much as
'We're telling you that's what it's going to be'. And then you
got the confrontation.
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As far as Halewood management was concerned both the
'carrot' and the 'stick', confrontation and accommodation strategies, were
designed with the same objective: to break down the principal source of
resistance to managerial authority, namely the shopfloor organisation based
around the stewards in both Body and Assembly plants. Clearly it was the
'stick' component of their strategy which predominated during the 1970s,
although the impact of the 'carrot' component was more insidious. Yet it
met with only limited success. There were dozens of sectional walk-outs in
both plants on the Halewood estate during the 1970s. Despite the sometimes
dampening impact of senior stewards on workplace militancy, it is clear
that quite powerful and independent shop steward organisations developed,
that were a constant thorn in the side of the Halewood management. Indeed,
the autumn of 1978 saw another 9-week national Ford strike (involving both
Merseyside plants) that successfully broke through the Labour government's
5 per cent pay norm to win a 17 per cent increase, reflecting the
confidence of shopfloor organisation.
By 1980 a number of quite fundamental changes in several
of the work processes at ITalewood took place as the plant went through a
re-tooling programme in preparation for the launch of a new model, the
Escort Mark III. Ford's £205 million investment heralded the age of new
technology in the plant. The new automated machinery was concentrated in
the Body plant (and in the paint-spraying area of the Assembly plant) where
39 robots were installed - more than in any other car assembly plant in
Britain. The Body plant was completely gutted and modernised as lines were
thrown out and entirely different jobs introduced. As the Body plant became
more capital-intensive the Assembly plant became relatively more labour-
Page 256
Ford: Stewards' Relationship To Management: The 1970s
intensive and both shop steward organisations became pre-occupied with the
movement of labour, as about 800 workers were either temporarily or
permanently transfered from the Body to the Assembly plant. Management
initially operated very cautiously; not sure how the new robots would
function and with a new model about to be launched they did not want to
provoke any conflict which might threaten production schedules.
Nonetheless, numerous stoppages took place because so many jobs were
disrupted and long cherished customs and practices undermined.
In November 1980 a letter to all its British employees
from Ford's referred to the 'appalling situation in the plants' with
unconstitutional stoppages continuing unabated. The Halewood plant had long
been seen by Ford as its problem plant in the UK. The company's own figures
show the plant accounted for a disproportionate amount of UK hours and
sales losses betwen 1978 and 1982 (Marsden et al. 1985. p128). New
disciplinary procedures to raise the penalties for 'unconstitutional
action' in 1979, a new work standards procedure in 1980, and the suspension
of workers who could not meet new production targets in 1981 all provoked
sectional walk-outs. As a consequence there were repeated lay-offs in both
the Body and Assembly plants. Disputes in 1981 and 1982 gave Halewood
shares of 14.6 per cent and 12.6 per cent of the British car industry's
working days lost (Marsden et al. 1985. pl3O). By 1981 the plant's new
technology had led to a reduction of labour of 6.2 per cent, with many
hundreds of voluntary redundancies. But management still found that
shopfloor practices were difficult to reform.
The threat of foreign competition within Ford's core
Mierican and European markets - particularly from Japanese car
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manufacturers - made the task of reorganisation more urgent. In the late
1970s there was a falling demand for British cars and a deep commercial
crisis as the car industry began to suffer chronic overcapacity on a world
scale. In 1981 Ford Europe's senior executive Bill Hayden visited Japan and
later, in a detailed internal document, he wrote of the ability of the
Japanese producers to undercut Ford's most efficient operation in Europe by
30 per cent. It was a devastating document and set the tone for the decade.
It was against this background that Ford coined a new calendar, called 'AJ'
- 'After Japan' to counteract the competition (Beynon, 1984). Ford's
initial response to the threat of Japanese competition was to push through
rationalisation and efficiency measures by traditional top-down methods and
in 1981 Halewood management reverted to the 'big stick' again by imposing
Ford's new disciplinary code, known within the plant as 'Double Dosing' or
the 3rd 'Riot Act'. It stipulated that if an employee had a grievance he
was to be given 10 minutes off the line to talk to a supervisor and
steward. If the problem had not been resolved during this period and he
refused to get back on the job he was suspended for the rest of the day. If
the shop steward organised a stoppage in his defence the section involved
were iimiediately suspended for the following day's shift. Gordon Cook, an
Fp1oyee Relations manager in the Body plant at Halewood, explained:
It was called 'Double Dosing'. Once we decided to take somebody
off-pay and the rest of the section went on strike for the rest
of the shift we suspended them for an equivalent amount of
time. So any one-day strike became two days. It was like
cutting off our noses to spite our faces but it was another way
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of making it more painful for the employees to take strike
action because it hurt people more financially.
Inevitably, the policy meant large numbers of workers
found themselves being laid off even though they had not been involved in
any dispute, causing tremendous anger amongst both stewards and members.
John Bohanna recalled the shopfloor response in the Body plant:
The Convenor, Steve Broadhead, and stewards took a hard line
position in response to 'Double Dosing'. As soon as the company
suspended anyone we reversed it and gave the company 10 minutes
to take it back or we threatened a plant-wide stoppage. We took
the position 'One's off pay, we're all off pay'. A lot of
supervisors backed down. But eventually it blew up at the same
time in both plants...we ended up reconinending an all-out
strike at mass meetings of the members.
After another 2-week strike across the two Halewood
plants Ford's were forced to withdraw their (iniquitous) disciplinary code.
Placed within the context of the general employers' offensive taking place
within British manufacturing industry during the early 1980s the strike was
a significant victory for the Halewood shop stewards.
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* the 1970s: the ewards' weaknesses
The shop stewards inside both Body and Assembly plants
during the 1960s and 70s succeeded in building powerful workplace trade
union organisations, able to encroach on managerial prerogatives in many
important respects. It was the day-to-day struggle on the shopfloor that
shaped the type of militant steward organisation that developed, able to
establish a degree of shopfloor control over manning, line speeds and the
allocation of work. Stewards administered overtime rotas and monitored the
movement of labour, strictly controlled through a 'seniority system' based
on the length of service of individual workers. Management's authoritarian
supervision of work and disciplinary procedures faced constant challenge.
As John Bohanna explained:
In the '70s the role of the supervisor was being challenged
every day, every hour, because people were confident. It was
being challenged more by the workers themselves - it wasn't
necessarily an organised co-ordinated action by the shop
stewards. But the leadership was responsible for being seen to
have the dominant role over who mans what job, who gets graded
and that...We were winning jobs all the time. If we didn't have
another man immediately we'd stop work and get another man.
Once we had another man we were going to keep him on the
section and if they tried to take him out we'd have another
strike. We actually created hundreds of jobs in the 70s.
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Nonetheless, the extent of job controls and the strength
of stewards' organisation was by no means uniform across the Halewood site.
Some sections of workers, such as the line-workers in the trim and final
assembly departments of the Assembly plant and on the 'white lines' inside
the Body plant, were able to take advantage of their strategic position in
the production process to develop relatively ambitious counter-controls.
With many of these jobs being extremely repetitive, monotonous and badly
paid (mainly B grade) there was added incentive to engage in shopfloor
resistance. Other sections bereft of significant leverage, such as non-line
workers on sub-assembly work, forklift drivers and janitors, had less
iimediate control over the job, and their higher basic pay (mainly C
grade), access to greater amounts of overtime and/or generally less onerous
work meant they did not as readily engage in militant activity. The uneven
level of experience and activity of individual stewards was also a crucial
influence on the degree of solidarity and cohesion among rank and file
workers in different sections.
i\nother important factor influencing the balance of
bargaining power was the state of the product market. The motor industry is
notoriously highly competitive and the dramatic restructuring of car
manufacture which took place on a world scale during the 1970s - with
imported cars taking an increasing share of the British market - placed
even greater pressure on Fords for increased productivity and output.
During what was generally a period of market boom, when the shopfloor was
working high schedules, it was often not worth it for management to
challenge areas of job control, because this carried the risk of a stoppage
and lost production. As Barry Upham acknowledged:
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In the rnid-70s the car industry was booming and we needed every
vehicle we could produce and there was a sense that when the
market was high and management wanted cars the union felt it
was in the ascendancy.
But the product market had its troughs as well as its
peaks. During these periods management were not slow to exploit the
situation to their advantage, limiting the extent and durability of
shopfloor controls. As Eddie Roberts related:
Ford's were quite fickle in their industrial relations
strategy. It used to come in waves. You would find that when
the order books were full they were quite willing to make
concessions all over the place. They would overman sections,
they would know people were working the 'welt', having extra
tea breaks and so forth. But when there was a bit of a squeeze
going on - either because the order books were tighter or there
was a model change coming up and they could mark tine a bit -
they were quite willing to dig their heels in and a lot of
disputes would occur. The thing did go in trends.
The combination of objective and subjective factors
affecting the balance of bargaining power is highlighted by a comparison of
the differences between the two plants on the Halewood estate, not only in
terms of management approach but also in the type of shop stewards'
committee that developed. Beynon's study concentrated virtually exclusively
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on the Assembly plant. Yet arguably, during the 1970s the relative
importance of the Body plant was considerably enhanced. Although there was
considerable overlap in terms of the level of shopfloor militancy - with
both plants being in the forefront at different periods of time - the Body
plant stewards' comittee was probably a more unpredictable thorn in the
side of management than the Assembly plant stewards organisation.
To begin with, the nature of the work process was more
physically demanding and dangerous in the Body plant than in the Assembly
plant; this caused far more problems over health and safety and tended to
precipitate regular shopfloor disputes over the level of noise, amount of
fumes and intensity of heat. Although the highly disciplined organisation
of work in the Assembly plant proved to be a constant source of conflict,
the considerable changes to the Body plant's production system,
particularly with the introduction of giant presses and new machinery in
the late 1970s and early 1980s, created even greater pressures for
shopfloor resistance. Moreover, there appear to have been more persistent
hard-line management attempts to impose discipline and control over the
pace of work and the level of abstenteeism within the Body plant.
Certainly, despite its bouts of set-piece confrontations there was a
relatively more co-operative relationship established between management
and senior stewards in the Assembly plant, where a larger number of
managers than in the Body plant believed in a more consultative approach to
workplace industrial relations.
The character of the shop stewards' leadership was also
rather different. In the Assembly plant there was a well established
'moderate' Convenor, Billy Maguire, who was in office throughout the 1970s
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and was personally very influential in shaping a strong stewards'
leadership only prepared to take strike action 'as a last resort'. By
contrast, in the Body plant there was a less stable steward leadership with
a succession of different Convenors during the 1970s, including a
Communist, Les Moore. The Assembly plant stewards also appear to have been
more firmly integrated into official trade union structures. The TGWIJ
Halewood factory branch comittee was completely dominated by Assenthly
plant stewards, who despite their preparedness to act unofficially, often
tended to operate within official union procedures; there was a co-
existence of branch and shopfloor organisation. By contrast, in the Body
plant the stewards' coninittee generally developed more autonomously of the
official union machine. In part, this was because TGWIJ shopfloor
organisation inside the Body plant was a much more recent phenomenon than
in the Assembly plant; only after the 1969 parity strike did the TGWIJ
become the majority union, following the exodus from the GMB of 2,000
members disgusted at the behaviour of its full-time officials. Even then,
until 1973 the Convenor of the Body plant was a member of the AUEW.
Furthermore, there were a far greater number of craftsmen in the Body plant
than in the Assembly plant, with their own independent power base of union
organisation. Indeed, a serious split between the TGWIJ and craft shop
stewards in the Body plant (which led to the formation of a separate craft
stewards' committee during 1973-8, not formally recognised by the company
or national union officials) meant shopfloor bargaining was invariably more
fragmented and less stable than in the Assembly plant. Finally, although
there was only ever a handful of politically coninitted left-wing stewards
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in either plant they seemed to wield slightly more influence within the
Body plant stewards committee.
At the same time the picture of a relatively militant and
powerful shop stewards' organisation in both plants at Halewood has to be
qualified by consideration of a number of important limitations. Firstly,
it was not the case that both plants were perpetually on strike. In fact,
for a great deal of the time rather uneventful bargaining took place that
resolved problems without confrontation, even if Ford's constant
reassertion of managerial prerogative left little scope for a long-term
accomodation between stewards and management. But the application of
management's 'carrot and stick' approach clearly had some success. If the
'big stick' approach (often provoking disputes) worked to undermine plant-
wide solidarity with its resulting constant lay-offs, the 'carrot'
approach, of involving senior stewards in overseeing the formalised
agreements, helped to create a more 'professional' basis for workplace
trade unionism. For example, the number of stoppages recorded by Ford's
(counted as disputes involving 3 or more workers stopping work for 15
minutes or more) although probably underestimating the actual level of
conflict in the plants (in terms of the duration of strikes, the numbers of
workers involved and their impact on production) does show a gradual
decline during the course of the 1970s.
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Secondly, there were a number of sectional divisions
handicapping the strength of shop stewards organisation. In the Assembly
plant the differentiation between line-workers and non-line workers - over
such things as the nature of work, level of supervision, rate of pay and
availability of overtime - was a traditional source of animosity. There was
also a great deal of resentment among many line-workers towards the women
sewing-machinists who worked within the trim manufacture department, partly
because although they worked only on day-shifts they were on a higher basic
grade than most line-workers and partly because they were viewed as women
only working for 'pin-money'. Similarly, in the Body plant, a significant
factor undermining shopfloor unity was the differences in job, pay and
conditions between the 2-shift and 3-shift sections, with the latter
traditionally concerned to maintain its advantageous position. Pnother
division was between 'PGWJ production workers and craftsmen, members of the
ATJE and EETPIJ, who often crossed TGWEJ workers' picket lines.
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Thirdly, there was the weakness of what Beynon (1984)
described as the stewards' 'factory class-consciousness', a highly
developed understanding of the day-to-day conflicts on the shopfloor, but a
politics essentially limited to the confines of the factory and not
generalised to wider political concerns. As Eddie Roberts, one of the most
prominent stewards of the 1960s, recalled:
We didn't have a very heightened political awareness. oae
us were active in political parties. We were all accused of
being every faction of Trot when the truth was none of us
really were. Almost naively in some respects our attitude was
conditioned around the shopfloor. We got the trust from the
lads and the support on the issues that became the priority. No
one was ever able to say we were politically motivated maniacs.
Although they tried that they weren't able to prove it.
Significantly, after leaving Halewood in 1970, Eddie
Roberts belatedly recognised the need for a political organisation rooted
on the shopfloor and joined the Communist Party. A handful of other
stewards joined small revolutionary socialist organisations, such Big Flame
and the International Socialists. Others were 'mainstream' members of the
Labour Party. Yet by and large, most of the stewards who emerged during the
1970s adopted a quasi-syndicalist approach, concerned only with immediate
issues on the shopfloor, with the Halewood stewards' bodies being
essentially peripheral to the campaigns and issues taken up within the
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local labour movement. Eddie Roberts reflected on the attitude of his
successor as Convenor in the Assembly plant during the 1970s:
The Ford stewards didn't integrate themselves within the local
labour movement, they bricked themselves in. Billy Maguire was
very different from me as a Convenor. I think if my deputy had
been elected he would have perpetuated a more progressive
regime. Individuals do have an influence, it's a fact. When
Billy came in radical newspapers and organisations came along
and Billy censured them all, threw them all out. Anyone who
wanted to carry a Ford banner who wasn't part of Ford's was
exconuiunicated. He cosseted and protected them from the outside
world.
The picture was not very different in the Body plant. No
doubt the fact that day-to-day improvements were achieved through shopfloor
union organisation encouraged most stewards to believe they could rely on
industrial muscle alone. But although this self-sufficiency reflected their
sense of strength it also underlined an important limitation which would
become ever more apparent during the recession years of the 1980s.
In conclusion, there is little doubt the balance of
bargaining power was tilted to the relative advantage of shop steward
organisation in the Ford Halewood plant during the 1970s. It was built up
in struggle against a management who, despite its limited initiatives aimed
at incorporating a layer of senior stewards, worked to undermine the basis
of a stable acconiiiodative relationship with the stewards' organisation
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through its complimentary and more dominant strategy of 'sticking the boot
in'. Despite aspects of co-operation the period was characterised by an
extremely confictual relationship. But this relationship was dramatically
altered from the early 1980s onwards.
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ST1ARDS' RELATIONSHIP TO MANAG 4I: ThE 1980s
* the 1980s: years of co-operation
The installation of new technology substantially reduced
labour requirements and in January 1983 Ford's announced a voluntary
redundancy programme with the loss of 3,000 jobs sought over a period of
two years. Although the steward committees were opposed in principle to job
losses they were not able to alter management's decision. Few people
volunteered for redundancy until Assembly plant workers walked out on a 4-
week strike in defence of a young line worker, Paul Kelly, sacked for
allegedly bending a small bracket in a car. The strike, which immediately
led to lay-offs in the Body plant, reflected the more general anger at
ma em's relentless drive for 'efficiency'. But Halewood management
took the opportunity of plunging the knife even further by announcing that
within eight days of a return to work in the Assembly plant they would
implement a series of new working practices in the Body plant, prompting
the Body plant shop stewards' committee to recommend indefinite strike
action if Ford went ahead with its plans. Eventually, Ford backed down fron
its hard-line stance. The Assembly plant workforce returned to work after
the company agreed to abide by the outcome of an independent tribunal into
Paul Kelly's sacking, which finally led to his re-instatement, and although
some efficiency based changes were introduced in the Body plant the
stewards were able to forestall key aspects of their implementation. It was
another illustration that Ford could not just ride rough-shod over shop
Page 270
Ford: Stewards' Relationship To Management: The 1980s
steward organisation in Halewood. But there was also a heavy price to pay
in terms of loss of jobs as a flood of people, many of them younger
workers, decided to take voluntary redundancy and accept the relatively
high payments offered by the company. Peter Warden, a rank and file union
activist in the Body plant, where he has worked since the late 1970s,
remembered:
Quite a few young unmarried men took the redundancy. Some of
them were the more militant people, particularly in my area.
They felt the most insecure. They had been going through two
years with the change in the model, unsure what their job or
the future was going to be and when the strike happened over
Paul Kelly - we believe the company instigated that because
when the redundancies first showed nobody put their name down -
when the strike began to bite the people who had the least
service and were unsure, they went.
The mid-1980s continued to be dominated by the fear of
job loss as shop stewards - confronted with a new dimension to Ford's
multinational activity - increasingly began to believe the Halewood plant
would be closed if workplace industrial relations were not drastically
changed. The company had developed the concept of a European production
system around its 'Ford Europe' company, as particular plants became
identified with single models; Halewood now only produced the one model,
the Escort. At the same time, internationally integrated sourcing meant no
longer did a single plant build a single model for its own national market;
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the same Escort model assembled at Halewood was also produced in Saarlouis,
West Germany, enabling Ford to switch production between plants and to make
productivity comparisons between the two with the ultimate threat of
closure unless efficency was improved. In February 1981 the 'Guardian'
newspaper carried the headline: 'Ford Plans To Run Down European Plants'
and reported that documents leaked from Detroit outlined Ford's plan to
switch Escort production to Brazil by 1983 with Ford Europe left to merely
supply the components; the European plant most likely to be affected, it
stated, was Halewood (4).
But the looming prospect of plant closure was greatly
accelerated after the 1983 Paul Kelly strike when Arthur Rothwell, Ford
Halewood's Operations Manager, took the highly dramatic step of going down
onto the shopfloor, stopping all the production lines and addressing the
workforce about the drastic changes needed if closure was to be averted.
According to Harry Craig, Production Manager of the Trim in the Assembly
plant:
When he had finished no one said anything. There was absolute
silence. But the clarion call didn't go out on the Friday and
we all changed on the Monday. It took at least a year before
attitudes really began to shift.
Throughout 1983-4 a number of presentations were given by
management to shop stewards using graphs, charts and a torrent of
statistics to illustrate the low level of labour productivity, the
overinanning, slow workpace and poor labour relations in the plant that
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threatened its future survival. Ford made extensive use of productivity
comparisons between their British and continental plants to prove Halewood
was the least productive in Europe. According to a newsletter issued to the
Halewood workforce in 1983, labour and overhead efficency in the plant
declined by 15 per cent between 1972 and 1978 while the Saarlouis plant in
West Germany - which also produces the Escort - underwent continous
improvement of 41 per cent between 1972-82 (Marsden et al. 1985. p26). The
constant theme was the need to cut labour, reform shopfloor working
practices, break demarcation, introduce wider flexibility, boost
productivity and raise quality.
Meanwhile, as will have become clear from the two
previous case studies, during the early 1980s economic recession Merseyside
became synonymous with plant closures arid redundancies. The closure of two
massive workplaces in nearby Speke, the Dunlop plant in 1979 - one of the
best union organised factories on Merseyside - and the BL Number Two plant
- at the height of a prolonged strike over mutuality and manning levels -
had a particularly sobering impact on the horizons of many Ford workers.
Senior stewards felt they were being taken to the edge of the abyss and
shown how deep it really was. As Frank Drurmiond remarked:
Jhether it was true or not the Ford Motor Company constantly
said 'Halewood - you're under threat. Your record is bad.
You've got an absenteeism problem, a labour relations problem'.
So we were under tremendous pressure. We had just had the
experience of the British Leyland plant up the road shutting
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down and we realised we were in direct competition with
Saarlouis if we were going to survive.
The key dileriina for the Halewood stewards, as they saw
it, was whether to completely resist change and risk closure of the plant
with catastrophic job losses or to acquiesce in certain changes so as to
increase the likelihood of survival, even though this would involve a
substantial reduction in the size of the workforce and major changes in
working practices. They decided on the latter option. Ray Storey has worked
on the trim in the Assembly plant for 12 years, serving for 2 years as a
shop steward, and is a member of the far-left Socialist Workers Party. He
related how the stewards responded:
Management convinced them with the economics of the thing that
the plants in Germany and Spain were producing cars more
efficiently with less labour and less cost. Management were
looking at it from a world viewpoint and Halewood was the least
productive. So therefore in terms of long-term investment it
made sense to put it where it was most productive instead of
Halewood which was prone to strike action. That convinced them
that management were looking to running down Halewood if the
situation didn't improve.
As a result, the Convenors in both Assembly and Body
plants approached the management to pledge they were willing to be part of
the 'saving of Halewood'. Steve Broadhead, Convenor in the Body plant,
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spoke directly to Bill Hayden, Ford's UK director, to indicate he was
prepared to work in line with the company to save jobs for the future.
Hayden visited Halewood and spoke directly to the senior stewards,
insisting they had to change the strike-bound image of the plant constantly
projected in the media. The only way to survive, he argued, was for
everybody from the shopfloor to management to realise that 'working
together' was the way forward; 'fighting the competition, instead of each
other'. As a gesture of intent, Hayden offered a new plastics project in
the Body plant costing $11 million - but only if the shop stewards agreed
to abandon their militant 'one out, all-out policy' towards lay-offs. The
'one-out, all-out' had often been invoked in the past when management had
laid-off groups of workers who had not participated in, but were
nonetheless affected by, stoppages involving other sections of workers. It
had resulted in numerous plant-wide shutdowns. But the Body plant Convenor
now used his authority and influence to convince the stewards to accept a
new selective lay-off agreement. A simultaneous process took place in the
Assembly plant, where the Convenor, Billy Maguire, argued that to ensure
Halewood did not close the stewards 'would have to do business in a
different way'. Ritchie O'Connell explained:
When Billy Maguire approached the company there was a hell of a
lot of heart searching amongst the stewards because
traditionally and historically we bad a point of view towards
management that they were not going to exploit our members. So
we had to sit down and re-appraise our approach and adjust to
the fact that the company were going to make certain demands on
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us that were going to be in the long-term interests of the
membership. But there was a hell of a lot of heart searching
because we had to turn over 20 odd years attitudes and we had
to think differently.
A joint presentation was given at a mass meeting in the
Assembly plant with Arthur Rothwell and his management team on the platform
alongside Billy Maguire and the senior stewards. As Frank Drummond
explained:
What we said to the meeting was we don't want to give any
fundamental agreements away like progression through seniority
(which we'd be prepared to man the barricades for) but we do
realise that to make sure this plant is still open in the 1990s
the stewards and members have got a different role to play with
management. The phrase became 'It 's not war-war, its jaw-jaw'.
The change of attitude by the 1-Jalewood stewards coincided
with important developments in the Ford Motor Company's approach to
industrial relations in its British plants (Starkey and McKinlay, 1989).
Faced with ever-increasing Japanese competition Ford's stressed its only
guarantee of market survival would come from noticeable improvements both
in productivity and in the quality of the finished product. However,
raising the level of quality was unlikely to succeed with management's
traditional adversarial workplace industrial relations approach. So a new
labour relations strategy, imported from the United States was adopted,
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named 'Eployee Involvement' (El). Unlike the merely structural reforms of
internal bargaining institutions that had been implemented during the 1970s
'El' also emphasised a gradual, processual approach to building a co-
operative relationship between management and unions, with the aim of
encouraging shopfloor workers to identify with the company's objectives and
of harnessing their consent to organisational change. From the mid-1980s
onwards Halewood management gradually changed its policy, suspending their
confrontational approach in favour of what could be described as a rather
sophisticated 'poisoned handshake' approach, aimed at establishing 'strong
bargaining relations'. Significantly, two continental managers recently
drafted into the Halewood plant, Albert Caspers and Jan Ubachs, had already
begun to encourage a constant dialogue with shop stewards, and over the
next few years the principles of 'El' were put into practice in earnest.
Frank Druinmond recalled the effect this had inside the Assembly plant:
Managers and supervisors started getting involved in actually
talking to the stewards. I suppose we began to court each other
a little bit. The attitude was 'this strike business is doing
us no good, we've got to change the image of Halewood and all
pull together. Let's not go back to the '60s and '70s when we
had to fight every day'.
As John Bohanna explained, a similar process took place
in the Body plant:
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The approach to people on the lines by management and
supervision became totally different. It didn't happen
overnight. But whenever a grievance arose that could
potentially lead to a stoppage the company would back-off
limitediately. The problem would run and people would talk about
it. The manager gave the steward the chance to talk to the
members on the section. It took the pressure off. The whole
atmosphere changed. Management would even go and chat to the
lads on the line - 'what's the problem, let's have a working
lunch'. The lads would go into the Conference room with IR, the
manager and a steward and there'd be pies and tea and sticky
buns. They'd get their dinner and they'd get paid for sitting
down and having a chat.
Halewood management adopted a variety of methods to
encourage both the leadership of the shop stewards' organisation and rank
and file workers to identify more closely with the problems confronting the
company, and hence accept the inescapability of the policies proposed by
management. Firstly, the Convenors' offices in both the Body and Assembly
plants were moved off the shopfloor and transferred to the personnel block
so they would be directly next to the plant managers' offices. Secondly,
many sectional stewards were granted 100 per cent time-off work and the
union provided with more extensive facilities such as typing and
duplicating provision, and a free supply of paper, pens and office
equipment. Thirdly, management held a series of video shows showing the
'state of the company' - of Ford Europe, UK and Halewood - screened first
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to the JWC's, then the shop stewards and finally to the workforce, aimed at
making them feel more responsible for the success of the company. Fourthly,
they introduced 'training progranines' that took workers off the lines in
small groups, walking them around the factory to show them how the car was
built from beginning to end - always involving the stewards with them.
Fifthly, they introduced 'joint action groups' composed of stewards and
managers in each area of the plant, meeting informally to discuss volume
and come up with agreed solutions to shopfloor problems. Sixthly, they
completely transformed all the tea areas, - brightening them up with
framed photographs, potted plants, etc - and made a number of improvements
to the plant environment - making it better lit and warmer. Seventhly, they
organised a major progranine of visits to the factory by workers' families
to encourage a wider sense of identity with the company.
Perhaps the most distinctive initiative was the financial
investment the company made into organising group trips abroad to other
Ford factories in Germany, Belgium and Spain. Two or three aircraft flew
from Liverpool Airport each week, with different groups of Halewood workers
accompanied by managers and shop stewards, on 36-hour round trips. Pbout
500 Halewood workers, with a delegation from every section of the plant,
participated in these visits abroad with the objective of encouraging an
improvement in the efficency and productivity of Halewood in line with the
continental plants. The advantages to be gained from management's point of
view were not lost on Barry Senior:
What they achieved was two-fold: it showed how they did it
abroad and it got them into contact - over dinner and a few
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drinks - with the managers. It formed relationships - and so
there was this forming of a bit of a bond.
Thus, a combination of material and ideological pressures
underlined the more cautious approach adopted by most stewards and rank and
file workers in the Halewood plant. Apart from the very high local rates of
unemployment in Merseyside and the ever apparent threat of closure, the
British trade union movement generally during this period was very much on
the defensive with the 'new realism' further reinforced by the Tory
government's defeat of the 1984-5 national miners' strike. In addition the
new co-operative relationship established between stewards and management
led to a substantial decline in stoppages of work and ended the constant
lay-offs and reduced weekly wage packets that had prevailed in the past.
Ray Storey outlined the demonstrable gains felt by many shopfloor workers.
Because of the sectional stoppages people were getting fed up
on the shopfloor. You didn't know whether you were going to be
laid off from one week to another. So there was unrest about
that and that's the way it was sold to the shopfloor. Getting a
regular wage packet every week was a sense of security. And
there was the feeling your job was safer from redundancy.
Discipline over 'welt' working was overlooked to a large extent
so people openly flouted that. And people saw that as a gain.
Also, they saw management were prepared to talk to them, so
there was less aggro, they were prepared to listen and consider
problems.
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The question arises how far did it represent an active
ideological embrace of managerial arguments of 'viability' and
'profitability' and acceptance of the logic of more flexible working
practices, as opposed to an organised tactical retreat forced on the
stewards because of the precarious situation they found themselves in but
with the eventual aim of recouping lost ground in the future? According to
John Bohanna, some shop stewards in the Body plant remained sceptical about
the company's friendly, outstretched 'poisoned handshake' strategy. They
interpreted it as a subtle attempt to incorporate the shopfloor union
organisation into management structures but with Ford as the major
beneficiary. But Ray Storey contrasted the attitudes of senior stewards
with sectional stewards in the Assembly plant:
The senior stewards accepted it hook, line and sinker. But
there was tension with some of the sectional stewards who felt
the senior stewards were accepting all kinds of things without
consulting them. But because they didn't have the counter-
arguments to challenge them they were gradually drawn more and
more into it. So it gradually seeped down. But I think
orginally they were dragged into it by the senior stewards and
Billy Naguire. when we had stoppages the argument that 'we're
all in the same boat and we've all got to work together' came
up. So it was gradually absorbed. As the pressure from the
shopfloor went away they were pulled more and more to embrace
it.
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A key problem was the lack of a coherent political
alternative from the Left stewards. Despite the differentiation between the
Body and Assembly plants and between the sectional stewards and senior
stewards it was essentially over the operational detail of the co-operative
relationship with management, over the speed of the changes to work
organisation rather than any disagreement in principle over the general
notions of 'competitiveness' and its inherent logic of change.
Halewood management viewed shop stewards throughout the
1980s as absolutely central to the process of achieving change and winning
the co-operation of the shopfloor, as Ray Storey acknowledged:
Management's 'backing-off' is a recognition that by involving
the steward in trying to sort Out problems, it's delivering the
goods. They think if they only spend the time explaining what
the changes entail and make the steward feel involved - he'll
understand the reasons and accept it.
The invariable rule is to 'talk first, second and last',
with disputes frequently settled through the involvement of senior
stewards. Terry Seagraves, a shop steward in the Body plant, explained:
Say there is a problem over an increase in line speeds. Before
management will let you down onto the floor to say to your
members 'right, let's go' they'll sit you down around the table
and get the senior steward in, the Convenor, as many people as
they can to argue a different line. They don't just allow you
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to go down there. They wouldn't increase the line speeds while
you're talking - in the old days they would have done that -
but they'll talk the dispute out. They say 'we would like to do
this' and we say 'But we've got these problems'. So the company
will try and address those problems but 75 per cent of the time
they get what they want. They're getting an awful lot without
conflict.
Not surprisingly, sectional stoppages of work - the
springboard of the shop stewards power - declined massively. According to
management figures, the number of strikes was reduced from an average of
about 75-100 in the late 1970s to about 12 by the late 1980s (5).
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Moreover, there is no doubt Halewood management's more
sophisticated approach to industrial relations succeeded in securing
acquiescence in substantial increases in productivity and output and
changes in working practices. For example, production of cars increased
from about 786 vehicles a day in 1982 to 1,100 in 1990 (7). Yet this
increase in output was achieved with a simultaneous 40 per cent reduction
in the number of jobs, as the workforce was cut by 4,000 during the 1980s
(8). Meanwhile, in 1985 Ford made an important breakthrough in securing the
agreeement of the NJNC to more flexible working practices within its
British plants. Although opposed by Halewood shop stewards and rejected in
a ballot vote of the membership, a far-reaching 2-year wages and conditions
agreement was implemented at local level. It drastically reduced the number
of job demarcations and workers were expected to be mobile around the
plant, to carry out a wider range of tasks including simple maintenance and
housekeeping of their workstations, and to have more responsibility for
quality control. As Ray Storey reflected:
Basically, they've got a more pliable, flexible workforce which
produces greater output in a shorter period of time and which
produces virtually continously".
Thus, by the late 1980s, the strong and independent shop
steward organisation, that had been prepared to give its backing to
militant unofficial workplace stoppages a decade earlier, had been
considerably weakened as the balance of bargaining power was pushed to
management's advantage. A general consequence of this development, which
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will be explored later on, is that the more conciliatory 'strong bargaining
relationship' established between stewards and management (particularly the
senior stewards) tended to routinise workplace trade unionism, demobilise
collective rank and file activity and undermine the vitality of steward
organisation.
* the late 1980s/early 1990s: potential ar 1 imitations
Although the shop stewards' power was considerably
undermined during the late 1980s this did not mean workplace union
organisation was impotent to forestall, influence or change developments.
A key factor ensuring the continued existence of shop stewards organisation
compelled to defend workers' collective interests was the fundamentally
antagonistic relationship that underlay the apparent picture of shopfloor
harmony. As Don Daunt, a white collar employee and Manufacturing Science
Finance senior steward in the Assembly plant, explained:
Arthur Rothwell, the Operations Manager, is certainly
unrecognisable from a few years ago. He was a very aggressive
man. It was as if he had a baseball bat in his hand which he
would beat you over the head with. Today he jokes that he's
still got it in his office, but it's on the wall in a glass
case. It's a bit tongue-in-cheek, but it's like a fire-alarm,
in case of emergency. That really is the mentality at Ford's.
They could change just like that. And we know it.
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In fact, there was also a continuing contradiction
between Ford's long-term goal of 'flnployee Involvement' and the short-term
necessity of asserting managerial prerogative. In other words, although the
basic relationship of conflict between management and shop stewards was
often submerged below the surface it did not disappear. From time to time
the 'big stick' or confrontational approach re-emerged in a variety of ways
and suggested the shop stewards' organisation was far from becoming
completely marginal to managerial concerns. For example, despite periodic
attempts, management were still not able to crack the shopfloor control
exercised over the movement of labour and manning of jobs based on
seniority. This remained a major source of grievance as workers defended a
hard-won unofficial 'custom and practice'. Likewise, stewards did not lose
control over overtime rotas and successfully defended informally
established 'early finish' practices. Equally, the company still faced an
incessant challenge to imposed work standards and unilaterally revised
timings of jobs and speed-up. In general, there was a mood of shopfloor
resentment towards management, although by and large this was not
translated into action as rank and file workers rarely had the confidence
to take matters into their own hands. But on occasions, the bitterness
boiled over into isolated sectional stoppages, for example in October 1989,
when a strike on the door-hanging section of the white lines over a health
and safety issue laid-off the entire Body plant for two days (for the first
time in five years) and forced management to make some concessions.
Significantly, half of the strikers were 'new starters', young lads who had
only recently been hired. Similarly, in the Assembly plant when 300 night-
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shift workers walked out over the introduction of new coiled airlines in
November 1990. Ray Storey related:
They wanted to introduce a curly compressed line on the new
model as opposed to the straight ones we used to have. There
was little difference between the two but people were annoyed
management had introduced them without consultation. The
section stopped straight away and the senior steward called a
meeting. He said there was no real reason management were
making the change except they thought they could get away with
it but then half heartedly said we should go back to work. He
was voted down two to one and we came out for two nights. It
ended in compromise with air lines that are part straight, part
curly.
Shopfloor resilience was also evident in a 2-week re-
grading strike by line-workers in both Body and Assembly plants in 1985.
Sporadic sectional stoppages against attacks on work standards coalesced
into a bitter explosion of anger at a national 2-year pay deal agreed
despite a massive vote of opposition from most UK Ford plants, including a
70 per cent ballot vote rejection at Halewood. As soon as it became
apparent that a widely anticipated extra pay allowance for line-workers was
not to be forthcoming a spontaneous rank and file revolt forced even the
senior stewards to give their blessing to a strike that effectively closed
down most of the Halewood operation. Even though the strike eventually
fizzled out without success it was an illustration that workplace trade
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unionism was still alive and kicking. Resistance was also evident when
management tried to introduce 'quality circles' into Halewood in 1985.
These 'problem solving' groups - involving meetings of supervision,
stewards and the workforce in each section of the plant - were aimed at
shifting the general emphasis away from the negotiation of change towards
more consultative methods (9). Their successful implementation in the
tJnited States encouraged Ford to adopt the experiment within its UK plants
and a management consultancy firm, W.P. Dolan and Associates, was brought
into the Halewood plant to oversee their introduction (10). Yet with
official TGWU support, the stewards successfuly blocked the attempt to
introduce 'quality circles' in Halewood, as they threatened to bypass the
formal channels of shopfloor union representation.
Another example of shopfloor belligerency was provided by
the national Ford pay strike of 1988 - the first in over a decade - that
was spearheaded by unofficial walk-outs from Halewood in protest at a
proposed 3-year agreement that provided for more flexible working
practices. Ray Storey related what happened when the company's offer was
discussed on the trim lines in the Assembly plant:
We held a meeting on my section. Everyone wanted to do
something. The meeting only lasted about 30 seconds. The
steward told us the offer; he said 'It's crap' and called a
stoppage, and we were out.
Frank Druninond added:
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We've not been beaten into submission. Nothing's beaten. It's
very, very subtle now and the methods have changed. But the
strike proved that Ford mis-read the situation. They really
believed the shopfloor would just about accept anything - but
they've been proved wrong. The stewards were totally opposed to
what the company were asking. We went to mass meetings and had
two secret ballots. 87 per cent voted for strike action. The
men knew how much they had given the company and how much they
had turned it around and they knew what they were being offered
was nowhere what they had achieved for the company.
A number of different elements appear to have combined to
create a sudden revival of militant struggle within the plant. Firstly,
there was the general feeling that Ford workers had taken enough;
flexibility and speed-up had led to a worsening of condition and the insult
of a new pay deal that 'asked for their souls' but gave little back in
return provoked a groundswell of bitterness. Secondly, there was the impact
of the limited economic recovery on many workers' attitudes. The fall of
unemployment nationally by 550,000 from its peak in 1986 was reflected in
Halewood by the ending of the recruitment freeze imposed in 1979 and the
taking on of new workers in different sections across the plants. The
message that many workers had accepted for years, that any struggle over
wages or conditions would threaten jobs, suddenly lost a lot of its
credibility. Workers felt a change in the strength of their bargaining
power. It was not too surprising therefore, that along with booming company
profits and high rates of productivity growth, the decline in unemployment
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gave Ford workers both the ability and motivation to ask for more. The
strike exposed the vulnerability of Ford's highly integrated European 'just
in time' single-sourcing operation, which left virtually no room for
alternative production sources or the storage of strategic stocks,
resulting in lay-offs at the Genk plant in Belgium. Ford UK executives
backed down from their original hard-hitting demands and the revised deal
increased pay above the level of inflation, reduced the length of the
agreement to 2 years and conceded that new working practices could not be
imposed without local plant agreement.
But despite these sparks of resistance it is important to
note the limitations to the durability of shop steward organisation inside
the Halewood plant. Certainly, the accommodative relationship established
between stewards and management continued to be a pervasive feature of
developments throughout the late 1980s and early 1990s. For example, the
1988 pay strike did not really change the terms of this relationship with
Halewood management. It was perceived as being a dispute with the Ford
Motor Company nationally, rather than with local Halewood management. It
neither upset the co-operative relationship with management nor fed any
greater confidence on the shopfloor to use strike action to fight over day-
to-day issues. As John Bohanna related:
It was though it was a weekend turn-over. The cosy relationship
with management was maintained throughout the strike, in as
much as management provided the pickets with a caravan and the
stewards allowed certain people to go in and move things
around. There was picketing but the senior stewards still went
Page 290
Ford: Stewards' Relationship To Management: The 1980s
on discussing things with management as if it was just normal
business. Although nothing was being produced the strike didn't
interrupt normal relationships.
Another example of this sustained co-operative
relationship occured just before the 3-week plant suirmer shut-down in 1989.
Ford had launched a £600 million 4 year investment programme in Halewood,
in preparation for the launch of a new Escort model, and major
reconstruction work had begun on re-tooling the plant with the latest new
technology and production systems, particularly in the Body plant. But
Ford's re-organisation plans were suddenly threatened when the 200 sub-
contract electricians fitting the new machinery banned overtime in
pursuance of a wage claim with their employers. Unfortunately, TGWU
officials and senior stewards jumped to Ford's defence by demanding the
electricians call off their dispute to allow the work to proceed. John
Bohanna explained:
The attitude of Ritchie Rollins [Convenor in the Assembly
plant] was that the electricians were holding us to ransom.
Delaying the introduction of the new technology meant we could
be laid-off without pay because it would be behind schedule. So
it was a threat to T and G workers. He told the electricians
they were no more than 'industrial gypsies'. He said they were
all right, they move on, but their action would threaten our
livelihoods.
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Even more damaging was the stance adopted by the Halewood
steward committees towards a strike by the plant's 600 AUEW and EEIPU
skilled maintenance workers in February 1990. Although Ford's TGWIJ
production workers had narrowly voted to accept a new national 2-year pay
deal the craftsmen at Halewood (and other plants across the country) walked
out on strike in protest at the strings attached to the deal, in the
process laying-off both Body and Assembly plants. Many TGWU senior
stewards, echoing the arguments from full-time union officials, condemned
the strike for being divisive and involving a minority trying to dictate to
the majority. Ray Storey recalled:
From the start Ritchie Rollins saw the strike as holding us to
ransom. His argument was 'The tail can't wag the dog, that's
golden rule number one.'
Such sentiments were backed up by many other stewards who
were suspicious of the involvement of the EFTPLT in the dispute, a union
that had been recently expelled from the TUC for its 'business unionism'.
Yet in reality, the craftsmen were fighting against strings that would
allow Ford to introduce more differentials and changes in working practices
that would see them lose skills and jobs. A craftsmen's victory would have
benefited all groups of workers in the plant.
By opposing the strike the TGWEJ stewards only played into
the hands of management and the right-wing leaders of the EFTPU. when
contract workers installing the new technology in the plant refused to
cross craftsmen's picket lines during the fifth week of the strike Halewood
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management approached the TGWU stewards for help in securing an iriinediate
return to work, threatening further lay-offs if re-equipping of the plant
was delayed. Although the TGWTJ senior stewards held numerous meetings with
the craftsmen they were unable to convince them to end the dispute.
Finally, management took the initiative and asked the TGW[J to break the
strike by crossing picket lines. The stewards' committees in both Body and
Assembly plants agreed and called mass meetings to recommend their members
to report to work as normal. Their action effectively broke the back of the
strike. Ray Storey related:
Some of the stewards even organised a counter-picket to the
craftsmen. The craftsmen were saying 'Don't go in' and the T
and G were saying 'Go in'. A craftsmen called somebody a scab
and a T and G steward said 'You're the ones who are always
scabbing on us' - which is true in terms of the history of the
plant.
Yet it was the first time in the Halewood plant's
history that production workers had themselves scabbed on a strike, albeit
on another union, setting a dangerous precedent for the future. Advising
their members to cross picket lines could only make scabbing appear
respectable and serve to divide and weaken shopfloor union organisation by
making it easier for Ford to push through attacks on one section of workers
after another. It was a reflection of the atrophy of workplace union
organisation that had occurred during the 1980s.
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Further challenges have confronted steward organisation
during the early 1990s. There is Ford's increasingly fierce battle to
remain competitive with Japanese car makers Nissan, Honda and Toyota and
with the increased competition caused by the 1992 single European market,
as well as the recession in the car industry - with cars sales pluniiieting
in Britain amidst a new economic crisis similar to the early 1980s - which
led to a dramatic slump in Ford's worldwide profits and accelerated the
process of restructuring, with 600 jobs lost in Halewood in 1990 and a
further 1,000 to be phased out during 1991 through voluntary redundancy,
early retirement and natural wastage. Throughout 1991 the plant was on a
four-day or three-day production week and Ford UK executives held crisis
talks with full-time union officials and Halewood stewards to renew threats
to close the plant unless its closed the gap with its competitors.
Unfortunately, senior stewards reacted to the announcement of 1,000
redundancies much in the style of the early 1980s, with factory bulletins
urging workers to co-operate with the company:
We should all realise that we have to do the best we can, in
our work, our quality and our performance, as these things
provide us with the most protection and help the company to
sell more cars. We at Halewood are all in the same boat. We all
need to pull together
The challenge of a re-designed integrated production
system with its demands for wider flexibility, team working and the erosion
of traditional demarcation lines separating production from maintenance
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workers, unskilled from skilled workers and blue-collar from white-collar
workers, will pose new problems and opportunities for steward organisation.
Management will be keen to introduce even more efficency changes, including
'bell to bell' working - getting rid of washing up time or finishing early
if the job is done, the right to retime jobs without union agreement, job
progression on merit - ending the policy whereby the longest serving
workers take the most senior jobs, and the abolition of fixed mealtimes and
teabreaks. At the heart of the problem will be management's attempt to by-
pass the channels of shop steward organisation by corrmunicating directly
with the rank and file members on the shopfloor and to create 'group
leaders' on the shopfloor, paid £20-25 extra weekly to take on a
supervisory role and become the pivot of workers' problems. At the time of
writing that was still something which was by no means unproblematic. As
Terry Seagraves explained:
There has been a change of attitude at Halewood - it's more co-
operative now because the face of management has changed to the
people on the shopfloor - but the underlying strength of the
steward organisation is still there. People still look towards
their steward to represent them even when the company tries to
get a group of people together. That is a fundamental thing
that the lads do insist on whatever the problem is. The company
haven't been able to bang that out of people's heads.
Ultimately, the key factor determining the regeneration
of a powerful and independent shop steward organisation inside the
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Merseyside plant will be the pressure from below and the level of struggle.
It was only through numerous sectional struggles that the collective
strength of the shop stewards organisation of the 1960s and 1970s was built
in Halewood. But success will also be dependent upon the rise of a new
layer of union and political militants to the stewards' leadership, capable
of arguing with their fellow workers and showing them in practice that they
can carry the struggle forward irrespective of notions of 'profitability'
and 'efficiency'.
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STEWARDS' RELATIONSHIP 1) RANK AND FILE MJ24BF1S: 1970s AND 80s
* the 1970s: activity arxl accountability
During the 1970s 'years of militancy' there were
virtually daily stoppages of work within Halewood. Frank Drunond recalled:
'The quote was "If you brought your sandwiches to work you were an
optimist" '. The reason for the high level of strikes was primarily the
'big stick' approach adopted by Halewood management. Terry Seagraves
related the situation in the Body plant:
It was a militant shopfloor in those days, very militant in
some cases. But justifiably so because of the way we were being
treated. We had a dog of a management. On the white lines area
we had three dog-rough people, a senior foreman, a
superintendent and a manager. It was 'effing and blinding every
time they went onto the floor and they got the same reaction
from the labour.
John Bohanna remembered the way new, young shop stewards
were encouraged by their more experienced, battle-hardened colleagues:
The first thing we were told is you've got to have a blazing
row with the foreman in front of all your workmates on the
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shopfloor - and be seen to stand your ground, no matter how
weak the foreman is. Don't have any mercy - just go for him.
You've got to be seen battling things through, winning
disputes.
Even though many disputes were actually started through
the initiative of rank and file members the shop steward always had to be
seen giving a lead:
Some of the arguments we used then just wouldn't stand up
today. We were finding arguments for absolutely anything at
all. If a man asked for a sub of his wages and the company
refused his mates on the line would iriediately stop work. If a
person was disciplined and given a verbal warning there would
be a strike. The stoppages of work were regular and if the
steward didn't lead the strike he would be open to question. He
had to be seen up front having a go. Even when the senior
steward advised the steward on the section to back down on the
issue he usually couldn't afford to, because he wouldn't have
been a steward much longer. The section was very confident,
they had the power and they used it.
Although management did not allow section meetings during
works time, rank and file workers often forced them to allow a meeting when
a dispute arose, so the steward could report back on the progress of
negotiations. Certainly, it was a period of great advancement for shopfloor
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workers at Halewood in terms of the controls over the job that were fought
for and established, particularly over the speed of the lines, the movement
of labour, job timings, manning and discipline. As Terry Seagraves
commented:
The shopfloor instilled confidence into the shop stewards and
the stewards knew they could rely on the shopfloor at the drop
of a hat over certain issues.
This picture of a highly confident, active and militant
rank and file constantly pushing the 'frontier of control' in their favour
was confirmed by management representative Barry Senior:
Many of the stewards were just manipulated by their members on
the floor. Some of whom were just mischievous in some of the
things they did. I mean really mischievous. They were
disruptive just for the sake of stopping the line and having a
blow. There was no real control by the senior stewards.
Throughout 1970s there was a massive influx of labour as
the number of workers in the plant reached its peak of 14,000 in 1978. Many
of those employed brought with them their experience of trade unionism from
different workplaces across Merseyside and were keen to establish counter-
controls to managerial authority. The close scrutiny of stewards'
activities placed them under a direct form of democratic accountability in
which the challenge of alternative ideas and personalities was a constant
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feature. Stewards' positions were invariably contested at election time by
more than one candidate and there was a relatively high turnover of
personnel; union records in the Body plant indicate the sectional stewards'
tenure of office averaged only 4-5 years, although it was longer for senior
stewards. As Terry Seagraves explained:
In the white line area there was a high turnover of stewards.
There was 2 stewards for about 300 men and there was that many
different issues going on - mainly timings, work methods,
mobility of labour - that if a steward let down on a certain
issue he'd get challenged. He'd see his term of office out but
inevitably he'd face a challenge, particularly in the high-
profile areas like the moving lines.
Sectional stewards often found themselves having to walk
the tightrope between working on the job and representing their members
interests, under twin pressures from both management and rank and file
workers. On the one hand, Ford's reluctance to let stewards off the job to
negotiate often provoked stoppages of work, although management were also
under pressure to grant stewards facility time so that they could help
resolve disputes quickly. On the other hand, while rank and file workers
recognised the need for their steward to have time-off work to represent
them they also often complained when they felt they were spending too much
time in the Convenor's office. As a result, many stewards tried to stay on
the job for at least some of the time by having reliefs or working on a
'Micky Mouse' job which they could get away from without too much
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disruption. As John Bohanna explained: 'It was amazing. It meant you had to
be seen to be working alongside people, to be there on the job, and not be
there at the same time, if you were going to be able to represent them
properly'.
Of course, it is also necessary to take account of the
rather problematical (non-strategic, vulnerable, volatile and
contradictory) features of rank and file workers' self-activity in relation
to which, and even against which, shop steward leadership operated.
Certainly, it would be mistaken to picture all the stewards in Halewood
during the 1970s as 'militants'. Ritchie O'Connell explained the situation
inside the Assembly plant:
We were always the ones accused of causing strikes but it
wasn't true. I'd say 99 times out of 100 it was the steward who
was trying to dampen things down, to resolve the dispute. We
would find ourselves the lads in the middle - on one side, we
would have the 'macho-managers' and on the other side we had
our undisciplined members - and we were in the middle,
constantly dealing with the lads, trying to get them back to
work and resolve the problem that way.
Frank Drummond agreed:
Quite a lot of times people went home against the advice of the
shop stewards. They probably got carried away with the euphoria
of how to win things. On some occasions it became quite
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indisciplined, silly strikes that should never have taken
place. The stewards weren't always in control of the shopfloor.
Often stewards felt obliged to support their members even
though they acted against their advice. Nonetheless, evidence of the
stewards' willingness to get disputes settled as quickly as possible was
confirmed by their adoption of the 'one hour notice' in the late 1970s. A
stoppage of work by a handful of workers often led to thousands being laid-
off elsewhere in the plant, which in turn threatened lay-offs in the
adjoining plant. Although the grievance could potentially have been settled
within the space of an hour or two - before lay-offs occurred - striking
workers on occasion did not wait for the steward; they just walked out of
the plant and went home. As John Bohanna explained: 'This blew the
company's brains. They couldn't do anything if people weren't there - there
was no way of resolving the situation'. Yet in the late 1970s, the stewards
agreed to a 'one hour notice' which gave the company an 'eleventh hour'
during which people waited after a stoppage of work to see if it could be
resolved before they left the plant.
The role of the senior stewards was rather more complex.
Both the Convenors in the Body and Assembly plants were on a permanent day-
shift and were provided by management with an office and paid to be the
full-time union representatives in the plant. Spending much of their time
in negotiations with plant management or monitoring the activities of the
stewards body they were generally less visible to rank and file members,
although they were intimately involved with day-to-day affairs on the
shopfloor. Similarly, most senior stewards on the Joint Works Corrniittee did
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not even have a nominal job on the shopfloor - enjoying 100 per cent time-
off work to conduct union business - although unlike the Convenors they
followed the alternating shift patterns of their members. But, whilst the
responsibility of their position often encouraged them to take a rather
more cautious attitude towards the constant stoppages that flared up they
also had to balance this with the pressure from constituents in their own
sections.
Ford's corporate long-term strategy of incorporation of
the Convenors and senior stewards did gradually succeed in formalising
procedures within the Body and Assembly plants and creating a slightly more
stable framework within which workplace industrial relations could be
conducted. Certainly, there was a concentration of decision making within
the top tier of senior stewards, with a tendency for JWC members to
negotiate all the major issues in the plant while the sectional stewards
merely administered within the boundaries already laid down. The formation
of a militant rank and file 'Combine' grouping during the 1978 national pay
strike was an indication of the disquiet felt by some shopfloor union
activists at these developments. It was an insidious process of integration
whose full negative effects would only be sharply revealed during the
1980s. But during the 1970s, a period of constant workplace struggle, there
was little basis for any deep seated or long term accoriinodation between
stewards and management, which ensured the relationship between senior
stewards and sectional stewards and between the stewards' bodies as a whole
and the rank and file were kept relatively accountable. Certainly, the
major stoppages in Halewood in 1971, 1977, 1978, 1982 and 1983, as well as
many other disputes, organised and led by the Body and Assembly plant
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steward comittees', provided evidence of their dynamic and firmly based
relationship with shopfloor members.
A specific illustration of this relationship was the
adoption in 1974 of the 'one-out, all-out' policy towards lay-offs caused
by sectional disputes. The shop stewards took the view that if a group of
workers in one part of the plant were laid-off because of a dispute
elsewhere in the plant there should be an all-out strike. Of course, in
practice the policy was only applied sparingly - for example, between six
to ten times a year across both plants - usually over issues of discipline
and the suspension of rank and file members. Its threatened use was usually
enough to force management to back down over particular issues. But it was
a powerful bargaining lever that successfully handicapped managerial
attempts to 'mould' stewards into their way of operating. In other words,
although the shop steward committees' retained a degree of autonomy from
the shopfloor, the constant shopfloor struggles ensured they did not become
too isolated from the practical needs of their members.
The TGWJ Ford Halewood branch linked the stewards day-to-
day activities on the shopfloor with the wider activities of trade
unionism. The branch met monthly and was attended by about 80 people -
including a number of stewards - although depending on the issues being
discussed there could be a few hundred in attendance. Significantly, the
branch comittee was always dominated by stewards from the Assembly plant,
where TGWU organisation was more long-standing. In addition, possibly
because of the different nature of work and shift systems that operated,
the majority of union members attending branch meetings tended to be from
the Assembly plant. As Beynon emphasises branch meetings were a key forum
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for debate and argument over the strategy adoped by both steward
committees, which in theory were subordinate to branch decisions, and a
number of young rank and file workers became active in its affairs, often
acting as key 'opinion leaders' back on the shopfloor. But the most
important arena for contact between the stewards and the members was the
shopfloor. Throughout the 1970s section, shift and mass meetings of the
full plant membership were a regular occurrence and were called in the
event of a dispute or stoppage of work, particularly when lay-offs were
imminent. But meetings were also held merely for information purposes, to
allow the stewards committees to relay news of ongoing negotiations,
posibly as a prelude to action in the future. Leaflets produced by the
stewards committees and handed out on the sections were also a common
feature of the relationship between stewards and members.
Beynon's study (1984. p189-211) drew attention to the way
shopfloor activism differentiated stewards from the mass of their members.
Involvement in day-to-day struggles and contact with events across the
plant created within both shop stewards' committees a more radical critique
of management than existed generally within the factory. My own research
confirmed this picture. Even if some senior stewards, occupying central
organisational roles within the plant, on occasions opposed strikes, their
representation of rank and file grievances in face of managerial
intransigence tended to encourage a more political orientation to workplace
industrial relations. Not that, as we have seen, in the majority of cases
this translated itself into much more than a 'factory class consciousness'.
Big Flame, a revolutionary socialist newspaper appeared in 1970, produced
by students with help from a handful of 1-ralewood workers. The International
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Socialists (forerunners of the Socialist Workers Party) built a factory
branch of about a dozen supporters in 1974-5. But the Labour Party was the
most influential political organisation amongst the stewards. Yet the vast
majority of stewards were not affiliated to any political organisation.
Even so, in formal political terms, the stewards were, by and large, to the
left of their rank and file members. But their close contact with the
members and willingness to mobilise rank and file activity in the face of
management instransigence meant the gap between leaders and led was
relatively narrow, particularly in comparison with the 1980s.
* the 1980s: passivity and lxireaucracy
The 'strong bargaining relationship' established with
management during the 1980s had an important impact on stewards'
relationship to rank and file members. The abandonment in 1983 of the 'one-
out, all-out' policy in favour of 'talking out' disputes, was a reflection
of this change. Instead of attempting to link together the unco-ordinated
sectional stoppages of work that constantly broke out across the plants -
many of which threatened lay-offs - into unified action against management,
the senior stewards effectively agreed to isolate and neutralise their
impact by adopting a more conciliatory approach towards lay-offs. Many rank
and file workers, frustrated at lost earnings and the uncertainty of their
long-term job prospects, welcomed the stewards' new agreement on the basis
that it was 'better to lose a few hours production than a whole day'. But
in the long-term it had the effect of undermining the strength of shopfloor
union organisation, as Ray Storey indicated:
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Its a lot harder now to get a sectional stoppage because you
don't feel as confident as a few years ago. With the 'one-out,
all-out' it gave sections protection, it gave them a lot of
power because a dispute could lay the whole plant off within a
matter of hours. But the stewards accepted a new selective lay-
off agreement under which management try to keep the rest of
the plant working for up to three days. It's reduced the
sectional power of the shopfloor. It's made them feel more
isolated because they have virtually no protection now.
Another reflection of the changed relationship between
stewards and members during the 1980s, was the massive decline in the
number of sectional stoppages, partly because the pressure from below was
less forceful and partly because stewards intervened to pre-empt threatened
action. Furthermore, with the introduction of new technology leading to
thousands of voluntary redundancies, the average age of the workforce in
Halewood generally became much older than previously - because it tended to
be the younger workers who took the money - with the average age rising to
about 40. Many shopfloor workers, with family responsibilties and teenage
children, became heavily dependent on a regular weekly wage packet. Ray
Storey recalled the transformation in the Assembly plant:
There were almost daily stoppages when I first started at Ford.
Lines would be stopped for half an hour or an hour - there used
to be loads of gaps on the line because of the shortage of car
bodies. But today you rarely get a gap on the line from 8
Page 307
Ford: Stewards' Relationship To Rank And File Members: The 1970s/80s
o'clock in the morning until quarter to five. It's almost
continuous production now...The stewards are quite pleased with
that. They've patted themselves on the back saying 'We've kept
you in and saved you money'. 10 years ago the stewards' role
was trying to resolve disputes - except there were a lot more
disputes and they were under much more pressure to solve them
satisfactorily to the rank and file. Disputes could get out of
their hands very quickly whereas today the stewards are much
more in control.
What disputes did occur became more institutionalised and
procedures more formal, with the senior stewards involved at an early stage
whenever the threat of strike action arose on a section. The attitude of
compromise - to change the image of Halewood as a strikebound plant -
predominated. The constant phrase used was 'we've got to keep our ammo
dry'. Barry Senior confirmed the stewards' change of attitude by the early
1990s:
The stewards realise now they can't win everything. They
realise that you just can't stop the plant over a small minor
sectional issue. Before they get themselves into a situation of
stopping the job they consult more widely with the senior
stewards. They think to themselves what will be the consequence
of stopping the plant? What will it do in terms of politically
embarrassing our national trade union officials? Or when the
vice-president of manufacturing gets onto them and say's 'what
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the hell are you people doing at Halewood?'... Sorts of
consideration they wouldn't have cared about in the past.
An extreme example of such constraint occurred in the
Body plant in 1987, when 10 line workers with a grievance over work
arrangements met with their steward and decided to take strike action for
the rest of the shift and return to work the next day. According to John
Bohanna:
When the Operations Manager found out he hit the roof, he went
beserk. 'It's the end of Halewood'. The massive pressure of
competition means that the company can't afford to be seen
allowing strikes to take place, they have to be stopped. So
they sent out a car with a senior steward and an IR manager to
visit each individual's house to get everybody back to work.
They knocked on people's doors and said the trade unions had
agreed to call the strike off. Most lads did go back but they
were bloody upset. It was unbelievable, something I would never
have dreamt could happen.
Meanwhile, the isolation of the Left became pronounced
during the late 1980s. For example, in the Assembly plant, the Convenor's
position, occupied between 1970-87 by Billy Naguire, a middle of the road
Labour Party member, was filled by Ritchie Rollins, who with the deputy
Convenor, Jack Jones, was a hard-line 'Kinnockite' supporter. A number of
other stewards who were members of the Labour Party were critical of
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Kinnock's right-wing leadership but believed the only way to change things
was to get a Labour government elected; until then, all that could be done
was damage limitation, making sure not to 'rock the boat' and jeopardise an
electoral victory. The Left on the stewards committee was marginal and not
organised. There was Tony Jones, a Labour councillor sacked for taking too
much time off work; Alan Dean, who took 3 years' leave of absence to become
deputy leader of Liverpool Council, spearheading the enforced redundancies
of council workers during 1991; and Ray Storey, the single member of the
Socialist Workers Party in the plant, who held a steward's card between
1988-1990. Inside the Body plant, the Left was in a more prominent position
with both John Bohanna and Terry Seagraves as long-serving senior stewards,
but no more influential.
The impact of the ideas of 'new realism' within the trade
union movement became evident, with many stewards accepting management's
view that Ilalewood had to be made more competitive in order to have a
future. Ray Storey related an argument that occured at a TGWEJ branch
meeting attended by stewards and shopfloor activists, many of whom were
Labour Party supporters:
We talked about the lines being speeded up. The stewards were
saying this is a good thing, we're building more cars at
Halewood, it means Ford are unlikely to close the plant. When I
said, 'Well I work on the line and I don't think it's a good
thing the line speeds are going up - we 're working hard enough
already as it is' - I was just ridiculed. They said 'Don't
expect Ford to produce cars and not make a profit.' And I said
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'Well, that's their philosophy, but it shouldn't be ours.
Anyway profits don't guarantee jobs, they haven't stopped the
head count going down at Halewood.' But that's what the
stewards lack - any wider, general politics that provide
counter-arguments to those of management.
Although stewards might have wanted to put up a fight
against management their ideological acceptance of notions of
'competitiveness' and 'viability' restricted their ability to fight back in
practice and led them, on occasion, to act in conflict with the interests
of their members. An example of this occured in the Body plant in 1989.
John Bohanna takes up the story:
There was a safety problem with people working on rickety
boards and demanding they be replaced. They waited 5 weeks.
That is a sign of the co-operation, in the past that would
never have happened, people would have stopped work and
demanded it be fixed there and then. But what happened was that
the lads wanted to stop work demanding this thing get fixed. So
there was a meeting of the stewards and the steward for the
section (who is also the deputy Convenor) Ratigan, said 'No,
management have promised the work will be done over the
weekend'. His attitude was the members' behaviour was a
disgrace. The company did start correcting it over the weekend
but on the Monday night the shift just walked out because it
hadn't been done properly. Ratigan never came in on the Monday
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night because he knew what would happen and he's brillant at
surviving like that. Everyone was back the next night because
the company worked like thunder to get the flooring right. But
when Ratigan met the section on the Tuesday night he maintained
they'd been right out of order.
A number of other factors worked to undermine the close
relationship between stewards and rank and file uiettthers. Be.c.auae. tb.
constant influx of new people into Halewood had ceased and the number of
stoppages had declined the constant challenges to the stewards' position
from the shopfloor also evaporated. John Bohanna related the situation
inside the Body plant:
By and large, stewards stay in the position for a much longer
time now than they used to in the past. Most stewards have been
in the job for about 10 years and have worked for the company
for 15-20 years. On my particular shift there are 14 stewards.
Excluding 2 that have just come in - the last newly elected
steward was in 1977. 80 per cent of the stewards have remained
the same as those who came in during the mid-1970s... There's
been a slow stagnation of the same faces.
Gordon Cook reflected on the significance of this
'stagnation' for management-steward relations inside the Assembly plant:
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The average age of the stewards has increased, they're all
about 40-odd now. Ritchie Rollins, the Convenor, is 50. He's
been a shop steward for 18 years. The deputy Convenor, Jack
Jones, became a steward about the same time. We've got a number
who've been stewards a long time and their whole attitude has
changed. Certainly, the ageing factor has changed everybody.
We've all grown older, maturer, mellower, more experienced.
Beynon's study emphasied the pivotal role of long-
standing and experienced senior stewards in Halewood, by quoting one
worker:
It was a bit like the Borgias. They had so much experience you
couldn't tell them anything. If you went over with a complaint
'this is wrong, that's wrong' they always had the answer. It
was impossible to oppose them really. If you tried, they'd cut
your head off. (1984. p350)
My own study confirmed the type of tension between
stewards and rank and file members described here. But as Ray Storey
explained, the differentiation was not necessarily resolved by the removal
of the steward:
I'd say the members are to the left of the stewards in the
sense that they have to bear the brunt of what management are
doing and the stewards don't work on the line. The restraint
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and moderation is something that comes from the steward to the
members rather than the other way round... The members don't
challenge the stewards more, because although they attack them
- 'you're not doing this, you're not doing that' - they don't
have the confidence they could do the job themselves. I became
a steward in 1988 but most have been in for 10-15 years. The
only reason I was elected was because the previous steward had
to resign.
Meanwhile, many stewards spent much less time on the
shopfloor with their members than in the past. Senior stewards tended to
spend over 50 per cent of their time in regular contact with personnel and
plant management; meetings at which managers usually told stewards about
the company's problems and their plans for overcoming them. In the Assembly
plant, even sectional stewards were on 100 per cent time off work (and did
not wear blue overalls like their rank and file union members on the
shopfloor) and tended to spend a disproportionate amount of their time in
the union office with other stewards. Only in the Body plant, did some
stewards still work on the line, for example working alternate one-hour
shifts with a workmate who covered for them when they were on union
business. Generally however, stewards' accountability was under less direct
scrutiny than in the past and it was this which allowed stewards a wider
freedom to act more independently and bureaucratically.
The decline of sectional or mass meetings took away an
important forum for democratic debate and decision making. Rank and file
members only received scant information about shop steward decisions and
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activities. Even bulletins were few and far between. Senior stewards
negotiated changes with plant management, often only informing the rest of
the stewards' body after the event, leaving the onus on individual stewards
to comunicate with their members, most of whom were left in the dark. It
helped to foster a passive membership and the more the stewards became
linked to management in a 'strong bargaining relationship' the more distant
they became from the workers they represented on the shopfloor.
Nonetheless, there were also important counter-pressures
and informal workplace sanctions to those acting solely to bureaucratise
shop stewards. Every steward was still compelled to go down on the line to
deal with issues on a daily basis - meaning they were in frequent dialogue
with their members and judged by their ability to satisfactorily resolve
issues. As John Bohanna pointed out:
At the end of the day you're only as good as your last job. You
can be a brilliant steward, give people eveything, but the next
day when they turn you get the shock of your life.
An example of the rank and file 'turning' was the 1985
line-workers' re-grading strike. For the previous two years senior stewards
had successfully acted like firemen by pouring cold water over the sporadic
sectional stoppages that threatened to puncture the co-operative
relationship established with management in the plant. As Ray Storey
remarked:
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Dispute after dispute was lost - because of the role of the
senior stewards. People started to think 'what's going on, we
aren't winning anything at the moment'. Even though sectional
stewards had given their backing to these stoppages the senior
stewards managed to sit on them by giving an assurance that
line-workers would be re-graded as part of the national pay
agreement that was being negotiated by national officials.
In fact, although national union leaders had encouraged
them to believe that re-grading was on the cards, no such agreement was
ever signed, and when news reached the shopfloor that line-workers would
not receive any extra allowance the vast majority of workers in the
Assembly plant angrily walked out on strike. The strike began while the
Halewood Convenors and senior stewards were away in London at NJNC
negotiations on the pay deal. They rushed back to Liverpool to deal with
the situation. Yet significantly, because even senior stewards are also
sectional stewards this 2-week spontaneous rank and file strike forced them
to completely swing around in favour of militant action against the
company, even in defiance of the official national union leadership. Ray
Storey observed:
We had a mass meeting in the Firpire Theatre and there was a
demand from the floor for all the stewards to get up on the
platform and say where they stood on the strike. One by one
they were forced to get up. Even the senior stewards made it
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clear they were for a continuation of the strike. It showed
they're still responsive to the shopfloor.
The 1988 national pay strike - spearheaded by Halewood
workers - underlined this continuing responsiveness of the stewards'
leadership. Again, the initiative for the strike came from below, from rank
and file members. But it successfully forced the shop stewards to take the
lead in organising a major strike - again in defiance of the national union
leadership. It is clear that the fact that the members 'turning' remains a
continuing possibility represents an important safeguard against the
entrenchment of a permanent and invulnerable bureaucracy amongst the shop
stewards. Even if management has been able to get away with many things it
wanted they have still been obliged to take steward organisation seriously,
essentially because there was still pressure from the shopfloor and they
knew that if they introduced changes without stewards' agreement there was
always the threat of a disruption to production.
But the atrophy of steward organisation generally during
the 1980s proved a major handicap to a re-invigoration of the relationship
between stewards and members. 1hilst the stewards held together union
organisation through a difficult period during which most members were
relatively passive they tended to lose confidence in their ability to lead
battles within their own sections and could often be more conservative than
the members they represented. Another problem was the way Left stewards in
the Body plant made the mistake of attempting to split the Ford Halewood
TGWtJ branch, looking for short-cuts to the necessary task of rebuilding
shopfloor strength to fight management.
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Traditionally, the branch was dominated by stewards from
the Assembly plant, with Ritchie Rollins and the senior stewards holding
the majority of branch committee positions. Not surprisingly, the policy of
co-operation with management adopted in the early 1980s was reflected in
the 'moderate' stance taken at union branch meetings. Attendance dwindled
to about 30-35 members. The handful of Left stewards from the Body plant
became increasingly frustrated. When they attempted to open up a discussion
at branch meetings with a view to offering support for strikes that
occurred in the Assembly plant they were told it was 'shop stewards' not
branch business' and blocked from being involved. The picture was not much
better on general political issues. In response, during the late 1980s the
Left collected 38 signatures from the 44-strong Body plant stewards'
committee in favour of having their own separate TGWU branch, receiving the
backing of left-wing full-time union officials and eventually after 3
years' wrangling, securing a ballot of the Body plant's union membership on
the issue. It was a bad tactical mistake, diverting the energies of the
militants down a blind alley. Even the Left in the Assembly plant opposed
the plan, as Ray Storey explained:
My argument was that if you don't think the branch is doing
what you want then you have to operate within it to change it.
I don' t think John Bohanna and some of the people arguing for
splitting the branch had done that, some of them hadn't even
attended the branch meetings. There's no reason the PTA should
control the branch, it's just that they've been more successful
at getting people to meetings. If they had split the branch
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they'd probably have got the same right-wing control growing up
within it anyway...They accused the right wing of using
bureaucratic rnaneouvres to get their way but they adopted the
same tactic - they wrote to regional officials to help them,
they relied on the official machine. The PTA stewards thought
the regional officials supported splitting the branch so they
could build their own little power base, because they resented
the power the Ford TGWU branch has and wanted to cut it down to
size and control it.
Not surprisingly, not only did the right-wing Assembly
plant senior stewards campaign against the split - distributing leaflets to
the Body plant's workforce prior to the ballot through the auspices of the
branch corrmittee - but they were also able to convincingly, and with some
justification, pose as the defenders of unity and strength:
Brothers, you have your own branch, the one you're in now and
you should defend and support it by voting YES in this vote.
Ask yourself why this ballot is going on. Ask yourself who
stands to gain. Ask yourself why outside influences are
involved. Ask yourself why only part of your branch is getting
a vote. Two different branches of the TGWtJ members could easily
carry different policies on wage claims of site importance
causing major disputes and unnecessary demarcation and
friction. Ask yourself why local and senior officers are
working so hard to split your branch. The reality is that
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certain people want to politicise your branch. Because they
have been unsuccessful they seek a split by conning people to
believe they are being deprived. What a lie...If the Ford Motor
Company were to draw up a plan to split the shopfloor they
couldn't have done a better job. The slogan of your branch
banner is 'Unity is Strength'. Let's stay that way...Vote YES
for UNITY.
Although the Left in the Body plant also distributed
leaflets a sizeable nunber of the stewards who had originally been
signatories to the call for a separate branch gradually withdrew their
support. John Bohanna reflected:
The branch created the fear that we were Lefties who wanted to
politicise people, we would have control of the money, be able
to order them out on strike even if they didn't want to. And
the membership bought it.
The ballot result produced a 2-1 vote in favour of
retaining the existing branch. Yet again, it was a massive and unnecessary
set-back for the Left. It served to boost the authority and confidence of
the right wing in both plants and within the TGWtJ branch, a major
beneficiary of whom was Halewood management. Arguably, the reason why this
sort of thing had not happened in the 1970s was because, confronting an
instransigent management and representating a combative workforce the best
militants at Halewood had been preoccupied with building up the strength of
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shopfloor organisation. Even if the TGWU branch is constitutionally the
premier union body in theory, the Left understood that day-to-day shopfloor
conditions were the key concern in practice. It was not a question of
counterposing one to the other. The Left was involved in both, but the
emphasis was tilted towards shopfloor organisation. But, with management's
'poisoned handshake' approach and the downturn in workers' struggles in the
1980s, the Left looked to the union branch as a short-cut solution to
advance workers' interests rather than the hard slog of trying to restore
morale and. rebuild an organised core of oççasLti.oa an the sizaqflcar br
putting management to the test within each section of the plant, using the
branch as a secondary forum in that task. Yet only through such sectional
strength can a real democratic and accountable relationship between
stewards and members be constantly re-invigorated.
Finally, what of the future? Perhaps the most serious
long-term threat to the relationship between stewards and members at
Halewood is 'team-working'. Already each section of the Assembly plant has
been divided up into groups of 10 with 'group leaders' recruited from the
shopfloor, responsible for ensuring all the jobs are manned, arranging
breaks and organising simple maintenance. Part of the aim is to improve job
flexibility. But it is also to by-pass the stewards organisation. Ray
Storey explained:
The group leader is paid about 10 per cent more, he's like a
chargehand at the moment. People accept things off the group
leader because he's seen as one of them which they wouldn't
accept from the foremen. But he could be in an ambivalent
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position, getting his ear bent by management. But at the moment
they're not subjecting him to that much pressure. On any big
problem you would still involve the foremen and the steward.
But it is undercutting the steward to a certain extent because
if you have a minor problem you see your group leader. As for
the future it depends on whether management use the group
leaders to tighten up on the quality of work. It represents a
long-term threat to steward organisation.
Management also want to introduce 'Integrated
Manufacturing Teams' of skilled and semi-skilled workers who will be
responsible for the maintenance and operation of a specific segment of the
manufacturing process. Those who get into the teams will be able to earn
extra allowances if they continually raise their level of skills and work
on new technology. But the danger of team-working for steward organisation
during the 1990s is not insuperable. There are always contradictions in
such management strategies which can be exploited by an effective shopfloor
organisation, for example, altering the stewards' constituency to encompass
a number of teams within a section of the plant. Yet only a substantial
recovery in the level of struggle and the active intervention of a new
layer of activists is likely to push the pendulum of democracy and
bureaucracy in another direction than the inheritance left by the downturn
of the 1980s.
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STEWARDS' RELATIONSIILP TO UNION OFFICIALS: 1970s AND 80s
* the late 1960s/1970s: establishing lay representation
The Ford Halewood stewards' relationship with local
Transport and General Workers Union officials during the 1970s was always
relatively independent. On the one hand, there was traditionally close
contact between the two, particularly as local union officials tended to be
ex-Ford Halewood workers themselves. Eddie Roberts described the role of
the local official during the early 1960s, when the plant was being
unionised:
Although full-time officers shouldn' t be seen as very important
in the scheme of things, Sam Glasstone was a good old fashioned
blood and thunder trade unionist who was just what the doctor
ordered to stand up to the bullies at Ford's. We loved him. But
he used to have an ambivalent view of things. 'He's just a
glorified shop steward' other officers used to say. When he
addressed a meeting he'd say 'Look lads, I've got to tell you
this, you're out of procedure, so nothing is gonna be made
official here - Now I don't blame you. If I was in there I
would have been out a bit fucking quicker'. So we used to say
'We don't expect any of them to be made official, we ain't
going back, so you can go in there tell them that'. And he'd
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say 'Fair enough, I like that'. Management would tell him his
members were out of order and he'd say 'Well, I've told them
that, but they're not coming back to work, unless and until'.
After the establishment of a well organised shop stewards
structure inside the Halewood plant the relationship with local officials
became much more autonomous. The resources at their disposal enabled
stewards to acquire the experience necessary to handle a variety of
grievances and negotiations within the confines of the plant. For example,
until his death in 1987, Billy Maguire was Convenor of the Assembly plant
for 17 consecutive years, his experience rivalling the local officials'. In
these circumstances, there was little reason to call for external
assistance, except to perform those tasks which only a full-time officer
was authorised to carry out, such as giving formal ratification to an
agreement or taking a major dispute into procedure. Thus, the vast majority
of stoppages of work were 'unofficial' and were dealt with internally by
the IJalewood stewards themselves, without the involvement of union
officials. There were, however, some exceptions to this, particularly when
either plant faced lay-offs. Moreover, on occasion, management saw the
advantage in using the officials to sort out unruly sections of workers, as
Barry Upham recalled:
I can remember one incident around 1976-8, when the Regional
Organiser of the T and G, Dickie Palmer, was brought in. We had
a lead disking booth. It was always a troublesome area because
it wasn't an easy or likeable job because the guys had to wear
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spacesuits and respirators. It was one of the most famous
places in the Body plant where 'welt working' was rife and the
booth was in and out by the minute on strike over all sorts of
issues. We involved the officer and we fired all the lead
diskers and after an appeal we agreed to reinstate them
provided they sign a declaration that they would be good guys
in the future. But we didn't reinstate all of them, some of the
militant ones stayed dismissed. Now that was with the knowledge
and concurrence of the Officer. So he recognised that whilst he
would always have to support his members things were running
out of control and something had to be done for the greater
good of the greater number of his members.
On the whole though, the shop stewards operated
relatively autonomously of the local officials, without their involvement
in the details of workplace industrial relations. Much more important was
the stewards' relationship with national union officials, particularly
those represented on Ford's corporate negotiating machinery with the trade
unions, embodied within the National Joint Negotiating Committee (NJNC).
Ford's had formalised its negotiating procedure in 1955, earlier than most
British companies, when it signed a procedure agreement with full-time
national union officials from the 22 unions with members in the British
plants. This ratified centralised negotiations over the major questions of
pay and conditions and led to a separation between plant-level shop
stewards and the national officials who represented the unions on the NJNC.
Throughout the l95Os and 1960s Ford's attempted to maintain this collective
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bargaining regime, dealing exclusively with national trade union officials
and ignoring the shop stewards, except for local bargaining purposes. Thus,
at the Dagenhain plant, a powerful but highly autonomous shop stewards'
corrønittee developed, with few links with the NJNC or with the formal trade
union structures (Beynon, 1984. p79). By contrast, the Halewood plant was
characterised by the emergence of a shop stewards' organisation determined
to forge links and alliances with the official structures of their union,
the TGWU. They were influenced by the experience of Dagenhani, where an
isolated plant organisation suffered a severe setback after the successful
victimisation of its leading stewards in 1962, and by the experience of
workers at the nearby Dunlop plant in Speke, where stewards had gained
considerable influence within the TGW[J by getting represented on key union
comittees. The 'Dunlop way' seemed to offer the possibility of using the
official trade union structures 'but without illusions' in its 'bent'
national officials and it was this approach that was adopted by the
Assembly plant stewards. By 1967 they were a force to be reckoned with in
the TGW[J at regional level and in 1968 had gained a seat on the national
executive comittee (Beynon, 1984. p83).
Neanwhile, from the late 1960s a 'devolution of power? to
shop stewards had been openly encouraged by TGW(J officials, with a more
central role in shopfloor negotiations for stewards and far closer links
between them and official union structures. Devolution may be seen, at
least in part, as a pragmatic response to the position which shop stewards
had achieved informally in many areas of the TGWU's membership, as at Ford
Halewood. Nonetheless, growing rank and file discontent at the Labour
government's incomes policy during this period pushed the TGWIJ to put up
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fierce verbal resistance to the pay norms and the union increasingly
shifted to the Left politically as a 'new breed' of union official took
office, particularly in Merseyside. The development of regular contacts
between the Ford Halewood and Dagenham shop stewards and the formation of a
Ford National Shop Stewards' Combine Committee was another important
development and in the late 1960s the Halewood and Dagenham stewards
attempted to reform the NJNC and the joint unions' national bargaining
machinery that concentrated all effective decision-making in the hands of
full-time union officials. The Ford National Convenors' Committee - a body
comprising of Convenors from each of Ford's UK plants - organised lobbies
of the NJNC meetings in London and demanded the referral of all national
decisions for ratification in the plants. Eddie Roberts recalled:
As far as national officers were concerned we quickly learned -
mostly through the experience of the Dagenham people who hated
the national officers and felt so badly let down by them - the
corrupt bastards they were on the National Joint Negotiating
Committee. They used to have their meetings in the Cafe Royal
in London. There wasn't any democracy or accountability or
opportunity for the wishes of the membership to be transmitted,
you weren't allowed to have any say in the compilation of the
pay claim or other issues. Even though we had developed quite
good structures in terms of shop steward organisation and in
terms of getting resolutions passed through the TGIJ, no one
took any notice of us at the NJNC. So stewards and Convenors
used to be outside the Cafe Royal lobbying the national
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officers. That was the relationship we had with the national
officers at that time. We had disdain for them.
Meanwhile, a national unofficial delegate conference of
shop stewards from all the Ford plants in the UK was instituted - known as
the 'Coventry Conference' because it met at the TGWIJ's Transport Hall in
Coventry - to decide general policy and formulate immediate demands.
Policies agreed at these delegate Conferences were binding on all plants
and the National Convenors' Committee was given the task of securing the
implementation of decisions reached. Again, Halewood stewards were
centrally involved; and in 1969 it was the Convenors and stewards in the
Assembly plant who took the initiative in organising plant-wide walk-outs
in response to Ford's proposed 'package deal' containing 'penalty clauses'
aimed at curbing 'unconstitutional action'. The unofficial stoppages
quickly spread to a national Ford strike and brought to a head the whole
problem not only of industrial relations in the plants but also the
relationship between the union officials on the NJNC and the plant based
shop stewards.
Despite the backing given to Ford's package deal by the
NJNC - dominated by right wing trade unions - the strike was given official
support by the left-wing TGW[5 general secretary, Jack Jones and AEEJ
President, Hugh Scanlon, and their national executives, reflecting the
internal differentiation within the union officialdom. As a result the
structure of the NJNC collapsed and the chairman of the trade union side of
the committee and the TGWtJ's national officer both resigned their
positions. After the strike - which forced Ford to water down its 'penalty
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clauses' - the NJNC was reconstituted with a more proportional distribution
of seats between the various unions, and for the first time ever, lay
representation from the plants. 4 places on the Committee were granted to
Convenors (including the 2 TGWIJ Convenors from the Halewood plants, Eddie
Roberts and Les Moore) to sit with the full-time national officials. Eddie
Roberts drew out the significance of the change:
It was a tremendous advance. The lay representation at least
ensured we had some say on the agenda. We didn't make any
difference to the actual style of negotiation. That was still
conducted through the chair and secretaries, Reg Birch of the
AEIJ and Moss Evans of the T and G would do the talking, and we
would just sit there like we were in a goldfish bowl. But we
were there to observe and carry back and it made a significant
difference, it was a breakthrough. For example, we put 'parity'
on the agenda. Ford's weren't happy with the development.
Meanwhile, 2,000 Halewood workers from the Body plant
left the General and Municipal Workers Union (GNWtJ) disgusted at its
failure to back the strike and joined the TGWU, which became the majority
union in the plant and on the stewards' committee. Thus, the 1969 strike
represented a significant victory for shop steward organisation in the
Halewood plant. It proved itself to be highly responsive to the demands of
a confident rank and file membership and able to act as a powerful counter-
weight to the bureaucracy of official trade union structures.
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Of course, this independence from the national union
leaders was a relative phenomenon and not an absolute state of affairs.
That the scope for independence could be narrowed was illustrated in 1971
when Ford plants across the country voted to join those at Halewood and
Swansea who had walked out on strike in response to Ford's pay offer of a
£2 increase on the basic rate. The national strike was aimed at
establishing 'parity' with the earnings of Midlands carworkers. It lasted
for 9 weeks until 'left wing' union leaders Jack Jones and Hugh Scanlon
bypassed the NJNC, (of which they were not members) secretly concluded a
deal with Ford's UK Chairman - which prohibited further strikes over pay
for the next 2 years - and presented it as a 'fait accompli' to the
official negotiators and plant shop stewards. Instead of allowing mass
meetings to decide whether to go back to work they insisted on a secret
ballot of the workforce, exactly as the Tory government's hated Industrial
Relations Act demanded. Although the pay settlement was higher than the
Tory government would have liked, Ford's had found that collaboration was
still possible, even with 'left' union leaders, and within a matter of days
they were clamping down on shopfloor organisation, sacking John Dillon, a
steward in Halewood's Assembly plant.
Meanwhile, the opening up of the NJNC also proved to be
double-edged. Significantly, the 1969 Ford strike had initially posed a
serious threat to the NJNC itself and its preservation as an authoritative
joint union-management bargaining forum became the company's top priority.
Paradoxically, the widening gap between national union officials and shop
stewards within the plants gradually persuaded Ford that it would be better
to deal with accountable shopfloor leaders who could be held responsible
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for their side of a negotiated agreement rather than be reliant on remote
national officials alone. During the 1970s they began to make a virtue out
of what had previously been a necessity, taking a series of initiatives
aimed at democratising the NJNC and progressively involving plant Convenors
and senior stewards in an institutionalisation of conflict within
formalised company-union procedures. The admission of all 21 UK plant
Convenors to the trade union side of the NJNC in 1978 was more than a
symbol of the transformation of industrial relations in Ford; it reinforced
the authority of the NJNC and demonstrated how far the company was prepared
to go in its attempt to incorporate the senior layer of full-time union
representatives in the plants (Friedman and Meredeen, 1980. p347).
Although the NJNC did not usually directly intervene in
domestic plant issues - except those relating to national pay agreements or
company wide strikes - the involvement of 2 Halewood Convenors in more or
less regular contact with Ford UK executives and national full-time union
officials inevitably had a significant effect on the conduct of steward
organisation on the site. Ford encouraged them to take a more active part
in persuading their rank and file members and stewards to remain at work
and 'talk out' grievances rather than 'walk-out' without allowing procedure
to operate. To assist them in this, senior stewards were granted much more
leeway to take time off work to conduct union business and a variety of
facilities were granted. Moreover, the Convenors increasingly came under
the pressure of full-time trade union officials who expected them to 'carry
the plants' in support of formal con!nitments and agreements made
nationally. These pressures towards 'incorporation' encouraged the
formation in 1978 of a small militant rank and file organisation
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disaffected with the way the Convenor system linked contact between the
plants directly through the official channels of the NJNC. It called itself
the 'Ford (UK) Workers Group (Combine)' and successfully established
supporters' groups in a number of plants across the country. One of the
largest groupings was based at 1-lalewood - of about a dozen unaligned left-
wing activists, including a handful of shop stewards. Formed some months
before the 1978 national strike, with the object of campaigning for the pay
claim, the 'Combine' produced many thousands of leaflets, stickers and
'Fraud' badges parodying the 'Ford' logo, and kept up constant pressure on
the NJNC by organising regular lobbies of the London negotiations, with up
to 150 workers attending from across the country. It aimed to build a rank
and file opposition to those Convenors and senior stewards who were
becoming more distant from the shopfloor and during the dispute tried to
play the role that a fighting national strike committee might have
undertaken - organising flying pickets to the docks, transporter depots and
Ford dealers.
Nevertheless, even if most plant Convenors on the NJNC
were implicated in the union officials' recommendation to accept a deal far
short of the £20 and 35 hours claim, Halewood proved to be the exception.
It was the only Ford plant in the country where the stewards conimittee
recommended rejection, although the rank and file, even here, voted to
return to work. After the strike, the 'Combine' supporters in Halewood
produced a few copies of a duplicated bulletin named 'The Halewood Worker',
which aimed to 'break down the isolation and the lack of communication
between workers in the plants'. (11) But the group withered away with the
downturn in workers' struggles during the mid-1980s.
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Yet it would be mistaken to assume that the process of
incorporation of the Convenors and senior stewards at Halewood was
unproblematic. Certainly, the tradition of fighting semi-independently of
the full-time officials - firmly established in the 1960s - was not lost
overnight during the 1970s, even though there were rather different levels
of autonomy between the stewards comittees in the Body and Assembly
plants. According to John Bohanna:
The most important difference in historical terms is that the
Assembly plant was always more under the official line of the
union whereas the Body plant conditioned itself to attempt to
run outside and within the official line. We always saw that
when the officials caine in it was to smack our hands because
we'd acted just as workers and the union was something distant,
although we were always under the union's protection and we
were acting out policies of the union and making greater
demands as a shop stewards organisation. But the Assembly plant
would adhere and recognise the official union line when we were
just not bothered with it.
But it was the lack of a deeply rooted and stable
acconinodative relationship between stewards and management in either of the
Halewood plants that ensured, despite the inherent danger of an
assimilation of senior shopfloor activists into the institutions of
collective bargaining at company level, that there were powerful counter-
vailing factors operating against the attempt by national union officials
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to win backing for policies of restraint. Essentially, it was the level of
shopfloor militancy during the 1970s that ensured they were held directly
accountable to their rank and file members and acted relatively independent
of union officials. Significantly, the Jialewood plants were much more
militant than other Ford plants across the country. Traditionally, every
pay offer was rejected by the Halewood steward committees and
reconinendations for rejection made to mass meetings of the membership,
usually only to be outvoted by the other more cautious Ford plants.
Halewood was invariably the initiator of national strike action, often
without waiting for official union sanction, for example in 1969, 1971 and
1978, and was usually the last site to return to work following national
ballots.
The explanation for why this was the case cannot be
sought solely in terms of the Halewood plants themselves. It is also
necessary to place the Halewood stewards within the wider context of
Merseyside - its economy, and its political, social and cultural traditions
(see Beynon, 1984 for some discussion of these traditions). The key point
here is that it further illustrates that, compared with most other Ford
plants in Britain, the Halewood stewards retained a high degree of autonomy
from full-time union officials during the period of the 1970s.
* the 1980s: trannission belt of influence
During the 1980s the relationship between the Halewood
shop stewards and full time union officials underwent a radical change. The
downturn in struggle within the plant left its imprint on the willingness
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and ability of shop stewards to act independently of the national union
leadership. Whereas fri the 1970s there had been a quite powerful shopfloor
organisation with a tradition of action without relying on the union
officials, in the 1980s the plant Convenors and stewards were increasingly
drawn into a more institutionalised relationship with both the company and
union leaders. Economic recession, mass unemployment, and the threat of
factory closure sapped the militancy of shopfloor workers, which in turn
undermined shop stewards' confidence to act independently of the officials.
Thus, the pendulini shifted from the relative independence of shop stewards
from the union leadership towards a relative dependence on them. The extent
of the dependence that would develop was indicated in 1981, after the
Halewood 'Double Doseing' strike. Ford only withdrew its 'disciplinary
code' after a reconvened meeting of the NJNC had agreed to a 'detailed
commitment from union leaders to improve self-discipline on the shopfloor'.
That meant twisting the arms of the shop stewards and members. TGMJ
national official, Ron Todd, sent a personal letter to all Ford workers
calling on them to demonstrate 'self-control'. It stated:
The trade union's aims in negotiations on behalf of Ford
workers are too often inhibited by our failure to honour the
agreements that we sign on your behalf. We therefore require
our members to reinforce our corrnitments to ensure that our
agreements are observed. Unless we operate as a disciplined and
united trade union force we can never direct our efforts
against the major problems facing our future - new technology,
predicted job losses, foreign penetration of our markets - all
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of these require our individual attention if we are to
safeguard our future interests (Freeman, 1984. p225).
During the early 1980s the entire weight of the official
union bureaucracy - with its 'new realist' philosophy that militant strikes
were a thing of the past - was consistently placed on the Halewood
Convenors and stewards, encouraging them to act as 'policemen of
discontent' in order to avoid frequent 'unconstitutional stoppages'. TGWIJ
full-time officials joined the chorus of those warning that Halewood faced
closure unless the stewards 'put their house in order'. Such external
pressure was of crucial significance in giving the Body and Assembly plant
Convenors the legitimacy necessary to convince their respective stewards'
committees of the need to adopt a new co-operative approach with Halewood
management. It was a reflection of the more general defeatist attitude
adopted by national union leaders in face of a hostile Thatcher government
and employers' offensive.
Virtually every initiative taken by Halewood management
throughout the 198Os, aimed at involving shop stewards in a collaborative
drive to boost effiency and productivity, was given wholehearted backing by
TGWU full-time officials. Thus, even though the Halewood stewards continued
to retain a high degree of autonomy in relation to the local district TGWU
officer, they became more and more subservient in their relations with and
ideological acceptance of right-wing policy emanating from national union
officials. Another problem was the activities of senior stewards within the
higher echelons of the TGWU machine. John Bohanna emphasised the
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significance of the 'moderate' Assembly plant stewards dominance of the
Halewood TGWU branch:
The branch is one of the largest in the country with 6,000
members so obviously its an important stepping stone within the
T and G, and the right have got it stiched up. Ritchie Rollins
[Assembly plant Convenor] is a representative from the branch
to the district committee, he's the national trade group
representative for automotive workers in Britain and he's on
the national executive committee. Jack Jones [Deputy Convenor]
is a member of the district committee and from that he's the
representative on the national automotive group.
Of course, in the 1970s there had been senior stewards
from Halewood represented at various levels of the TGWU's machinery. But
generally, they tended to be left-wing influenced stewards concerned to
advance the interests of shopfloor workers at the expense of, and in direct
opposition to, the interests of the employers. For example, they played a
part in overturning the union's initial backing of the Labour government's
'Social Contract' in favour of a return to free collective bargaining,
which in turn was a prelude to the national Ford pay strike of 1978 which
broke through the government's 5 per cent pay norm. But by the late 1980s,
the transmission belt of influence, although always a two-way channel,
moved much more forcefully from above. Certainly, despite the lay character
of the TGWIJ's governing bodies - such as the National Executive Committee -
there was a lot of pressure, particularly as there was relatively little
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counter-pressure from below, to look to the permanent fuil-time officials
for guidance on the major national issues. Moreover, although the faction-
riven 39-seat ruling body has traditionally been controlled by the left, in
the late 1980s the influence of the right became much stronger.
Meanwhile, the 1988 national pay strike graphically
exposed the weakneses of shop steward organisation at Halewood vis-a-vis
the national union officials. Initially, both Halewood management and full-
time officials were taken by surprise at the 'new mood' of shopfloor
militancy expressed by an 88 per cent ballot vote in favour of strike
action. The enormous power that Ford workers have was demonstrated when the
Ford plant in Belgium was closed and the plants in Valencia and Saarlouis
were forced to work part-time, after a little less than two weeks of strike
action. Unfortunately, the opportunity to use this power to inflict a
decisive victory over Ford's was squandered. Full-time national union
officials were able to quickly regain control of the strike and get it
called off after recomending acceptance of a slighly improved 2-year deal,
which conceded more flexibility in working practices within the plants,
albeit subject to local agreement. But if the union officials played their
characteristic conservative role it was the erosion of strong shop steward
workplace organisation in Halewood (and the other Ford plants) - as a
result of the years of collaboration with management - which made it easier
for them to get the deal accepted. At first, Halewood shop stewards, under
in!nediate pressure from some militant sections of their members, had
provided leadership to the unofficial strike wave. But they failed to
involve the majority of workers in strike activity once the plant had been
stopped. As Ray Storey explained:
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All the way through the strike nothing was done to involve
people. Anyone who wasn't a steward was discouraged from going
on the picket line. The Convenors wanted it passive, to keep
the picket lines down to a minimum. The argument that dominated
was that we could win just by sitting tight, nothing more. But
as the picket line was the only meeting point for the workforce
during the strike that left the majority of people isolated at
home where they were vulnerable to pressure to return to work
as soon as another ballot was arranged.
The union leaders were able to steamroll the NJNC into
accepting a deal which was well below what could have been achieved.
Although both shop steward committees at 1-Jalewood recommended rejection of
the deal they failed to inspire any confidence that more could be gained,
not least because the plant Convenors refused to publicly break with the
directive to return to work issued from national union officials. Terry
Seagraves recalled:
A lot of people wanted to carry the fight on. But the officials
seemed determined to accept whatever offer the company came up
with. There were 3 final offers. Mick Murphy called one of them
'an historic deal'. It was an hysterical deal as far as we were
concerned. People thought we could have got more out of it. The
shop stewards' committee did reject the offer but the way the
Convenors put it to the meeting didn't inspire people. It was
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total defeatism...There was a lot of disgruntlement at the way
the officials called it off.
In 1990, the national organiser of the TGW[J, Jack Adams,
wrote a personal letter to every Halewood TGWU member urging them to break
the picket lines of striking craftsmen, on unofficial strike over the
national pay deal. Having made an agreement with Ford's the union
leadership feared any disruption could lead to the company fulfilling its
threat to withdraw investment at British plants. Unfortunately the idea
that 'if it's good for the company it's good for the union' led TGWIJ
stewards at Halewood to agree to authorise scabbing against the AUEW and
EETPU members. Again, the union officials' stance was carried directly into
Halewood by the senior stewards.
Notwithstanding such developments it is important to
recognise that there have also been important countervailing pressures
operating on the shop stewards during the 1980s, despite the general
decline in struggle. Thus, the 1983 Paul Kelly strike, the 1985 line-
workers strike and the 1988 pay strike demonstrated that steward
organisation is much more responsive and accountable to rank and file
pressure than the full-time union leadership. Such strikes illustrated that
the problem of dependence is not necessarily of a permanent nature. Because
the union officials were so unwilling to fight on their members behalf and
were prepared to accoriinodate to the company, despite the sacrifices many
shopfloor workers felt they had made, it created a space in which a
minority of rank and file workers were prepared to take the initiative, to
act independently from below. It was this which forced the shop stewards
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into militant activity, albeit tentatively.
Arguably, such strikes demonstrate the underlying
potential of rank and file workers' struggles in the Ford 1-Jalewood plant.
Of course, in none of the disputes did strikers feel strong enough to defy
the officials indefinitely. This reflected the weakness of the stewards
organisation that has occured in recent years. But these strikes provided a
potential glimpse of the 1990s. They showed the risk that Ford's run of
launching an offensive that could provoke an unofficial backlash in which
the rank and file and a re-invigorated shop stewards organisation makes the
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CHAPTER FIVF: SCW4E COMIIJSIONS AND LFSS(4S
1NrROIxXTI
Each of the preceeding case studies illustrated how the
powerful shop steward organisations built up during the 1960s and 70s were
considerably weakened during the 1980s and in the case of the surviving
plant, Ford's, continue to face formidable challenges during the 1990s. The
qualitative changes in the strength of stewards' organisation were the
result of both objective and subjective factors, both external and internal
to the workplace. The product market crises of the early 1980s dealt a blow
to shopfloor power and presented stewards with immense strategical and
tactical difficulties that could not easily be overcome. The shift in the
balance of bargaining power to the advantage of management was inextricably
linked to the hostile economic and political climate within Britain
generally and the Merseyside geographical context in particular, with an
avalanche of plant closures and redundancies hitting the region with a
vengance. The downturn in workers' struggles within the British labour
movement - deepened by the defeat of the miners' strike in 1984-5 - was
another debilitating influence on the strength of the stewards'
organisation. The ideological embrace of 'new realism' by the TUC - and the
curbing of industrial militancy in favour of a more co-operative stance
with employers and the Conservative government - was reflected in the
pressure placed on shop stewards by full-time union officials to make wide-
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ranging pragmatic concessions to management. Even many shop stewards (and
rank and file members) anxious to minimise job losses and prevent plant
closure, embraced aspects of 'new realism', albeit in a more varied, uneven
and contradictory fashion than the union officials. The absence of a
coherent ideological or political alternative leadership from the Left was
a further impediment to any other outcome.
In this concluding Chapter I make a comparative analysis
of the shop steward organisations at Birds Eye, Bemrose and Ford's, and
relate the case study findings in the main body of the thesis to a critique
of the social democratic analytical approach of Eric Batstone outlined in
Chapter One, with the aim of drawing out some wider lessons about the
underlying dynamics of shop steward organisation, activity and
consciousness. This involves: a suriinary of key common themes - with
reference to stewards' relationship to management, rank and file members
and full time union officials; an assessment of the usefulness of my
theoretical framework and background hypothesis to the case study research
method, specifying the limits of generalisation; an evaluation of the
significance of my findings; and some overall lessons on how to rebuild the
strength of steward orgarilsation and on the importance of revolutionary
socialist political intervention in the workplace.
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STEWARDS' REISff[P 1D MANAG
All three case studies illuminated the contradiction
between conflict and accommodation that lies at the heart of the shop
stewards' relationship to management. Managers were often concerned not
only to assert their authority and intensify work but to also orchestrate a
degree of more active co-operation from workers. Thus, they utilised a
variety of tactics to control and motivate workers with shifts and
variations in the relationship between force and consent. In turn, these
different managerial strategies influenced the development and character of
the stewards organisation and its relationship with management.
On the one hand, shop stewards often faced a 'hard line',
managerial approach which forced them to respond with a conflictual
relationship. Ford's provided a vivid example of this. During the l970s the
'stick' component of Ford's strategy involved the assertion of unfettered
mangerial prerogative and the pursuance of tight shopfloor discipline with
the aim of achieving high and continuous production levels. It was this
antagonistic approach which precipated constant stoppages of work and
encouraged stewards to articulate rank and file grievances, lead shopfloor
struggles and build a strong, combative and independent shop stewards'
organisation. A similar process, albeit less sharply delineated, occurred
at Birds Eye. Of course, in neither workplace was this a uniform process.
It varied according to the differential bargaining leverage exercised by
sections of workers, the varied experience and leadership of stewards and
so on. Moreover, stewards sometimes felt they could not afford to challenge
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management on every occasion as outright confrontation could leave workers
vulnerable and risk serious defeat. Nonetheless, 'hard line' management at
Ford's and Birds Eye did have the effect of encouraging stewards to
mobilise their members in a conflictual relationship which challenged
managerial authority.
On the other hand, both plants illustrated how shop
stewards can also sometimes face a co-operative 'soft line' from
management, aimed at incorporating them into an accommodative relationship.
Again, Ford's provided the sharpest example of this process. During the
early 1980s, in the context of a changed economic and political climate,
management's 'poisoned handshake' approach led to a 'backing off' whenever
a shopfloor dispute arose so at to talk out issues without confrontation.
It led to a routinisation of workplace trade unionism, the demobilisation
of collective rank and file self-activity and an undermining of the
strength of shop steward organisation. A similar process occured at Birds
Eye. Again, this was not necessarily a uniform picture. In some respects,
the more co-operative relationship with management was grounded in real,
albeit limited, concessions, although this did not preclude occasional
battles with management. But Birds Eye and Ford illustrated that stewards
who have established an accommodative relationship with management over a
proloned period of time can become vulnerable to such managerial tactics
and thus disarm themselves in defending basic union organisation from
encroachment.
Of course, the tension between conflict and accommodation
did not express itself in an either/or scenario. The same management could
apply both strategies at the same time. Thus, at Ford's during the 1970s,
Page 345
Chapter Five: Some Conclusions and Lessons
the 'carrot' component - an attempt to incorporate stewards' organisation
by democratising the NJNC and granting stewards plant-level facilities -
was a complementary management strategy. Similarly, at Birds Eye, there was
a contradiction between a relatively conflictual plant-level management
approach (often encouraged by corporate Birds Eye intervention) and the
more co-operative approach of departmental managers (although this varied
between departments). The overlap was also evident during the l980s. For
example at Ford, management's long-term 'flirployee Involvement' strategy
clashed with its short-term need to reassert the 'big stick' on occasion,
provoking rank and file resistance. At Birds Eye, the apparent new co-
operative approach soon gave way to an attempt to force draconian new
working practices in the shape of 'Workstyle', provoking outright steward
hostility.
Perhaps, the most graphic example of the mix of
conflictual and accommodative relationships between stewards and management
was demonstrated in Beinrose. Thus, during the l970s, management had a two-
fold strategy. On the one hand, they regularly threatened to close the
plant down, particularly whenever contracts caine up for renewal, unless
productivity was improved. On the other hand, given the nature of the
product market, it often made little short-term financial sense to resist
chapel demands and jeopardise production, so they were prepared to make
significant concessions to win consent (even though the plant was
apparently consistently unprofitable). As a result, whilst powerful chapel
committee organisations' developed, able to carve out a series of counter-
controls to those of management, there was also a relatively high degree of
co-operation between the two, for example over the maintenance of
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production levels, Of course, a major difference between shopfloor
industrial relations at Beinrose compared with Birds Eye and Ford's was the
comparatively low level of workers' struggle. The chapel committees'
strength caine much more from advantageous market pressures, workers'
strategic relationship to production and an institutionalised pattern of
craft job control than from the daily battles on the shopfloor which
characterised the others. Nonetheless, the same contradictory pressures of
conflict and accommodation, influenced by managerial strategy, were
evident.
However, the contradiction between conflict and
accommodation was never equally balanced in any of the three workplaces. In
Ford's during the 1970s, it was the 'stick' component that was the
predominant managerial strategy, ensuring a relatively high level of
workers' struggle and combative steward-management relations which provided
little basis for any deep-seated accommodation. By contrast, during the
1980s, Ford's 'poisoned handshake' approach, whilst punctuated by
occasional application of the 'big stick', encouraged a quite different co-
operative relationship with shop stewards. Similarly in Birds Eye during
the 1970s, management adopted a much more antagonistic approach to
stewards' organisation than during the early 1980s, until the pendulun
swung back again in the late 1980s. Even in Bemrose, despite management's
much more complex, ambivalent approach, the day-to-day shopfloor
relationship with the chapel committees was relatively more conflictual
than co-operative during the l97Os than during the 1980s (notwithstanding
the set-piece confrontations on a plant-wide level during the 1980s).
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The differences in management approach can be explained
primarily by their response to changes in product and labour markets, the
influence of corporate strategy on plant level managers and the perceived
strength of shopfloor union organisation. A critical issue then concerns
the influence of management policies and tactics on the nature and
character of steward organisation. Clearly, there was no automatic
convergence between management approach and shop steward response. It
depended on the context and on other factors, such as the level of rank and
file confidence and activity and the nature of steward leadership. Thus,
Birds Eye management's more conciliatory approach following the 1978 lock-
out did not lead to a more co-operative relationship between stewards and
management. Paradoxically, although the stewards suffered a severe setback
they found management's hesitancy in the face of production problems
associated with the new technology provided them with the opportunity to
rebuild some shopfloor strength, in the process pushing up manning levels
and engaging in plant-wide strike action in defence of two sacked
colleagues. By contrast, Bemrose management's confrontationist stance over
flexible working practices during the early 1980s did not provoke the
chapel committees into militant resistance. In other words, the
relationship between management strategy and the nature of steward
organisation is not a simple or mechanical one. There are complexities
involved. Nonetheless, the tension between conflict and accommodation in
stewards' relationship to management was clearly evident in all three
workplaces.
What also became apparent were the pitfalls of 'strong
bargaining relations'. As was noted in Chapter One, Batstone assumed that
Page 348
Chapter Five: Some Conclusions and Lessons
by moderating their goals stewards could achieve more for their members
than they could through a more militant perspective (Batstone et al. 1977,
1978). This might mean in specific instances the gains won by stewards
would be less than they might have been, but equally there would be other
occasions when procedural routes achieved gains (or rniniinised losses) where
outright conflict would suffer resounding defeats. Thus, the moderation of
demands involves a rational estimate of the chance of success of different
demands. The key question becomes the overall balance of gains and losses
and the formulation of the most cost-effective strategy. Although some
stewards could have rather ambitious goals (that might even envisage
structural change of capitalist society) and be prepared to adopt militant
strategy and tactics to pursure them, Batstone seemed to envisage a much
narrower horizon of pragmatic reform. Similarly, Jones and Rose (1986) have
championed what they have termed 'pragmatic trade unionism', moderate and
responsible shop stewards who are not restricted in the range of
compromises they are prepared to accept in the form of flexible bargaining
over changes in work.
Yet what the case studies showed is that 'strong
bargaining relations' effectively failed to deliver, both in terms of
substantial material improvements in workers' conditions and in terms of
the vitality of shop steward organisation. It is useful to make a
comparison between the 1970s and the 1980s. Clearly, there were aspects of
'strong bargaining relations' in both Birds Eye and Ford's during the
1970s, but because of managerial intransigence there was little basis for
any deap-seated acconinodation. Instead, it was shopfloor activity, a 'do it
yourself' militant reformism, enacted from below rather than carried out
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from above on workers' behalf, which succeeded in carving out a significant
element of counter-control over the ininediate work process and provided the
basis upon which strong workplace union organisation could be built. For
example, in Birds Eye, it was sectional stoppages of work that won improved
bonus payments, condition rates and job evaluation, which won the
guaranteed working week and May Day holiday and prevented loss of bonus
payments when machineery broke down. Such activity also had the merit of
forging the strength of stewards organisation. A similar picture was
evident in Ford's.
Of course, there were limitations to this combative
approach in both workplaces, not least the ambivalent attitude towards
sectional militancy taken by some stewards. But the setbacks and defeats
suffered during this period were not because of the relatively militant
shopfloor approach, but despite it. Even in Bemrose, where 'strong
bargaining relations' were much more firmly rooted, management were
obliged, due to the peculiar nature of the product and labour markets, to
concede very high rates of pay, control over the movement of labour and
high manning arrangements, because they feared the shopfloor power of
chapel corrinittees' organisation and the threat or use of sanctions to
disrupt production. Nonetheless, whilst 'strong bargaining relations' in
these circumstances ensured the balance of bargaining power lay to the
advantage of the stewards there was a very low level of struggle and
serious weaknesses in the cohesion of union organisation.
Significantly, Batstone appears to have assumed that
'strong bargaining relations' were only to be found where there was a broad
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balance of power between stewards and managers. In fact, as will have
become apparent, similar kinds of relations can exist not only in
situations where the bargaining power of stewards is greater (as in Bemrose
during the 1970s) but also where it is less (as in Birds Eye and Ford's
during the l980s). Crucially, Batstone failed to take sufficent account of
the problems which arise when the institutional framework of bargaining
relations becomes insecure or unstable as a result of product market
pressures or economic recession (as during the 1980s). Because the 'rules
of the game' changed in these circumstances the options open to stewards of
shared rules and understandings and 'give and take' were rather different
than previously and relying on 'strong bargaining relations' - whatever its
estimate of costs and benefits at one point in time - could no longer be
guaranteed to delisjer the most cost-effective strategy when judged in terms
of the defence of established jobs, advantageous working conditions and
strong workplace union organisation.
As the case studies exemplified, the consequence of
stewards adopting 'strong bargaining relations' during this period
invariably meant making wide-ranging concessions to management that would
not have been considered in more favourable circumstances. whilst such
pragmatic bargaining provided a number of limited benefits it also had
serious disadvantages. For example, at Birds Eye it handicapped their
ability to utilise the high demand for the MenuNaster range and their
control over the new technology to substantially improve wages, manning
levels and working conditions. Moreover, such 'strong bargaining relations'
were only maintained at the price of dampening down rank and file self-
activity and undermining the strength of stewards' organisation.
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Ultimately, it lulled workers into a false sense of job security and ill-
prepared them to resist the enforced closure of the plant. The lesson is
clear, the key to the advance of workers' interests lies not in
sophisticated 'strong bargaining relations' but in the level of confidence
and militant activity of rank and file members, and stewards' willingness
to mobilise and channel that strength in opposition to management.
In some respects Batstone's whole notion of reformist
workplace trade unionism and 'pragmatic bargaining' underlines the manner
in which shop steward orgarELsation necessarily operates on a terrain which
inevitably involves compromise and trade-offs. Certainly, it was
understandable that during the 1980s, faced with the threat of plant
closure, some stewards felt it necessary to abandon the relatively militant
strategy of earlier years to adopt a more flexible and co-operative
relationship with management. The case studies appear to have provided some
evidence to suggest that no matter how structurally strong or militant, the
limitation of workplace trade unionism is that it is not in a position to
systematically rather than episodically encroach on managerial prerogative
when faced with attempting to thwart large scale redundancies or plant
closure. The problems of a purely plant-based locus of action and the
absence of mass political mobilisation inside the British labour movement
more generally were graphically exposed. Nonetheless, arguably there was no
inevitability about the tyranny of market forces, in the form of corporate
restructuring, riding roughshod over shop steward orgariisation. It would be
mistaken to assume an iron law of development which somehow predetermines
how stewards will react and underestimate the part that shopfloor struggle
and conscious intervention could, despite the material obstacles,
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potentially have played. Certainly, the case studies signalled the
varieties of approach adopted by different shop stewards within each of the
three workplaces (for example between Joe Barton and Joe Carberry in Birds
Eye or Billy Maguire and John Bohanna in Ford's). A key question is whether
a different political leadership could, potentially, have substantially
altered the course of events or not. The distinction between a reformist
and revolutionary socialist approach within the workplace is examined in
more detail in the next section.
Finally, what of the future? Can shop stewards, at least
at Ford's, rebuild a strong workplace union organisation and push the
balance of bargaining power away from management's advantage? Has the new
climate of 'responsible' workplace industrial relations really become
ingrained or will it evaporate as the company struggles to maintain
momentum in fiercely competitive markets? Arguably, the significance of the
1988 strike is that it offered a glimpse of how a renewed sense of workers'
confidence can be felt when particular circumstances coincide. In this
case, it was the company's high profits, a lowering of unemployment and a
feeling that the years of sacrifice had not been adequately rewarded.
Workers felt their bargaining strength was stronger and took advantage of
this to win a better pay rise than was being offered. But other factors,
for example, the introduction of a new car model, a slight upturn in the
economy, or an intensification of struggle within the British labour
movement generally could boost workers' bargaining leverage in the future.
Moreover, Ford's attempt to make fundamental changes to work organisation
during the l990s could undermine the stewards' co-operative relationship of
the last decade, particularly if rank and file workers force the pace from
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below. In other words, the re-vitalisation of steward organisation and a
return to a much more combative stance can by no means be ruled out,
although the impact of a renewed economic recession in 1991-2 could
seriously hamper such developments.
SmiARDS' RELATIONSHIP TO RANK AND FILE M14BS
A number of commentators have drawn attention to the
contrast between 'participatory' and 'representative' democracy in shop
stewards' relationship to rank and file members (Terry, 1983a; Fairbrother,
1984; Fosh and Cohen, 1988). Thus, it has been suggested that during the
1950s and 60s stewards were genuine workplace delegates, deeply immersed in
the activities and pre-occupations of those they represented; policies
emerged out of regular discussion and debate within the workplace and
stewards were directly accountable to the membership, liable to be
dismissed in the event of an inadequate performance. By contrast, during
the 1970s and 80s, following the emergence of a lay elite of full-time
senior stewards, there was the development of a more professional,
hierarchical and centralised stewards' organisation which became
increasingly differentiated from the members (Hyman, 1979; Terry, 1983b).
My case study material suggests tendencies towards democracy and
bureaucracy tended to co-exist with one another throughout the period. As
Beynon revealed, even in the heyday of workplace militancy at Ford Halewood
during the 1960s, the shop steward found himself "torn between the forces
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of representation and bureacratisation" (1984. p209). But it would also be
mistaken to assume, as Batstone (1985) did, that 'nothing has changed',
that steward organisation today is basically as hierarchical and
centralised as it ever was in the past and that the 'bureaucratisation of
the rank and file' thesis (Hyman, 1979) is misconceived. Arguably, the
central issue is not whether stewards have a 'participatory' or
'representative' (in Batstone's terms 'leader' or 'populist') role but what
is the balance at any one time between these two co-existing and
contradictory tendencies and what were the internal and external pressures
pushing in each direction? In each of the three workplaces studied it is
clear the relationship between stewards and the members did undergo a
qualitative shift between the 1970s and 1980s.
In both Birds Eye and Ford's during the 1970s, there were
tendencies towards 'representative' democracy with senior stewards
sometimes using their 'power for' the members as a 'power over' them by
restraining militancy (for example, at Birds Eye participating in
management's break-up of the cold store department) but it was much more
towards the 'participatory' component that the pendulum was pushed, partly
as a result of the pressure from below, the high level of rank and file
struggle - itself a response to hard-line management - and partly as a
result of the active intervention of stewards themselves in bargaining on
the shopfloor.
Although the steward comittees retained a degree of
autonomy from the shopfloor the constant struggle ensured they did not
become too isolated from the practical needs of their members. In other
words, there was a direct connection between the level of shopfloor
Page 355
Chapter Five: Some Conclusions and Lessons
confidence, activity and militancy vis-a-vis management and the relatively
democratic relationship that existed between stewards and members. There
was also a direct link between workplace union democracy and the shop
stewards' goals and objectives. The generally combative stance of the
stewards encouraged the active participation of rank and file members in
union affairs. The experience in Beinrose was more complex. On the one hand,
chapel corrimittee representatives maintained a relatively close and
democractic relationship with rank and file members; whilst there was not a
high level of struggle there was a lot of confidence on the shopfloor vis-
a-vis management and there was quite a degree of involvement in chapel and
union affairs. On the other hand, the sectional nature of chapel
organisation and 'strong bargaining relations' with management facilitated
the development of a highly centralised and semi-bureaucratic form of
leadership in the hands of the FoCs. But even here there were stronger
elements of participatory than representative democracy.
All this was in sharp contrast to the 1980s, a period
when the relationship between democracy and bureaucracy swung towards the
latter component in all three plants. Again, it was possible to see a
connection between the low level of shopfloor confidence, activity and
militancy vis-a-vis management and the relatively more bureaucractic
relationship between the shop stewards and members that ensued. The 'not
rocking the boat' stance towards sectional disputes dissipated the mood to
fight and sapped shopfloor morale and confidence. In the context of rank
and file demobilisation and passivity stewards became more remote from the
direct form of accountability and democractic scrutiny that had previously
prevailed. It was also possible to see a connection between the shop
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stewards' much narrower goals and horizon and the lack of participation of
rank and file members. 'Strong bargaining relations? with management
encouraged stewards to act much more on their members' behalf, there was
little need to involve them in activity or decision-making and the links
binding the stewards to the members were weakened. Of course, it was not
entirely a one-way process. The stewards still represented members' day-to-
day interests and were placed under some scrutiny and spontaneous rank and
file rebellions were an important safeguard against an invulnerable
bureaucracy becoming locked into place. Nonetheless, the atrophy of
stewards' organisation generally proved to be an important handicap to the
re-invigoration of a dynamically accountable relationship between stewards
and members.
Thus, although workplace trade unionism faces both
external and internal pressures (and counter-pressures) towards democracy
and bureaucracy, the distinction between a 'representative' and
'participatory' form of steward role is a useful one. For Batstone the
union is organised on the basis of a body of 'leader' stewards who owe
their position to their knowledge and expertise and who maintain a steady
downward flow of corrriunication to the members. In such a workplace the
membership at large have very little responsiblity for the active
development and pursuit of policies or objectives nor would stewards see
any virtue in such involvement. But my case study evidence suggests that
without participation by the members a shop steward structure is something
of a sham as far as workplace union democracy is concerned. Because the
whole logic of trade unionism is collective, workplace union democracy has
to be a democracy in which everyone is encouraged to take an active part.
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Indeed, a 'participatory' form of workplace union democracy is not some
abstract ideal model but the most effective practical route to the
development of a strong independent shop steward organisation able to
obtain real concrete gains for the members and ensure a vibrant form of
workplace trade unionism.
In all three workplaces there was a tension between
sectional rank and file workers' militancy versus the shop steward
committes' plant-wide strategic perspective. On the one hand, the strength
of workplace union organisation arose from sectional power and the battle
for workers' immediate day-to-day grievances. On the other hand, there was
the need to protect the interests of the majority of workers across the
plant as unco-ordinated activity threatened the cohesiveness and bargaining
authority of the stewards body as a whole. In essence, it raised the
question of the relationship between spontaneous shopfloor activity and a
collective trade union identity, between sectionalism and generalisation,
and the key role played by shop stewards.
The problematic nature of the relationship between rank
and file workers' sectional activity and broader political consciousness
within each of the three case studies was evident enough. Certainly,
sectionalism represented a major obstacle to a unified collectivist
response to management. Yet sectionalism was not a fixed state of affairs.
On the contrary, the basically antagonistic nature of the labour process
gave it a dynamic, uneven and contradictory character, as the shopfloor
practice of 'welt working' illustrated. Even though the existence of
discrete sections of workers within each plant - divided by the nature of
work, department, gender, etc - created the basis for fraentation and
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disunity there were also factors promoting collective trade union attitudes
and organisation amongst people who worked together and shared common
interests. Moreover, as Batstone revealed, whilst organisational and
institutional factors help shape sectional work group behaviour and
attitudes, the social networks that inform argument and initiative and
through which 'leader' shop stewards promote 'trade union principles' of
unity and collective identity are also significant (Batstone et al. 1977;
1978). Of course, Batstone's underlying assumption that rank and file
members are only sectionally orientated, requiring a 'responsible' steward
leadership to control their undisciplined militancy, was misconceived. But
his analysis had the merit of focussing attention on the relationship
between workplace activity, union collectivism and the intervention of shop
stewards.
Beynon (1984) also probed the extent to which the shop
stewards are the catalysts of collective workplace trade unionism. But
unlike Batstone, Beynon had a much more positive view of the contribution
made by rank and file self-activity. He revealed the dialectical interplay
between the day-to-day struggles of shopfloor workers on the one hand, and
the distinctive form of 'factory class consciousness' developed by an
experienced shop steward leadership on the other, that generates a basic
collectivism and opposition to management and through which effective
workplace union organisation is developed and sustained. This involves
stewards both 'listening to the lads' and arguing with them, sharing their
experiences on the assembly line and giving a lead.
what the case studies suggested is that sectional
militancy is the bedrock of strong plant-wide stewards' organisation, its
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success depending upon the ability of stewards building up the power of
union organisation by fighting over the innediate issues that confront
their members and involving them in activity, whilst at the same time
forging a sense of collective identity between different sections of
workers by linking the grievances of the most confident and best organised
with those of the less confident and well organised. For example, at Ford's
during the 1970s, individual shop stewards 'cut their teeth' on sectional
militancy, in the process not only helping rank and file members carve out
some control over the job and bolstering their bargaining authority vis-a-
vis management but also strengthening the power and esteem of the stewards
coninittee within the plant as a whole. A similar picture emerged at Birds
Eye. Whilst the push for collective activity of this kind often came from
the comitted shop steward or political activist such minorities were
effective in mobilising the rank and file and overcoming sectionalism only
because the conception of a more generalised, class-wide trade unionism was
part of workers' consciousness, at least to some degree, as for example,
the solidarity strikes in Birds Eye demonstrated. Admittedly, it swam
alongside and was often in competition with other more limited ideas about
work and politics, but it could be appealed to and developed.
Unfortunately, during the 1980s the Ford stewards'
generally supportive attitude towards sectional militancy evaporated under
the policy of co-operation with management. Instead of attempting to link
together the unco-ordinated stoppages of work that broke out across the
plant into a united strategic challenge to management, the stewards adopted
a more conciliatory attitude in favour of 'talking out disputes'. In the
long-term this had the effect of isolating and undermining sectional power
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and weakening the strength of stewards' organisation across the plant.
Again, there was a similar picture at Birds Eye. At Bemrose, the isolation
of action to the particular section of a chapel merely had the effect of
reinforcing departmental and chapel sectionalism and threw away the
opportunity of forging shopfloor links and building up a united approach to
management. whilst the lack of such a joint stance may not have appeared to
have hampered the power of union orgaaisation during the 1970s there is no
doubt it underlay the chapels' erosion of strength during the 1980s.
Clearly, the contours of workplace struggle are
tremendously uneven, so that workers who are passive one day can just as
easily be driven to militancy another. Management always try to divide and
rule, picking off those troublesome areas which need sorting out at any
given time and counting on the passivity of the rest to bludgeon the
aggrieved minority into submission. But the proper response to this by shop
stewards is not the bureaucratic 'unity of the graveyard' - in which sparks
of rank and file militancy are extinguished from above - but an attempt to
break the sectionalism by spreading the action and involving other groups
of workers in fighting together, levelling upwards to the active minority
rather than downwards to the lowest conmon denominator of the passive
majority. In other words, although material and ideological forces within
capitalism pull workplace trade unionism towards a limited sectionalist
horizon, whether or not they stay there is fixed, not simply by capitalism
but to a significant extent by the rhythms of struggle and by the
effectiveness of the shop steward leadership to which rank and file workers
are exposed.
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Another key theme explored within the case studies was
the limitations of the stewards' political horizon and the failure of the
Left to provide a coherent alternative to the 'pragmatism' of Labourism.
Clearly, there were substantial material obstacles to the translation of
shopfloor activism into a wider political (let alone a revolutionary
socialist) perspective, including internal fragmentation and sectionalism.
Yet arguably, the influence of 'mainstream' Labourism - even if not
formally embodied in political organisation on the shopfloor - was an
important factor reinforcing the limitations and compromises of workplace
trade unionism within the three plants. Batstone assumed (as do reformist
Labour Party leaders, union officials and shop stewards) that workers can
improve their position and obtain reforms within the framework of the
capitalist system, without challenging the nature of that system. As long
as capitalism seemed relative healthy there was a logic in this, important
concessions could be won through workplace bargaining. Thus during the
l960s, much workplace militancy did not have a directly political
character, there was what Beynon described as stewards' 'factory class
consciousness', a highly developed understanding of the day-to--day
conflicts on the shopfloor but a politics essentially limited to the
confines of the workplace and not generalised to wider concerns (1984,
p108).
During the early 1970s, amidst the impact of economic
crisis, political confrontation and the generally combative mood of the
working class movement, the influence of the Left grew within the steward
coriimittees' in Birds Eye, Bemrose and Ford's (although it remained a
minority influence). Yet, although a handful of stewards joined small
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revolutionary socialist orgarLsations, many others - whilst often to the
left of traditional Labourism - tended to separate economics and politics,
operating merely as militant trade unionists in a quasi-syndicalist
fashion. This did not prevent them from giving a lead to shopfloor
struggles and building up the strength of union organisation during the
1970s. On the contrary, it was often their initiative that pulled other
less militant 'Labourist' stewards into action. Nonetheless, trade union
militancy alone proved to have severe limitations in the recession years of
the early 1980s when the fear of unemployment strengthened management's
arguments about the need for 'efficiency' and made workers wary of entering
struggle which might threaten the survival of the factory. Certainly, the
logic of 'Labourist' reformist politics in this situation was to hold back
from fighting, to seek compromises with management and even to become
committed to the strike-free running of the plant. Undoubtedly, the lack of
confidence to break or at least loosen the vice of employers inside the
British working class overall was a key impediment to a more militant and
generalised political perspective among stewards and the decline in
struggle made the Labour Party and TUC's notion of 'new realism' a much
stronger straightjacket to action.
Yet it is my contention that there was no inevitability
about this process, no iron law of development which pre-determined how
workers would react. Certainly, it would be mistaken to underestimate the
part that conscious intervention by individual militant stewards, capable
of arguing with their fellow workers and pressing a different course of
action to the pragmatism of others, was able to play (for example within
the 3-shift area in Birds Eye). Sections of workers often showed a
Page 363
Chapter Five: Some Conclusions and Lessons
readiness to fight, even if sometimes this took the form of passive
resistance. That they tended to lack was the crucial subjective element
needed to turn a defensive action into an offensive one. In fact, many of
those who subsequently complained of workers' unwillingness to fight were
not free of blame for this. Workers' activity is not like a revolver that
can be kept unused for years in the leaders' pockets and then taken out and
fired at will. To overcome the inertia, in part the product of lack of
confidence and the debilitating effect of 'leave it to us' leadership,
workers had to have confidence in themselves and in the stewards that
organised and led them. The reformist Labour Party and trade union
officials could never have been expected to provide the catalyst for this
vital self-activity of workers. But arguably, the Left shop stewards also
failed to provide the type of alternative political leadership that might,
potentially, have influenced much wider numbers of workers into struggle.
Whilst the case study material provides no strong positive evidence to
substantiate such an assertion it seems reasonable to point to the very
real possibilities that existed for pushing the limits of workers'
resistance much more than actually transpired, although what is undoubtedly
more speculative is whether the existence of sizeable groupings of
revolutionary socialists in each of the three workplaces could have made
any fundamental difference to the actual outcome of events. Despite the
empirical limitations, an exploration of such an interpretation is both
justifiable and necessary, given the analytical and political vantage point
of this thesis.
It will be apparent the case studies devoted
considerable attention to the question of socialist organisation, an aspect
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of workplace trade unionism which coirnientators often treat only in passing
and with a certain disdain. For many observers the various political
groupings which play a role are merely part of the kaleidoscope of events,
but the three workplaces signalled how the weakeness or absence of
socialist organisation can often make a crucial difference to workers'
struggles. Unfortunately, during the 1970s, the vacuum on the Left in
Nerseyside, created by the historical weakness of the Conununist Party in
the region, was not filled by the small far-left groupings, who despite
some influence remained relatively marginalised. During the 1980s, the
downturn in struggle further isolated the Left, although often their ideas
and approach contributed to their own isolation. Thus, in Ford's the Left
was never particularly strong, although it did have a base within both the
Body and Assembly plant stewards' comittees. In Birds Eye, the influence
of the Left was much more evident, albeit isolated within the 3-shift area
during the 1980s. Only in Bemrose was the Left firmly rooted, at least
within the SOGAT chapel, and in an advantageous position to shape the
course of events. But in none of the three plants was there a sufficently
coherent group with the ideological and political resources that might have
enthused workers with the confidence they could fight back.
Of course, even if the Left had been stronger and
provided such leadership there was absolutely no certainty it could have
broken the shackles imposed by objective constraints. There was the problem
of sectionalism. There was the problem of the overall acquiescence to 'new
realism' within the Nerseyside and British labour movement and of
convincing workers that militant resistance could be successful despite
managerial threats to close the factories down. There was the problem of
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attempting to win solidarity action from other plants within the same
company to avoid possible isolation and defeat. There was the problem of
confronting the cautious preoccupations of full-time union officials. In
many respects it is clear, whatever the political complexion of the shop
stewards' leadership, the obstacles to a more militant and successful
challenge to managerial plans were inense. But to acknowledge the
impossibility of building 'socialism in one factory' is not necessarily to
reject the possibilities that existed for mounting effective action that
could have potentially substantially altered developments, albeit only
temporarily.
Moreover, even if the victory of workers could not have
been guaranteed at least the nature of the defeats might have been
radically different. For example at Bemrose, shop stewards like Barry Caton
believed that despite the formidable obstacles it would have been possible
for the chapel committees to have made a much better organised tactical
retreat (that maintained basic trade union principles intact) on some
issues - such as changes in working practices - and dug in their heels on
others - such as manning, on the basis of preparing to recoup lost ground
whenever opportunities arose or circumstances became more favourable. Thus,
whilst he accepted that generating militant resistance to the redundancy
package in 1987 was problematic he recognised how a rearguard action over
the company's use of TNT transport could have rekindled some confidence,
which in turn might have created the momentum for a fightback over jobs. By
contrast, stewards such as Joe Barton in Birds Eye saw the need for
compromise quite differently, effectively making a virtue out of necessity
by stamping out any sparks of workers' militancy, ideologically accepting
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the parameters set by management and actively collaborating to win workers'
consent to company objectives. Arguably, not only was it unnecessary to
have conceded so much ground but the strategy proved ultimately to be self-
defeating.
In some respects Joe Barton and Barry Caton personify the
difference between a reformist and revolutionary socialist perspective
within the workplace. Of course, this distinction is somewhat less sharply
polarised in the case of Bobbie Lamb, Jimmy Wilson and some of the quasi-
syndicalist stewards but it does help focus attention on the different
types of political approach adopted. Clearly, the differences between shop
stewards like Joe Barton and Barry Caton revolve not merely around ultimate
goals - and whether socialism can be achieved through parliament or not -
but also concern day-to-day practical questions of strategy and tactics on
the shopfloor. They are reflected in the distinctive approach each has to
the struggle for reforms - in demands for better wages, improved working
conditions and job security. 'Reformism' of the shopfloor variety is a
difficult phenomenon to pin down because it is defined by its internal
contradictions. It expresses a complete mixture of opposites, contesting
some of the effects of management power - usually through reasoned argument
and 'strong bargaining relations' although on occasion through shopfloor
mobilisation - whilst simultaneously accommodating to capitalist power in
general, by invariably containing protest and opposition within the
established 'rules of the game'. Herein lies the essence of reformist
workplace trade unionism, namely class collaboration, the attempt to
reconcile the antagonistic interests of management and workers, exemplified
by Batstone's model of 'sophisticated' shop steward organisation.
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By contrast, the revolutionary Marxist shop steward
believes the interests of workers and management are incompatible and
always attempts to draw the maximum number of workers into militant self-
activity and raise the class struggle to its highest possible level,
viewing the struggle for reforms as a means by which workers can build the
organisation, consciousness and confidence to ultimately overthrow the
capitalist system. Only by starting from the self-activity of workers does
the fact of shop stewards co-operating to wide-ranging changes in
flexibility and the loss of jobs in order to make a factory 'efficient'
seem the glaring weakness it really is. The revolutionary Marxist shop
steward is concerned above all to build strong workplace organisation and
to encourage the development of a combative rank and file on the basis that
the more confident workers are the more likely they are to reject
managerial ideas and to embrace class-wide, socialist arguments which can
help advance both the ininediate fightback and the struggle to transform
society. In other words, being prepared to acknowledge the need for
compromise and retreat in unfavourable objective circumstances but not by
hiding or minirnising the consequences of this from rank and file workers
nor by abandoning attempts to raise the level of resistance and political
understanding.
The reason why the distinction between a reformist and
revolutionary socialist approach in the workplace is important - even if on
specific issues and in particular circumstances different individuals may
appear to act in similar ways and notwithstanding the fact that some
stewards may sometimes vacillate between the two positions - is because it
sharply poses the question as to whether if there had been more Barry
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Catons in the three case study workplaces - sizeable and organised groups
of revolutionary socialists able to give a co-ordinated lead - it might
have been possible for them to have exercised a decisive, and rather more
successful, influence on the activities and struggles of shopfloor workers
than the Joe Bartons did.
STEWARDS' RELAFICSHIP TO UNION OFFICIALS
Batstone (and Courlay, 1986) emphasised the mutual
interdependence between shop stewards and full-time union officials which
ensures there is no real divorce between a 'democractic' workplace union
organisation and a 'bureaucratic' official trade union machine. Despite
sources of conflict - concerning their contrasting definition of members'
interests and responsibilities for achieving objectives - there is broad
agreement on general goals and 'trade union principles'. hilst Hyman has
(1979) insisted that presenting the relationship in terms of a dichotomy
between 'bureaucracy' (signified by a stratum of full-time union officials)
and 'rank and file' (workplace members and their shop stewards) would be
absurdly oversimplified it is doubtful whether Batstone would have even
accepted Hyman's own more qualified notion of bureaucracy as a set of
social relations that permeate the practice of trade unionism.
Clearly, as we have seen, the accomodative and
bureaucratic tendencies sometimes identified simplistically with full-time
union officials actually operate in different forms and to different
Page 369
Chapter Five: Some Conclusions and Lessons
degrees at all levels in the representational structure of trade union
orgamisation - affecting even shop stewards. Nonetheless, the failure
(common to many commentators including Roberts, 1976; Kelly, 1988) to
acknowledge the existence of a distinct and basically conservative social
formation inside the unions - whose material position and social relations
provide a set of interests qualitatively different from and opposed to
those of the mass of their members - means ignoring some of the most
fundamental features of the relationship between shop stewards and full-
time union officials. A few general observations can be drawn from the case
study material which underline some of the limitations of Batstone's
conceptual framework and analysis.
To begin with, there are the underlying dynamic and
contradictory tendencies towards independence and dependence which can
radically alter the character of stewards' relationship to union officials.
Thus, in all three workplaces during the 1970s although there were aspects
of both independence and dependence the balance was undoubtedly tilted
towards the former. Boraston et al's study (1975) revealed that the larger
the workplace organisation the greater the resources at its disposal and
the more opportunities for stewards' organisation to acquire skill and
experience in handling their own affairs. But the most important factor
encouraging a relatively independent relationship to full-time union
officials in Birds Eye and Ford's was the high level of shopfloor militancy
and the stewards' committee combative approach to management. Such rank and
file confidence and activity boosted the strength of stewards' organisation
and encouraged the degree of self-reliance and initiative that acted as an
important counter-weight to the usually restraining influence of officials.
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Similarly in Bemrose, although there was little overt shopfloor rilitaiii,
the powerful bargaining strength vis-a-vis management imderpiricried the
chapel comittees' relatively independent stance towards both braith ad
national officials. By contrast, in all three plants during the 1A1,
economic recession, threats of factory closure and the stewards' cop-
operative relationship with management sapped shopfloor militancy,
undermined stewards' confidence to act independently of the officials an
resulted in a more formalised and dependent relationship towards them.
Whilst the tradition of acting semi-independently was not entirely lost,
the officials' 'new realist' philosophy played a key role in encouraging
stewards' to adopt conciliatory bargaining relations with managent on the
basis that shopfloor militancy had become outmoded and counter-productive
in the changed economic and political climate. The Ford stewards' bac.ng
for official union scabbing on striking craftsmen in 1990 showed the extent
of the dependence.
Nonetheless, it is significant that the shift to the
right amongst union officials during the 1980s did, on occasion and over
some issues, go so far as to create a gap which could be exploited by
militant initiative from below. An example of this was the way union
officials concluded a 'final' pay settlement with Ford's in 1958 only t be
wrongfooted by rank and file militancy. This created a situation which
allowed a minority of shopfloor activists to seize the initiative
temporarily. It showed the way in which unofficial action and organisatIort
could begin to emerge when the officials failed to respond to growing anger
amongst the members. However, it also showed how such organisation was
shaped by the influence of 'new realism' inside the trade union movement.
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Similarly in Bemrose, although there was little overt shopfloor militancy,
the powerful bargaining strength vis-a-vis management underpinned the
chapel committeest relatively independent stance towards both branch and
national officials. By contrast, in all three plants during the 1980s,
economic recession, threats of factory closure and the stewards' co-
operative relationship with management sapped shopfloor militancy,
undermined stewards' confidence to act independently of the officials and
resulted in a more formalised and dependent relationship towards them.
whilst the tradition of acting send-independently was not entirely lost,
the officials' 'new realist' philosophy played a key role in encouraging
stewards' to adopt conciliatory bargaining relations with management on the
basis that shopfloor militancy had become outmoded and counter-productive
in the changed economic and political climate. The Ford stewards' backing
for official union scabbing on striking craftsmen in 1990 showed the extent
of the dependence.
Nonetheless, it is significant that the shift to the
right amongst union officials during the 1980s did, on occasion and over
some issues, go so far as to create a gap which could be exploited by
militant initiative from below. An example of this was the way union
officials concluded a 'final' pay settlement with Ford's in 1988 only to be
wrongfooted by rank and file militancy. This created a situation which
allowed a minority of shopfloor activists to seize the initiative
temporarily. It showed the way in which unofficial action and organisation
could begin to emerge when the officials failed to respond to growing anger
amongst the members. However, it also showed how such organisation was
shaped by the influence of 'new realism' inside the trade union movement.
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This allowed the officials to regain the initiative, switching from
opposition to strike action to supporting action, but on their terms and
under their control, enabling the officials to defuse the initial surges of
militancy and to isolate and demoralise the activists. Nonetheless, it
revealed how in the future, it may be possible for workers' struggle to
escape the control of officials in ways which a strong and politically
orientated stewards' organisation could potentially exploit.
Batstone also failed to acknowledge how the differences
of opinion often expressed between stewards and officials are symptomatic
of a basic conflict of interests that arises - not because of a tension
between the 'pursuit of justice' or 'sectional interest' which causes
stress for officials in "managing the job" as Watson (1988) suggests - but
because stewards tend to assign primacy to substantive interests - wages,
conditions and job security - whilst the officials tend to be much more
concerned with procedural issues such as the preservation of stable
bargaining relations with management and the organisational interests of
the union machine. Thus at Beinrose during the 1970s, this conflict of
interests was apparent in the contrast between the SOGAT chapel's ability
to use its workplace bargaining strength to win extremely good wages and
conditions and the minimal role played by union officials, which had the
effect of undermining the officials' raison d'etre, authority and self-
esteem in the eyes of chapel members (and other union members across the
country). Matters were eventually brought to a head in the 1980s over the
contrasting attitudes towards shopfloor manning levels and the need for
flexible working practices, which resulted in the explusion of Jimmy Wilson
from SOGAT and his removal as FoC. At Birds Eye, the union officials'
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instruction to stewards to accept the capitulation terms for a return to
work to end management's lock-out in 1977 was another example of a
fundamental divergence of interest. At stake for the officials, was the
fear of a loss of union membership through plant closure combined with a
desire to end a protracted dispute that was embarrassing to the union's
credibility. But for the stewards involved, it was a question of attempting
to maintain their organisation intact and in as good a shape as possible,
even if they were to suffer a major defeat. Again, when the plant was
threatened with closure in the late 1980s, although the stewards went along
with the officials' muted strategy of resistance it was ultimately them and
not the full-time officials who paid the price in terms of losing their
jobs.
There were some distinctions between officials at
national and local level and between left and right-wing officials. Thus,
at Birds Eye the stewards' attitude towards local officials was much less
antagonistic than to national officials. Partly, this was because the
former, although involved in national union-company bargaining that usually
secured poor pay deals, it was merely in an advisory capacity, unlike
national officials who tended to play a key role in negotiations. Partly,
it was because they were much less physically removed from the stewards'
workplace organisation and were usually more suspectible to pressure from
the rank and file. Often they were ex-shop stewards who retained close
links with the local labour movement. By contrast, national officials were
usually more remote and likely to be more concerned with the interests of
the union machine. Hence, the Divisional Organiser Dickie Palmer's
ambivalent attitude to his union's instruction to return to work to end
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management's lock-out. Partly it was because the local official during the
late 1970s, Eddie Roberts, was a left-winger who was very supportive of the
stewards. But even a sympathetic left-wing local official was no guarantee
of the defence of workers' interests, as the stewards' reliance on John
Farrell's flawed strategy of opposition to plant closure demonstrated.
Finally, Batstone completely ignored the problem of how
shop stewards often need to combat the frequently damaging role of full-
time union officials and win workers away from complete reliance on them.
In all three workplaces during the 1980s the weight of the official union
machinery was consistently placed on the steward organisations to encourage
them to collaborate with management efficency measures. It exposed in sharp
relief how building the strength, confidence and independence of workplace
union organisation does not mean absolving official union leaders of all
responsibility for the conduct of affairs. Unfortunately, although the Left
stewards often subjected the officials to sharp criticism they tended not
to place concrete demands on them which could have focussed attention on
how to take the struggle forward. For example, if the militant stewards at
Birds Eye had demanded that John Farrell call for immediate strike action
to resist the threat of plant closure it is possible that under pressure he
might have responded. The placing of demands on Farrell would have fitted
the situation where there was a gap between the widespread anger at the
company's plan to shut the plant and the lack of confidence of workers to
take the initiative in fighting back. A campaigning lead from the officials
could have made a vital difference to the outcome of events, restoring a
bit of confidence on the shopfloor and providing the potential basis upon
which stewards could have won the arguments for strike action. Even if
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Farrell had not responded to such calls for action the making of the demand
would have exposed his unwillingness to fight and would have justifiably
placed the main responsibility for the defeat not on the rank and file but
on ineffectual official union leadership.
Significantly, Spencer's study (1989) of workplace trade
unionism in three Liverpool workplaces emphasised the importance of shop
stewards' links with the official structures of trade unions to ensure
support for any possible action the workplace organisation might wish to
undertake. Although he acknowledged that official union pressure can
restrict spontaneous strike action - by insisting only 'official' activity
should occur - and that the union hierarchy may seek to 'incorporate'
stewards into its official structures, he maintained that, as long as
stewards can influence union policy and as long as unions are prepared to
decentralise some of their decision making, shop stewards are best served
by making demands on official union structures whilst simultaneously
building horizontal links with other steward organisations. Whilst his
analysis has the merit of focussing attention on how pressure can be
exerted not only downwards from union officials to stewards' organisation
but also upwards, his assunption that steward organisations can continue to
provide effective resistance to management by mutually supportive trade
union action does not deal with the basically antagonistic structural and
ideological linkages between stewards and full-time officials.
Unfortunately, he falls into the same error committed by Batstone, namely
liquidating the whole concept of bureaucratisation so as to render the term
virtually meaningless. Yet not only does this obscure the real conflicts of
interest inside the unions it also effectively lets union officials
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completely off the hook. Whilst Beynon (1984) is justified in attempting to
locate the 'sell out' of union officials within the wider context of the
dilemmas of workplace trade unionism under capitalism this should not, as
could be implied, mean fatalistically accepting the behaviour of officials
and ignoring strategies which, to an important extent, could begin to
transcend their limitations.
OF R1EARH
Before proceeding to draw some general lessons from the
case study material it is necessary to make a reassessment of my analytical
framework and background hypothesis, specifying the limits of
generalisation and evaluating the significance of my findings. Firstly,
although other commentators pioneered usage of the dualities of conflict
and accommodation, democracy and bureaucracy, independence and dependence,
within the study of workplace trade unionism (Lane, 1974; Hyman, 1975) I
have attempted to deepen and extend this theoretical framework by
explicitly employing these conceptual terms within the three-fold
categorisation of stewards' relationship to management, rank and file
members and union officials to structure the interpretation of my emprical
evidence and shape the mode of its written presentation. Arguably, this
analytical framework proved a useful tool of research, an explanatory
mechanism for conceptualising and understanding the dynamic nature of shop
steward organisation, activity and consciousness within the three plants.
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It could be argued the case studies underlined the need
to refine the conceptual understanding of the three dichotomies into a more
nuanced view of the relationship between the different elements. Certainly,
attempting to conceptualise the world involves an inevitable tendency to
oversimplify and distort reality by reducing multiple particularities to a
common identity. For example, do shop stewards have an independent or
dependent relationship to union officials? In many respects they have both,
although instead of discrete positions with clear boundaries there is a
continuum of possible and overlapping responses - ranging from complete
independence at one end, co-operation in the middle and complete dependence
at the other end - depending upon both internal and external pressures to
the workplace. Even the basic terms - independence and dependence - have no
precise and unambigious definitions. On the other hand, how far are the
costs in terms of oversimplification outweighed by the gains in analytical
purchase? (Hyman, 1989b. p146). Although living reality is always richer in
development, in complications, than any theoretical concept a clear
understanding of the general tendencies at work, based on a clear
theoretical analysis, is essential. Even if the case studies exposed the
nuances and complexities involved in the conceptual formulations this did
not undermine or invalidate the objective of understanding the basic
dynamic, the essential contradiction between independence and dependence
that lies at the heart of stewards' relationship with union officials. In
this sense, it proved useful to adopt the two vernacular terms as a guide
to the underlying processes involved. Only from such an essential, albeit
simplified, vantage point, did it become possible to evaluate not simply
whether stewards adopted an independent or dependent role but what the
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balance was between the two and what pressures gave rise to the variations
and intensity in stewards' response. Arguably, it was for this reason the
dichotomies adopted within the case studies proved an indispensable tool of
analysis.
What then of my background hypothesis? I argued that the
balance struck between the contradictory tendencies was profoundly affected
by the changing balance of class forces. Because the balance of class
forces depends upon the general character of the struggle within capitalist
society it could not be assessed adequately merely by looking at the
balance of bargaining power in a workplace isolated from the wider social,
economic and political context in which it is located. Therefore, it was
necessary to integrate specific case studies of the nature of shop steward
organisation within three workplaces in Liverpool within a general
consideration of the changing balance of class forces in Britain. Whilst
Batstone was justified in arguing that purely structural analyses fail to
take account of the internal dynamics of workplace union organisation he
failed to adequately locate these within the external context of historical
and social structures. Yet without a broader framework it becomes
impossible to assess the durability and limits of 'strong bargaining
relations' in any particular workplace. Certainly, it is apparent the
circumstances favourable to the institutionalisation of collective
bargaining are largely dependent upon the broader context of the political
economy in which they are embedded. Nonetheless, the key focus of my
enquiry was the specific dynamics of steward organisation, activity and
consciousness within three particular workplaces. Whilst I attempted to
weave in and take account of the wider external factors - such as the
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impact of the major defeats of workers' struggles during the 1980s -
necessarily, my main preoccupation was with factors internal to the
workplace. Thus, although the 'balance of class forces' provided the
broader matrix for analysis my chief focus of interest was the 'balance of
bargaining power'. Similarly, my primary focus was on three specific
workplaces. The limits of generalisation from the research are discussed
below.
Arguably, my research material illustrated how the
'balance of bargaining power' is both an analytical concept (at a level of
theoretical abstraction) and a descriptive term (a generalisation of
practical reality). The concept provided a theoretical prism through which
it became possible to simplify reality into its essential characteristic
component. Nonetheless, its use could only be of value when actually
applied to concrete material conditions, with all its contradictions and
complexities. Only by examining specific workplaces did it become possible
to understand which particular factors affect the pendulum of advantage
between workers and employers at any particular time and what the balance
actually is. An understanding of bargaining power in any particular
workplace requires attention to a cluster of internal and external
influences and their interaction, including the state of the product and
labour markets, state of the economy and level of class struggle generally,
the nature of managerial strategy and shop steward leadership and the role
of union officials. Similarly, the uneven distribution of bargaining
leverage between different sections of workers within the same workplace
can be accounted for by a variety of influences, including the nature of
work and workers' strategic relationship to production, the degree of
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sectionalism between workers and the character of steward leadership.
Such causal influences do not vary independently of each
other but tend to operate in a manner which makes it difficult to unravel
their separate effects. Of course, the proportional weight of the impact of
some variables can vary within a particular workplace. For example, in
Ford's and Birds Eye during the 1970s, it appears to have been primarily
management's confrontational approach that tended to precipitate militant
workplace struggle, which in turn helped shape the relatively strong shop
steward organisations that emerged. By contrast, in Bemrose, it was much
more workers' strategic relationship to production, the institutionalised
pattern of craft job control and the state of the product and labour
markets that provided them with powerful bargaining leverage. However, a
comparison of the three workplaces showed that, whilst it was necessary to
specify the conditions promoting a particular type of stewards
organisation, there were significant similarities in the combined
interaction of such variables. Certainly, in each of the three case studies
the crisis of the product market in the early 1980s stood out as a major
element in the equation, affecting the shift from relatively confident shop
steward organisations of the 1970s to the much more defensive steward
organisations of the 1980s. The recent studies by Terry (1989) and
Marchington (1990) have confirmed the manner in which product market
pressures serve to align union concerns with management priorities by
putting certain pressures on both management and workers, albeit of an
uneven nature. This variable provides management with the opportunity to
convince workers of the need to make major concessions in working practices
as the price of plant survival, although the argument has to be made in
Page 380
Chapter Five: Some Conclusions and Lessons
particular circumstances - which however favourable to some outcomes rather
than others - is by no means an inevitable process. Thus, my research,
whilst exploring both 'structure 'and 'action' attempted to focus on a
- critical, if usually overlooked, variable affecting the balance of
bargaining power, namely the nature of shop steward political leadership
and its relationship to the level of workers' confidence and self-activity.
Whilst Terry (1989) also drew attention to stewards' lack of ideological
and political resources in tackling managements' co-operative strategies
amidst product market crises he did not make it clear whether this is an
inevitable process in such circumstances or, if it is not, what type of
political perspective might be appropriate and how it might connect with
the dynamics of workplace union organisation.
In a limited microscopic sense, my hypothesis was
confirmed by the empirical material on Ford and Birds Eye (and with some
qualification on Bemrose). At least in broad terms, it was possible to
distinguish between two broad phases of struggle, one of upturn in workers'
struggles in the 1970s and one of downturn during the 1980s (although any
confirmation of the decline in struggle and erosion of workplace union
organisation that characterised the British working class movement
generally from the mid-1970s onwards was not discernible). The sapping of
workers' confidence to mount an effective fightback against management
during the 1980s led to an atrophy of the strong shop steward organisation
built up during the 1970s, a weakening of the close relationship between
stewards and rank and file members that encouraged a bureaucratisation of
workplace trade unionism, and an undermining of stewards willingness to act
irrespective of the influence of full-time officials. Yet my empirical
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material also confirmed that significant countervailing tendencies
continued to operate, which suggested the balance struck between the
contradictory tendencies of the shop stewards' position could potentially
be reversed (at least in the case of Ford).
Of course, in some respects it was not possible to
confirm or deny my hypothesis on the basis of such a narrow focus of three
specific workplaces. On the one hand, even if all three case studies had
disputed my hypothesis they could have been exceptions to the general rule.
On the other hand, even if all three of the case studies had appeared to
confirm my hypothesis it would be too narrow a base from which to make
sweeping generalisations about its applicability. In reality, there were
elements of both confirmation and rejection, as was likely to be the case
in any similar limited case study material. But arguably, the most
important point was not the hypothesis as such, but the way it helped focus
critical attention on some of the underlying features of shop steward
organisation, activity and consciousness.
Which brings me to the question of the limits of
generalisation from the case studies. Clearly, there are important
specificities about the results which it would be mistaken to ignore,
namely, the way the general balance of class forces in society can
potentially affect different groups of workers in varying ways according to
the nature of the industry where they are employed, their occupation,
geographical location and trade union traditions. Thus, the Nerseyside shop
steward organisations were far better organised and more militant than
those of other plants within the same company (or industry) elsewhere in
the country, taking the initiative in setting up a stewards' combine
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corinittee (Ford's), establishing better pay and conditions of work
(Beinrose) and often rejecting management pay offers only to be outvoted by
their counterparts elsewhere (Birds Eye). In assessing such differences it
is necessary to take account of the significance of the economic,
political, social and cultural context of Merseyside. It could be argued
there are a related set of contributory factors which go some way to
explaining the region's distinctive collectivist traditions. My case
studies suggest workplace militancy during the 1970s was encouraged by,
amongst other things, the relatively deprived economic and social
conditions, hard-line combative management and the role of influential
militant shop stewards. By contrast, during the 1980s, the downturn in
workers' struggle and stewards' more co-operative relationship with
management was probably influenced more than anything else by the impact of
the economic recession, in a city where manufacturing industry was hit
disproportionately hard and where the rate of unemployment remained
consistently much higher than the the national average.
Thus, the specificity of the case study material
contained in my account - given the important corporate, sectoral and
regional variations within any general picture - has to be taken into
account. Nonetheless, this does not preclude a level of analytical
generalisation being made about the general contours of shop steward
organisation, activity and consciousness. In this respect the case studies
illustrated the variety of dilenrias faced by shop stewards throughout the
British labour movement over the last twenty years. The common themes are
of much wider relevance, even If specific conditions need to be constantly
borne In mind and the closure of two of the plants in no way makes obsolete
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many of the problems examined, over and above any defence of historical
analysis in its own right. In fact, the case studies offer lessons not only
for an assessment of the past but also for an understanding of contemporary
developments and future trends.
Finally, it is necessary to consider some of the problems
involved in my research method, the contribution the research has made to
an understanding of workplace trade unionism and what further research
might be appropriate. Naturally, there were difficulties involved in
constructing an account of what were essentially historical events and
processes from contemporary oral accounts through a method of interviews,
notably attempting to balance a systematic narrative account with a more
selective approach of relating key episodes as being 'representative'
incidents or particular benchmarks of the general processes involved; and
the problem of a selective reconstuction by informants who often held
firmly fixed views about the events and the personalities involved.
Moreover, there was the problem of the contrast between what informants
thought at the time of particular events and what, with the benefit of
hindsight they thought at the time I interviewed them. Gaining a critical
view of such accounts was absolutely necessary. It meant on the one hand,
relying on such key individuals for the invaluable contribution they could
make to an understanding of developments, but on the other hand, retaining
a questioning stance that was prepared to examine the same issue from the
contrasting vantage points of the various individuals involved and placing
them in a historical as well as contemporary context. Retaining a critical
and independent edge was assisted by the theoretical and political basis
from which I approached the research, although the problem of gaining
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access to management representatives in Bemrose and Ford's inevitably
somewhat narrowed the potential research resource base.
I believe my research provides an important contribution
to an understanding of the dynamics of shop steward organisation and the
interplay between organisation, activity and consciousness. Given the study
of workplace industrial relations during the 1980s suffered a dearth of
case studies the rich source of empirical material provided on three
workplaces in this account should be a helpful. addition to our knowledge of
some of the underlying limitations and potentialities of workplace trade
unionism which will be of relevance not only to students of industrial
relations but also to workplace union activists enagaged in the battle
against employers during the 1990s. Nonetheless, a great deal of further
empirical case study research, focussed on the specific and varied
experiences of workplace industrial relations in different industries and
localities, is necessary for a more comprehensive picture of the changes
and continuities taking place within shop steward organisation. Clearly,
studies of particular workplaces where revolutionary Marxists have, or have
had, much greater influence than in the case studies above, even if only in
an episodic fashion during the course of a strike, would make a valuable
contribution to our understanding of the significance of different forms of
political influence within the workplace. More detailed consideration of
the problematical features of workers' shopfloor organisation - such as
'welt' working, sectionalism and the sexual division of labour - and of the
complex relationship between shop stewards and full-time union officials
would also be very useful.
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REBUIIDIM S.IIcN	 ARDS' ORGANISNFION
Some general lessons can be drawn from the case study
material. Although the basic structure of shop steward organisation at
Ford's in the early 1990s remained intact the picture was overlaid by the
experience of cumulative defeats which sapped rank and file confidence. The
relatively much stronger steward organisation of the 1970s was forged
through struggle, small victories which consolidated workplace union
organisation, in which the rank and file played an active role. Today,
disputes come after years of defeat and demoralisation. Hence, the
contradiction between the occasional renewed sparks of workers' militancy
and the dominance of the ideas of 'new realism'. This means the job of re-
building the strength of shop steward organisation, of raising the level of
self-confidence and workplace union democracy, is likely to be a long, hard
haul, not only in Ford' s but inside manufacturing industry and within the
British labour movement more generally.
Clearly, the best defence of workers' interests is
strong workplace union organisation which, despite the need for compromise,
is both willing and able to engage in militant struggle against management.
To secure the involvement of their members stewards have to be fully
accountable - through full reports of negotiations with management, regular
section meetings and mass factory meetings, working alongside the members
and avoiding as far as possible 100 per cent time off work. Nonetheless,
the real strength of steward organisation will come through workplace
struggle. The task must be to restore morale and re-build an organised core
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of opposition by putting management regularly to the test within each
section, recognising that in the course of struggle it is possible for an
active minority to overcome the unevenness in organisation and ideas
necessary to lead the passive majority into battle. Every issue has to be
approached with the aim of raising the level of rank and file self-activity
and increasing the extent to which the fight of a section is generalised to
the factory as a whole - whilst constantly looking beyond the factory gate
to the struggles of other workers elsewhere. It means recognising that
neither relying on union officials (even left-wing officials) nor
condemning them out of hand is a substitute for independent stewards'
organisation able to use the union leaders when they issue a call for
action and to tackle them when they refuse to fight; a strategy of working
with the officials at the same time as being prepared, if necessary, to
work against them.
The question of political organisation and consciousness
is also of paramount importance. So long as the shop stewards' political
horizon is limited within the dominant tradition of 'Labourism' their
ability to make fundamental advances in workers' interests will be severely
hampered. Certainly, Batstone's 'strong bargaining relations' model of shop
steward organisation is an essentially 'moderate' reformist perspective
which merely serves to reinforce the limitations and compromises of
workplace trade unionism within capitalist society. Yet arguably other
alternative characterisations of workplace trade unionism also fail to
provide a firmly grounded basis for the revitalisation of strong shop
steward organisation in the 1990s. For example, Fairbrother's quasi-
syndicalist perspective of workplace union democracy and membership
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activism (1984; 1987a; 198Th) - represented in all three workplaces by a
layer of the most active stewards who tended to separate economics and
politics - tends to avoid the issue of how to counter the influence of
reformist leaders. Equally, Militant's strategy in Bernrose highlighted the
opposite danger, of looking to short-cut solutions - such as concentrating
on capturing control of the lower echelons of the union machine and on
attempting to make the Labour Party a vehicle for working class advance -
to the neglect of independent shopfloor activity and political
organisation. Meanwhile, Beynon's celebration of shopfloor militancy (1984)
provides no indication of how the shop stewards' 'factory class
consciousness' might be broadened into a more 'class conscious'
perspective. By contrast, my case study material could be interpreted as
signalling, even if provides little explicit positive evidence of, the need
for a revolutionary Marxist party which is able to link broad socialist
arguments with a practical day-to-day shopfloor strategy that can
successfully challenge the influence of reformist full-time union officials
and Labour Party leaders and provide an alternative political pole of
attraction to workers.
Many coninentators who accept the need of broadening
workers' political horizon reject the alleged 'workerism' of the British
Left and the assumption that workplace 'economistic' militancy is the only
valid expression of collective working class experience and action. Thus,
Hyman (1989a) has argued that trade unions can never be more than one
element in a multiplicity of forms of resistance to capitalism, a
resistance which mnst encompass wider social movements and not simply the
sphere of wage labour. Undoubtedly, the revolutionary socialist ideal, as
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Lenin put it: "Should not be the trade union secretary, but the tribune of
the people, who is able to react to every manifestation of tyranny and
oppression, no matter where it appears, no matter what stratum or class of
the people it effects; who is able to generalise all these manifestations
and produce a single picture of...capitalist exploitation" [1970, p183].
Nonetheless, the main framework through which workers organise against
their exploitation within capitalist society is the trade unions and within
them shopfloor organisation. Indeed, as Rosa Luxemburg [1970] argued, the
industrial struggle is the key cutting edge of socialist politics: "Where
the chains of capitalism are forged there they must be broken". From this
perspective Hyman's stress on the ideological struggle to convince workers
to adopt broad social aspirations and objectives can only be achieved
through fighting for influence and leadership in workers' struggles. The
one is impossible without the other.
This raises the long debated question of whether
socialist consciousness arises from the intervention of socialist parties
from outside the workers' movement or the spontaneous generation of
revolutionary consciousness inside it through trade union activity (Lenin,
1970; Kelly, 1988). In fact, the case studies suggested how the two
elements are involved. Firstly, economic workplace struggles can generalise
from the class struggle to produce a sort of consciousness 'from within' -
what Beynon called 'factory consciousness' (1984, p108) - which in certain
circumstances of heightned class struggle can lead to the politicisation of
at least a minority of workers. But even if shopfloor militancy can lead to
a political radicalisation of some workers it does not follow that
socialist conimitment occurs automatically. In fact, many of the most
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radical stewards in the case study three workplaces adopted quasi-
syndicalist approaches and did not spontaneously free themselves from the
influence of Labourism. It is for this reason the alternative ideas of
revolutionary socialism have to be introduced by a political organisation
independent of the majority of workers. In this sense, revolutionary
socialist ideas could be said to come 'from without'. In other words,
although apparently contradictory - consciousness from within by
spontaneous generation or without by the intervention of independent
revolutionary socialist organisation - a dynamic combination of both is
vital.
Unfortunately, the experience of Ford's shows that the
legacy of the past decade will not be washed away overnight and that the
reformist 'strong bargaining relations' approach shared by the majority of
shop stewards will act as a brake on the development of future workers'
struggles. The difficulty which, even amidst a painstakingly slow revival
of confidence, the old traditions of sectionalism and reliance on union
officials will cause socialist militants who try to capitalise on workers'
resistance will be a recurring element. But it is possible that during the
1990s the mood of bitterness against the previous years of tighening labour
discipline vented through small struggles could provide revolutionary
socialists with a few inches more elbow room to gain the sort of influence
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